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Preface 
 
 
Several ILO colleagues recently began work on Decent Work indicators. Almost invariably, they 
ran into problems capturing comprehensively what is at the very centre of the ILO and Decent 
Work, the standards that the Organization has set over the years in the labour field, or they left 
aside standards altogether.  This irked me sufficiently, late last year, to try my hand at putting 
forward some ideas.  Little did I know what I let myself in for.  A number of my colleagues in the 
International Labour Standards Department were aghast at hearing of the simplifications that 
indicators would introduce without paying attention to the substance and details of everything 
specialists look at. By contrast, I was encouraged by some of my immediate colleagues and by 
members of the Advisory Group on Statistics, as well as by David Kucera of the International 
Institute for Labour Studies who critically discussed an earlier version of this paper when I 
presented it on the occasion of an Institute seminar.  To all of them I am most grateful for their 
views.  
 
I should also like to thank Christiane Veltsos for setting up an Excel programme to process the 
data, and Imène Debèche, Nana Nti, Judith Ollig and Lisa Pecherot for keying in thousands of 
data or helping me on questions of countries’ capacities and non-functioning States.  Thanks are 
also due to Nathalie Dalibard and Coralie Thompson for typing several revisions of this paper.  
All remaining errors are mine.1 
 
 
 
May 2003       W.R. Böhning 
Director, InFocus Programme on 
Promoting the Declaration 
 
 
1 Comments by e-mail should be addressed to bohningr@ilo.org until the end of 2003 and thereafter to 
wrbohning@bluewin.ch. 
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Chapter 1. Framework of considerations 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
In his report to the 2001 International Labour Conference the Director-General of the ILO drew 
attention to Decent Work deficits – the “gap between the world we work in and the hopes that 
people have for a better life”.2  One of these gaps is what he called the rights gap.  The aim of this 
paper is to conceptualize and measure numerically the gap between the real and the ideal world 
of basic workers’ rights with the help of the ratification, reporting, supervisory and complaints 
data at the disposal of the ILO.   
 
Measurement is about numbers, which may put off some readers.  However, this paper will be 
easy to follow even for people who are uncomfortable with numbers.  Its style of presentation is 
aimed not at colleagues in the international community familiar with the workings of the ILO and 
with indicators but at laypersons, academics and officials in various countries interested in the 
subject matter of human or labour rights.  No more mathematical knowledge is required than 
adding, subtracting, dividing or multiplying.  Figures will render visible the reasoning so as to 
make it understandable to readers not used to examining this kind of material.  Demonstration 
tables will set out step-by-step how the indicators are calculated.  A manual-like style has been 
chosen because at the initial stage of the development of ideas on this subject a fully explicit and 
understandable text is needed. 
 
How are gaps in basic workers’ rights conceptualized?  Such gaps exist (i) when there is less than 
full adherence by governments to fundamental ILO Conventions, principles and rights or related 
obligations; and (ii) when ILO supervisory or complaints mechanisms reveal legislative or 
practical implementation problems in respect of basic workers’ rights.  Lack of adherence gives 
rise to an adherence gap.  Revealed implementation problems give rise to an implementation gap.  
The adherence and implementation gaps add up to the basic workers rights’ gap.  Such a gap will 
show up in the system elaborated here as a number larger than 0.  At 0 there is no gap.  The 
maximum gap is 100. 
 
What are the purposes of spelling out rights gaps on an annual basis?  The first is to track over 
time the evolution of a country’s gaps in order to determine whether they are getting bigger or 
smaller.  Thanks to the distinction between international adherence and revealed implementation 
problems, one can see at a glance which factor is responsible for the basic workers’ rights gap: 
whether it is a lack of adherence or of the ability to redress implementation problems or a 
combination of the two.  Depending on the answer, quite different responses may be called for.  
The measurements put forward here can then be used to monitor progress.   
 
Advocacy is the second aim.  Pointing out gaps can induce individual governments, employers’ 
and workers’ organizations as well as other non-State actors to do something about them.  A 
country with a large adherence gap may want to re-examine its political hesitations to ratify ILO 
Conventions.  A country with a large implementation gap can commit itself to reducing it; it can 
set itself time-bound targets; and it can appeal to other countries or international organizations, 
the ILO in the first instance, for assistance in moving forward.  Again, the indicators elaborated 
here can then be used to monitor progress.   
 
2 ILO: Reducing the decent work deficit: A global challenge (Geneva, 2001), p. 8. 
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This paper has not been conceived for the purpose of constructing a single index or to rank 
countries.  But ranking is possible on the basis of the data generated if one compares the size of 
countries’ rights gaps.  Ranking is actually desirable if one wants to know which countries face 
the largest gaps and what broad reasons may be responsible for their situation.  But it is not the 
reason for developing this particular set of indicators. 
 
Of course, there are many ways to close a gap between the real and the ideal world held up by the 
ILO.  And there are many components of Decent Work.  Rights are one of them.  What I present 
hereunder could, suitably calibrated, form part of a set of Decent Work indicators or even of an 
eventual comprehensive Decent Work index on this subject.  
 
Readers should take this paper as a contribution to the progressive realization of basic rights 
throughout the world.   Further work is planned. 
 
1.2 Which basic workers’ rights?  
 
Eight Conventions have been designated by the Organization as the most important, core or 
fundamental ones.  These are, in historical order, the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29), 
the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87), 
the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98), the Equal 
Remuneration Convention, 1951 (No. 100), the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 
(No. 105), the Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111), the 
Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (No. 138), and the Abolition of the Worst Forms of Child 
Labour Convention, 1998 (No. 182).  Member States are urged to pay special attention to these 
eight Conventions.3  Once ratified, countries are obliged to submit reports at regular intervals on 
how they implement the provisions of the Convention. 
 
The Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-Up (Declaration 
for short) was adopted by the Organization in 1998.  It espouses four categories: (a) freedom of 
association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining; (b) the elimination 
of all forms of forced or compulsory labour; (c) the effective abolition of child labour, and (d) the 
elimination of discrimination in employment and occupation.  Countries that have not ratified one 
or several of the eight core Conventions are expected to respect, promote and realize the 
principles and rights that underpin these Conventions.  The Declaration has instituted an annual 
reporting procedure to induce countries to reflect on their progress and to progress in the 
direction of ratification. 
 
Thus, this paper focuses on the eight fundamental or core Conventions (the terms will be used 
interchangeably) and the four fundamental principles and rights enshrined in the Declaration.  
These are the subjects that matter most to the ILO.  They should therefore take pride of place in 
any attempt to find out what workers’ rights gaps exist, how big and durable they are.   
 
In my measurement of the basic workers’ rights gap, the subject of freedom of association and 
collective bargaining is accorded more weight than the other three subjects due to the fact that the 
 
3 They have ratified them more than four times as often as other ILO Conventions.  If one divides the present total 
number of ratifications of all fundamental Conventions (1,182) by eight, one obtains an average of 147 ratifications 
per Convention, compared with an average of 34 ratifications for each of the other 175 Conventions. 
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Committee on Freedom of Association is brought into the indicator system.  This Committee can 
receive and deal with complaints even where a member State has not ratified Convention No. 87 
and/or Convention No. 98.  No comparable body or procedure exists regarding forced labour, 
child labour or non-discrimination.  This is a reflection of how the Organization views the 
relative importance of this subject compared with others: freedom of association is a 
constitutional principle of the ILO that countries are deemed to be bound by when they become 
members of the Organization.   
 
1.3 Important criteria 
 
The following criteria have to be respected if one wants to construct defensible and credible 
indicators in a politically sensitive field such as human and labour rights: 
 
- each dimension must be transparent and reproducible.  Readers must not be left guessing 
as to what is involved.  Other persons must be able to replicate the constructs and calculations 
and reach the same results; 
 
- all dimensions and data must be based on neutral sources.  The basic workers’ rights 
system selects only ILO procedures and relies exclusively on unbiased ILO data.  There is no 
need to draw upon indicators or data established by national governmental bodies, non-
governmental organizations, universities or other international organizations.  Readers may 
wonder about limitations of ILO data; but the limitations are minor; they will be discussed; and 
they do not call into question the validity and neutrality of the specific information that is being 
drawn upon; 
 
- dimensions or data should not derive from subjective judgments.  They must reflect 
objective facts rather than personal interpretations.  The objective facts that are brought into the 
system are ratification and reporting on Conventions along with selected pronouncements by the 
Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations and by the 
Committee on Freedom of Association; 
 
- actual data must be available on a systematic and recurrent basis.  Data should be 
available at short intervals if one wishes to see how gaps in basic workers’ rights evolve in the 
course of time.  Annual data will be used here.  Ad hoc studies and occasional surveys cannot be 
carried out sufficiently often;4   
 
- universal capture should  be ensured, and there must be no a priori discrimination among 
countries.  The construction of the system and the data feed into it must not be biased inherently 
against some countries rather than others.  This criterion will be verified in the course of the 
where it may be in doubt. 
 
1.4 Indicators and weights 
 
As the workers’ rights gap elaborated here is based on indicators, one needs to be clear what 
indicators are, what kind of indicators are relevant, what their internal logic is, how points are 
assigned to them, how they are weighted, etc.  Some brief explanations therefore follow. 
 
 
4  They would be useful, however, to verify the results calculated at the country level in this paper.   
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Indicators select pieces of reality, those that are most important.  They suggest what is happening 
but do not necessarily reflect reality fully or exhaustively.  Indicators simplify and aggregate 
dispersed information that is complex and which they display in an intuitively understandable 
form.  Indicators – and the rights gap deriving from them – help to gain, at a glance, a picture of 
where things stand and how they change over time. 
 
Different kinds of indicators are relevant to human rights.5  Input indicators portray something 
that contributes to an end but does not, by itself, achieve it.  An analogy from the economic 
sphere would be investment.  In the human rights field, ratification of a Convention is equivalent 
to an input.  Process indicators are concerned with procedures or mechanisms set up to advance 
matters towards a desired goal.  An analogy from the economic sphere would be bipartite or 
tripartite negotiations of wages.  In the human rights field, the supervision of a ratified 
Convention or the handling of complaints each constitute a process that can be given numerical 
expression and become a process indicator.  Outcome indicators are the ultimate objective of 
indicator construction because they reveal actual achievements or impacts.6  An analogy from the 
economic sphere would be unemployment, which results from the interaction of investment and 
wage levels (and, of course, of other factors).  The gaps in basic workers’ rights measured in this 
paper are an approximation of outcomes “on the ground”, i.e. in countries.  They indicate deficits 
that are occasioned by lack of adherence to international values and obligations, on the one hand, 
 
5 On indicator developments and their application to the field of human rights, it is worthwhile to go back to the first 
of UNDP’s human development reports.  See UNDP: Human Development Report 1990 (New York and Oxford, 
OUP for UNDP, 1990).  Two recent surveys provide useful background information.  See M. Green: “What we talk 
about when we talk about indicators”, in Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 4 (November 2001), and L. Compa: 
“Assessing assessments: A survey of efforts to measure countries’ compliance with freedom of association 
standards”, a paper for the National Academies’ project on international labour standards (September 2002), at 
www.national-academies.org/internationallabour.  A private company, Verité, undertook an ambitious but flawed 
exercise, see its Report to California Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS), Emerging Markets Research 
project, at http://www.calpers.ca.gov/invest/emergingmkt/verite.pdf.  Regarding relevant indicator work carried out 
in the ILO, see D. Kucera: “Core Labour Standards and foreign direct investment”, in International Labour Review 
(Vol.141, no.1-2 (2002/1-2), pp.31-69, and the literature quoted there; R. Anker et al.: Measuring decent work with 
statistical indicators, INTEGRATION Working Paper No.2 (ILO, Geneva, 2002); and research started by the Latin 
America and Caribbean Area Regional Department, published in Panorama Laboral 2002 (OIT, Lima, 2002), pp.64-
65, where a ratification index is calculated as well as a record of complaints to the Committee on Freedom of 
Association.  ILO colleagues of the Infocus Programme on Socio-Economic Security have been engaged in the 
construction of component indexes of socio-economic security and of a comprehensive Decent Work index.  
Preliminary results were presented at the Informal Consultation on Reconceptualizing work, Geneva, December 
2002.  See G. Standing and F. Bonnet:  A voice representation security index; S. Dasgupta and W. Onobogu:  
Measuring employment security in industrialized countries; F. Bonnet:  Un indice de la sécurité du travail; A. Khan, 
F. Bonnet and S. Barbattini: Labour market security index; E. Rosskam and J. Figueiredo:  A work security index; S. 
Natrajan:  Measuring income security in OECD countries 1990, 1999;   F. Bonnet and J. Figueiredo:  A skill security 
index;  and P. Annycke:  Old age income security:  The role of social security benefits.  All of these macro-level 
indices use various ILO Conventions as input indicators.  Micro-level surveys that also yield Decent Work indeces 
are reported on in the Special Issue on Socio-Economic Security of the International Labour Review, Vol. 141, No.4 
(2002), where the article by G. Standing: “From People’s Security Surveys to a Decent Work Index”, pp. 441-454, is 
the most pertinent.  Another approach to indicators was used in relation to safety and health at work through a 
questionnaire addressed to all ILO member States to which almost 60 per cent replied, see: ILO standards-related 
activities in the area of occupational safety and health, Report VI, International Labour Conference, 91st Session 
(Geneva, ILO, 2003).   
6 Whether an indicator covers an input, process or outcome depends on the observer’s viewpoint that, in turn, reflects 
the purpose of the investigation.  For example, investment can be looked at as an ouput of a process within 
enterprises or as an outcome of economic conditions.  Wages constitute an input of many economic models or 
outcomes of power relationships on the ground.  By the same token, adherence as conceived in this paper could be 
viewed as a discreet input or as an ongoing process. 
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and by the interaction of countries with the ILO’s supervisory and complaints mechanisms, on 
the other hand.  That measurement is a credible reflection of realities on the ground.  While it 
may not fully reflect reality in every case, no better proxy is available at present as far as basic 
workers’ rights are concerned. 
 
Where indicators record whether something exists, happens or does not, they are binary in nature.  
Ratification is an example of a binary indicator.  This paper will use the binary form (YES/NO) 
extensively.  Almost invariably, binary indicators side-step interpretation questions and 
subjective judgements. 
 
Weights have to be established where two or more factors compose an indicator, to reflect each 
dimension’s importance in relation to the whole.  One option is to give each the same weight.  
This might appear to be the least controversial way of weighting.  However, it is not a very 
sensible way – as will be seen – because some things are bound to be more important than others.  
Judgments will, therefore, have to be made.  Even the “same weight” option is a (hidden) 
judgment.  I take care to spell out and explain the different weights chosen.  If observers disagree 
with the weights proposed here, they can re-calculate the rights gaps with different weights; the 
paper gives them the information necessary for replication.7  
 
The question of weighting one indicator relative to a second or more indicators does not arise in 
the gap system, because the implementation indicator is a derivative of the adherence indicator; 
its values are a proportion of the values assigned to Conventions.  And the basic workers’ rights 
indicator is the sum of the adherence and implementation indicators. 
 
The rights gap elaborated here is a composite indicator that provides one yardstick for a number 
of Conventions, principles and rights.  The reason for covering all core Conventions, principles 
and rights simultaneously is that it gives a more complete and valid picture of a country’s 
performance on key subjects than does singling out one of them. 
 
Researchers may be interested in just one category of Conventions, principles and rights.  They 
could apply the method proposed here to any single Convention, principle and right – within the 
ILO and in respect of other treaty bodies’ Conventions such as those of the United Nations.  Or 
they could use quite different methods, sources and data specific to each Convention, principle 
and right, and in that way explore the evolution of workers rights.8  But one faces considerable 
harmonization and merging problems if one wants to render comparable quite different methods 
and data after having carried out the calculations.   The approach chosen here is to assess all core 
Conventions, principles and rights because the Organisation has made them stand out from the 
rest. Such an assessment is easier if, from the outset, one builds blocks that are made up of 
identical material, thereby avoiding subsequent problems of comparability and aggregation.  
 
 
7 All raw data used here can be found in ILO publications, most of them can be accessed through the ILO’s public 
website (http://www.ilo.org).  
8 Annual statistics are available on wage differentials by sex.  These would fit well as an indicator for the Equal 
Remuneration Convention, 1951 (No. 100).  Other data are available for many countries on occupations and sectors 
of employment by sex.  These would catch the gender dimension of the Discrimination (Employment and 
Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111).  The OECD reviewed 74 countries’ performance in respect of freedom of 
association and collective bargaining, grouping them into four categories on the basis of panel data. See OECD: 
Trade, employment and labour standards: A study of core workers’ rights and international trade (Paris, OECD, 
1996) and International trade and core labour standards (Paris, OECD, 2000). 
  
Gaps in basic workers’ rights 
 
6
 
1.5 Countries’ capacity to give effect to Conventions, principles and rights 
 
Human as well as ILO’s labour rights apply irrespective of a country’s economic development 
and of its political system. Just as, for example, the fundamental human right of protection from 
arbitrary detention is applicable as much in a developing country as in an OECD country, so 
freedom of association is not dependent on how industrialized a country is; forced or child labour 
is not tolerable even where it occurs in very poor countries; and the right to equality does not 
presuppose a certain per capita income.  Quite another question is how ILO’s counterpart 
ministries can give effect to core Conventions, the extent to which they can train labour 
inspectors to ensure their effective respect in enterprises, how the labour law or broader legal 
system can enforce them, etc.  Answers to these kinds of questions are bound to reflect, at least 
partially, a country’s level of development in general terms and its financial and human 
capabilities in particular.  A developing country such as Benin or a transition economy such as 
Moldova will be challenged to a larger extent than an advanced industrial country such as France 
when it has to cope with ratification, reporting and implementation issues.   
 
To take capacity into account one could use, for example, World Bank GNP per capita figures or 
UNDP’s Human Development Index as indicators and apply them in one form or another to the 
system elaborated here.  However, two problems arise.  One is that these are not ILO data.  
Another is that the intuitively most defensible way of taking countries’ lack of capacity into 
account, given the features of the system constructed here, would be to advantage countries that 
lack capacity by deflating their gaps.  Initial tests revealed this to be an unsatisfactory approach. 
 
This paper limits itself to categorizing countries according to whether they have “adequate”, 
“little” or “least” capacity.  Countries will simply be shaded to indicate visually into which 
category they fall.  Countries that are not shaded hereunder can be assumed to have “adequate” 
capacity to deal with the sort of problems that ratification and realization entail, countries shaded 
lightly have “little” capacity and countries shaded more strongly have “least” capacity. 
 
There is a set of ILO data that can be used as a proxy of countries’ capacity.  This is the portion 
of the regular ILO budget that countries are supposed to shoulder (called assessed contributions 
for short).9  That portion is calculated on the basis of two factors: relative wealth and population 
size.  The two together reflect countries’ financial capability or tax base and, in this way, their 
general administrative capacity, including that of ministries of labour.  All member States are 
assessed as to what they should pay.  The minimum contribution is 0.01 per cent of the ILO 
budget, which applies to, for example, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and the Solomon Islands.  
At the other end of the scale, the United States, Japan and Germany together contribute about half 
of the regular ILO budget.  Scheme 1 sets out the distinctions I adopted for the purposes of this 
paper.  The capacity category of each of the 166 countries retained in the basic workers’ rights 
system can be seen in the later table 12.   
 
Countries were shaded for each of the 18 years or for the years during which they formed part of 
the system.  It may be noted in passing that no country moved up the scale from the strongly 
shaded to the lightly shaded category.  Very few countries moved up the scale from lightly 
shaded to colourless, among them Peru and Thailand.  Quite a few dropped down from lightly 
shaded to strongly shaded capacity, among them half of the successor States of the Soviet Union,
 
9 The data can be found in Governing Body documents dealing with financial questions. 
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Scheme 1. Approximating member States’ capacities by categorizing their assessed 
contribution to the regular ILO budget, beginning of 21st century  
 Least capacity Little capacity Adequate capacity 
 Less than 0.02%  
of ILO budget 
0.02% – less than 0.1%  
of ILO budget 
0.1% or more  
of ILO budget 
Number of countries  101 26 48 
As per cent of 175 ILO member States 58% 15% 27% 
Shading    
 
 
as well as the Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Jamaica, Lebanon and Panama.  Where such changes 
happened, this paper selected the shade attributed during the last three years, 2000-2002, or 
during at least two of these years.   
 
1.6 Which countries are covered and from when? 
 
The calculation of the rights gap starts in 1985 because by that time contemporary economic 
globalization had influenced most countries’ policy-making and had made itself felt in product 
and labour markets as well as relative to labour institutions.10  Since the mid-1980s workers 
began to be faced with strong calls for more flexibility.  At the same time, authoritarian regimes 
gave way to democracies in a number of developing countries.  Paradoxically, there was both a 
more enabling environment for values such as those upheld by the ILO and more pressure exerted 
on workers in general and unions in particular to respect the “laws of the market”.  With the 
breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia at the beginning of the 1990s, contemporary 
globalization extended its reach and perfected its modes of operation.  The period covered by the 
indicators developed here is the period of contemporary globalization.11 
 
While indicators have to cover all countries with the same yardstick, certain exceptions have to 
be made for a few countries to avoid bringing them into the system more than once, which 
would “penalize” them.  To start with, the non-metropolitan territories of certain countries – for 
which a special ILO regime exists – are left out of consideration.  If one were to include non-
metropolitan territories, one would potentially score some countries twice or more often for the 
same basic fact; or the score might be “YES” in one territory but “NO” in another territory, 
giving rise to attribution problems. 
 
Also not covered here are: 
-  China’s two special administrative regions, Hong Kong and Macau.  Values are calculated only    
for China; 
- Malaysia’s three constituent states, i.e. Peninsular Malaysia, Sabah and Sarawak. Only 
Malaysia is included; 
-  Tanzania’s two states, i.e. Tanganyika and Zanzibar.  Only Tanzania is included. 
 
Where a government lacks the authority to administer its territories, depends on foreign powers 
and is not capable of implementing obligations deriving from international commitments, the 
country is referred as a non-functioning State.  Non-functioning States will not be scored at all or 
 
10 See A. J. Ghose: Jobs and incomes in a globalizing world (Geneva, ILO, 2003). 
11 It so happens that information on ILO’s supervisory and complaints cases is available electronically from 1985 
onwards (referred to as ILOLEX) both on CD-ROMs and on the ILO’s public website (see 
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/iloquery.htm). Prior to 1985 one has to consult printed documents.   
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only during recent years when they were properly functioning States.  For example, when a 
country is held to be a non-functioning State some time after the beginning of the period under 
review (say, during the years 1990 to 1995), the country is not scored during the preceding years 
(1985-89) because the gap system is interested in trends and averages over long or medium time 
periods, and it would not be very sensible to produce trends or averages based on end points with 
an interruption in the middle.  Only the last uninterrupted period is included here, and then only 
with effect from the second year after the literature suggested that the country ceased to be a non-
functioning State (in this example the country would not be scored in 1996 but would be scored 
as from 1997). 
 
Twelve countries’ situations correspond to the notion of non-functioning States.  They are scored 
as follows (with the years in brackets during which they are generally considered to be non-
functioning States):  
- Afghanistan not during any year (1985-2002); 
- Albania not during any year (1997-2001, i.e. the country could be scored as from 2003); 
- Angola not during any year (1985-2002); 
- Bosnia-Herzegovina as from 1997 (1993-95); 
- Cambodia as from 1995 (1985-93); 
- Democratic Republic of Congo not during any year (1985-2002); 
- Haiti as from 1997 (1986-95); 
- Lebanon as from 1994 (1988-92); 
- Liberia not during any year (1989-2002); 
- Sierra-Leone as from 2002 (1991-2000); 
- Somalia not during any year (1991-2002); and 
- Tajikistan as from 2002 (1993-2000).   
 
Six non-functioning States, therefore, remain outside the system entirely.  For the other six, table 
12 indicates the years that were not scored.  All twelve, as can be seen from the shading, fall into 
the category of countries with least capacity. 
 
For all other member States the calculation of the workers’ rights gap starts in 1985 except for 
those entering or rejoining the Organization later.  New members are scored in this indicator 
system as from the year following their membership (two years later in the special case of 
Yemen).   
 
A few countries that existed at the beginning of the review period but which disappeared later on 
are left aside entirely.  These include the German Democratic Republic (which joined the 
Federal Republic of Germany in 1990), the Czech and Slovak Republic (which split in 1993 
when each became a member of the ILO), the Yemen Arab Republic and the People’s 
Democratic Republic of Yemen (which united and joined the ILO as the Republic of Yemen in 
1990), the USSR (which dissolved in 1991; its successor States joined the ILO in 1992 and 
1993) and the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (which broke up in the early 1990s, was 
readmitted to the ILO in late 2001 and changed its name to Serbia and Montenegro in February 
2003). Annex I details membership changes in the Organization for the whole period for which 
indicators are calculated. 
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Scheme 2. The structure of the basic workers’ rights system 
Indicator Component Dimension GAP points 
ADHERENCE Core Conventions  
 
Non-ratification 0 – 12.6 on each of seven or   
0 – 11 on each of eight Conventions 
  Non-reporting on ratified 
Conventions 
0 – 1.7 on each of seven or   
0 – 1.5 on each of eight Conventions 
    
 Declaration 
 
Reporting on unratified 
Conventions  
(from 2000) 
0 – 1.4 bonus points on each of up to four 
principles/rights 
  Progressing on unratified 
Conventions (from 2004) 
0 – 4.1 bonus points on each of up to four 
principles/rights 
    
ADHERENCE GAP    
= Core Conventions GAP    
- Declaration GAP    
Maximum 88 
points 
     
IMPLEMENTATION Committee of Experts 
 
Direct Requests on 
ratified Conventions 
0 – 1.3 on each of seven or   
0 – 1.1 on each of eight Conventions 
  Observations on ratified 
Conventions* 
0 – 3.1 on each of seven or   
0 – 2.8 on each of eight Conventions 
    
 Committee on Freedom 
of Association 
To Be Kept Informed  
reports 
0 – 1.3 per case up to 
1999 0 – 1.1 from 2000 
  Interim Reports 0 – 2.5 per case up to 
1999  0 – 2 .2 from 
2000 
0 – 12 points 
(each dimension 
individually,  
and both 
together,  
capped at 12) 
    
IMPLEMENTATION GAP    
= Committee of Experts GAP    0 – 31 
+ Committee on Freedom 
   of Association GAP 
  0 – 12 
Maximum 43 
     
  Basic workers’ rights GAP** 
= ADHERENCE GAP 
+ IMPLEMENTATION GAP 
   
Maximum 100 
points 
* If the Committee of Experts acknowledges that progress has occurred, the system accords bonus points, which reduce 
IMPLEMENTATION GAPs to half or zero points. 
** Also referred to as overall GAP. 
 
 
1.7 The basic features of the indicator system 
 
Two major indicators – called ADHERENCE and IMPLEMENTATION, which are capitalized 
when these terms refer to the system elaborated here – form the basic pillars of the basic workers’ 
rights gap.  They feed the overall gap with numbers.   
 
A gap as conceptualised and measured in this paper will henceforth be referred to in capitalized 
bolded letters – GAP.  Scheme 2 provides an overview of the system’s structure. 
 
The ADHERENCE indicator measures the ratification of ILO Conventions and the fulfilment of 
obligations incurred as a result of ratification or under the Declaration.  The maximum GAP that 
can be attributed to lack of ADHERENCE is 88 points, which would obtain where a member 
  
Gaps in basic workers’ rights 
 
10
State had not ratified any of the core Conventions (for details see chapter 2).  Given that at 
present every member State has ratified at least one core Convention, a GAP of 88 points could 
come about only if a new member State entered the Organization without ratifying a core 
Convention soon or if a current member State denounced all ratified core Conventions.  
 
The IMPLEMENTATION indicator captures information brought to light through ILO’s 
supervisory and complaints procedures.  If these procedures do not reveal any implementation 
problems, IMPLEMENTATION will not give rise to GAP points.  But if there are such 
problems, IMPLEMENTATION will fuel the GAP up to a maximum of 43 points.  The size of 
the IMPLEMENTATION GAP is a function of the weights given to the supervisory component 
(Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations – henceforth 
Committee of Experts)12 plus the complaints component (Committee on Freedom of Association 
- henceforth CFA).  In any year, the Committee of Experts component can give rise to up to 31 
points.  The CFA component has an upper limit of 12 points.  Adding both together gives a 
maximum of 43 points as far as the IMPLEMENTATION indicator is concerned (for details see 
chapter 3). 
 
Due to the interaction of the indicators and the weights chosen, the maximum overall GAP is 100 
points.  The maximum would be reached if no core Convention was ratified (entailing an 
ADHERENCE GAP of 88 points), if no bonus points were earned under the Declaration, and if 
IMPLEMENTATION’s CFA component (which can enter into operation irrespective of the 
ratification of Conventions) came to as many as 12 points, which is its upper limit and roughly 
equivalent to the value of a Convention.  This reasoning will become clear when each factor is 
explained in detail in the following chapters. 
 
Also due to the interaction of the indicators and the weights chosen, ratification of a single 
Convention would prevent the maximum GAP of 100 points being reached even where the 
Committee of Experts component and the CFA component gave rise to their respective maxima.  
This is due to the fact that the pronouncements of these two Committees are held to call into 
question no more than a – relatively small – portion of the value of a ratified Convention, as will 
be explained in detail later.  The IMPLEMENTATION indicator is thus inextricably linked to the 
ADHERENCE indicator.  It depends on it.  Implementation problems that come to light through 
the ILO’s machinery do not call into question ratification as a whole but only a part of the value 
of ratification.  Hence, IMPLEMENTATION cannot ever be as large as ADHERENCE in the 
system envisaged here.  
 
The choice of a rights scale that stretches from 0 to 100 points is due to the desire to make it easy 
to grasp numbers intuitively.  Dividing GAP points by 100 would yield the kind of scales readers 
may be familiar with from UNDP’s Human Development Reports.  However, the scale of the 
rights GAP is not “normalized” in the way UNDP’s scales and others are, where the standard 
formula is applied, i.e. (actual value – minimum value)/(maximum value – minimum value).  One 
could conceivably reconfigure the system proposed in this paper and apply the normalization 
formula from the start, or one could normalize its results ex post facto. But first things first: this 
paper proposes a method of dealing with certain kinds of indicators that can be taken further. 
 
 
12 Its English initials, CEACR, are here used in source notations only. 
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Chapter 2. The adherence indicator 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
ADHERENCE could be constructed in different ways.  The method chosen here is to build 
initially a Core Conventions component and then to graft a Declaration component on to it. Each 
component has two dimensions. Thus, ADHERENCE has four dimensions in all. 
 
The core Conventions component seeks to reflect the very basic fact that countries – voluntarily – 
ratify ILO Conventions and fulfill the constitutional obligation to report to the ILO on how they 
apply them in law and in practice.  Taken together, ratification and reporting, are scaled along a 
range from 0 to 100 points.  Zero points would obtain where a member State had ratified all of 
the ILO’s fundamental Conventions and where it fulfilled its reporting obligations on them 
correctly.  In that case there would be no shortfall of ADHERENCE and no GAP.  Non-
ratification gives rise to a GAP.  Not reporting when required to do so likewise gives rise to a 
GAP. 
 
During the years 1985-1999, only seven core Conventions existed because Convention No. 182 
did not enter into force until 2000.  Therefore, the core Conventions component’s dimensions 
have to be calibrated on seven core Conventions before the year 2000 and on eight thereafter. 
 
2.2 Core Conventions component: Ratification dimension 
 
Ratification, the core Conventions component’s first dimension, is the most decisive initial step a 
country can take.  Almost everything else depends on it, nationally and internationally.  It is 
therefore accorded a very large weight.  The ratification component’s total weight is fixed at 88 
out of the 100 points of the core Conventions component. 
 
If 88 is the maximum value for all ratifications, the ratification of any single Convention has a 
value of 88/7 = 12.6 for the years up to and including 1999 when there were only seven core 
Conventions and of 88/8 = 11 as from the year 2000 onward. 
 
Ratification credits a country on the ADHERENCE indicator with a certain value beginning with 
the year in which the ratification was registered.  These values will be repeated year after year.  
They would disappear only if a denunciation of the ratification were to occur, in which case the 
values would turn into an equivalent ADHERENCE GAP as from the year after the 
denunciation.13  Table 1 exemplifies the calculation of ratification scores for Jordan during a 
period when Convention values changed from 12.6 points to 11 points. 
 
No particular limitations exist regarding the YES/NO nature of scoring or the source of data.  A 
country either ratifies or it does not.  Ratification, if in conformity with certain formal or 
substantive requirements, is registered publicly (see source note to table 1).  There are no inherent 
limitations in the data itself. 
 
13 An alternative would be for the indicator system to apply the ILO rule that countries remain internationally bound 
to apply the denounced Convention for ten years and to report on it as well.  This rule would be difficult for outsiders 
to follow in its implications and is therefore dropped in favour of a transparent immediate cut-off date without any 
further implications.  One denunciation of a core Convention occurred during the review period when Malaysia 
denounced Convention No. 105 in 1990. 
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Table 1. ADHERENCE GAP, Core Conventions component, ratification dimension, 
   example Jordan, selected years 1992-2002 
Convention No. 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
29 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
87 - - - - - - - - - - -
98 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
100 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
105 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
111 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
138 - - - - - - 1 1 1 1 1
182 - - - - - - - - 1 1 1
Number of ratifications 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 6 7 7 7
Maximum 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 8 8 8
Score = maximum – number 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1
GAP = score x 12.6 or score x 11 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 12.6 12.6 11.0 11.0 11.0
- Not ratified. 
Weight of ratification in ADHERENCE = 88.  Value of 1 Convention: 1992-1999 = 12.6, as from 2000 = 11. 
Source: Ratifications and denunciations of Conventions are regularly listed in an ILO Governing Body document called Report of 
the Director-General, section “Progress in international labour legislation”.  For the latest issue, see GB.285/18, which – like all 
Governing body documents – is also available on the ILO’s public website: 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/gb/gbdoc.htm.  A shortcut to the data is the country list on the following public ILO 
website: http://www.ilo.org/public/db/standards/normes/appl/appl-ratif8conv.cfm?Lang=EN.   
 
 
2.3 Core Conventions component: Reporting dimension 
 
The core Conventions component’s second dimension captures member States’ reports on 
ratified Conventions.  Article 22 of the ILO’s constitution obliges each member to submit a 
report on the measures it has taken to give effect to the provisions of Conventions to which it is a 
party.  These reports, on which national workers’ and employers’ organizations have a right to 
comment, are submitted to the ILO Committee of Experts to permit it to assess whether the 
countries’ legal and factual situation corresponds to the terms of the ratified Conventions.  More 
will be explained later about the Committee of Experts’ role and functions.  Suffice it to say here 
that certain reports are due at certain intervals; they are requested to arrive in time to enable the 
Committee of Experts to examine them; and the Committee regularly records whether reports that 
were due were received.14 
 
Reporting matters because it potentially brings out into the open, indeed into the public domain, 
instances where countries’ laws and practices are not in line with the Conventions.  But it is much 
less important – the weight foreseen is 12 points – than ratification.15 
 
 
14 Information on reports that are due and (not) received is recorded in CEACR, 1985, Appendix I, p. 365ff; CEACR, 
1986, Appendix I, p. 321ff; CEACR, 1987, Appendix I, p. 440ff; CEACR, 1988, Appendix I, p. 375ff; CEACR, 
1989, Appendix I, p. 471ff; CEACR, 1990, Appendix I, p. 446ff; CEACR, 1991, Appendix I, p. 467ff; CEACR 
1992, Appendix I, p. 519ff; CEACR 1993, Appendix I, p. 474ff; CEACR 1994, Appendix I, p. 500ff; CEACR 1995, 
Appendix I, p. 400ff; CEACR 1996, Appendix I, p. 394ff; CEACR 1997, Appendix I, p. 407ff; CEACR 1998, 
Appendix I, p. 458ff; CEACR 1999, Appendix I, p. 577ff; CEACR 2000, Appendix I, p. 451ff; CEACR 2001, 
Appendix I, p. 617ff; CEACR 2002, Appendix I, p. 687ff; CEACR 2003, Appendix I, p. 731ff. 
15 The weight chosen reflects the desire to accord a similar importance to reporting on ratified Conventions and on 
unratified Conventions under Declaration auspices (see footnote 17). 
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In relation to a single Convention, failing to report when required to do so becomes a GAP that is 
equivalent to 12/7 = 1.7 points for 1985-1999 and 12/8 = 1.5 points as from the year 2000. 
 
The maximum number of reports that are due varies because countries are not required to report 
every year on each core Convention.  In principle, they have to report only every second year.  In 
practice, countries are requested to report if they have not done so when previously required or if 
the supervisory body has reason to ask for a detailed report. 
 
There are no inherent limitations in the data itself.  In 1995 there were two sources of data, the 
first with a cut-off point of 3 March 1995 and the second at 8 December 1995.  This paper takes 
account of both and chooses the most favourable outcome for countries.  If a report for a 
particular Convention was due for the March session of the Committee, was not received in 
March but was received by the time of the rescheduled meeting of the Committee in December, it 
is scored positively for 1995.  Likewise, if a report was due in March, received then and was 
again due in December but not received at that time, the score is nevertheless a positive one.  If 
different Conventions were due in March and December, each Convention will be scored 
individually. 
 
Reporting – unlike ratification – is counted only in relation to the year for which reports are due.  
Table 2 illustrates the calculations of reporting points for Thailand. 
 
No particular limitations exist regarding the YES/NO nature of scoring or the source of data.  A 
country either reports on time or it does not.  The comprehensiveness or quality of reports is 
something that a system of this kind cannot assess.  
 
Ratification and reporting on ratified Conventions are additive parts of one component.  Thus, the 
total core Conventions GAP is the sum of the ratification GAP and of the reporting GAP.  Table 
3 illustrates cumulative scores of the GAP by reference to three Asian countries.   
 
China’s large GAP is due essentially to non-ratification.  The country has so far ratified 
Convention No. 100 in 1990, Convention No. 138 in 1999 and Convention No. 182 in 2002.  
India ratified Convention Nos. 29 in 1954, 100 in 1958, 111 in 1960 and only one core 
Convention, No. 105, during the period under review here, in 2000.  India also incurred a few 
GAP points through non-reporting in 1991-94 and 2000.  Sri Lanka had ratified two of the 
relevant Conventions at the beginning of the period and seven by its end, which lowered its initial 
GAP from 63 to 11 points.  It, too, experienced some problems with reporting during the years 
1994-97. 
 
2.4 The Declaration’s relationship to Conventions  
 
The 1998 Declaration was principally aimed at countries not having ratified ILO core 
Conventions. It obliges them to ensure that workers are free to organize and bargain collectively, 
that they not be forced to work, that child labour is abolished and that women, minorities, etc., 
not be discriminated at work.  While it is not a substitute for ratification, the Declaration obliges 
non-ratifying countries to respect, promote and realize ILO’s fundamental principles and rights as 
long as they do not ratify the relevant core Convention(s).   
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Table 2. ADHERENCE GAP, Core Conventions component, reporting on ratified 
Conventions dimension, example Thailand, selected years 1992-2002 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Thailand 
Due Recd Due Recd Due Recd Due Recd Due Recd Due Recd Due Recd Due Recd Due Recd Due Recd Due Recd 
29 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 - - 1 1 - - 1 1 - - 1 1 
100 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 0 1 1 
105 1 0 1 1 - - 1 1 - - 1 1 - - 1 1 - - 1 1 - - 
Due                    Received 2 1 2 1 1 0 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 
Score = due – received 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
GAP = score x 1.7 or 1.5  1.7 1.7 1.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.5 0 
- Not ratified.  Convention Nos. 87, 98, 11 and 138 not ratified.  Convention No. 182 ratified in 2001 but the reporting cycle had 
not started for Thailand. 
Weight of reporting on ratified Conventions in ADHERENCE = 12. 
Report due = 1.  If received = 1.  If not received = 0.  Value of 1 report: 1985-1999 = 1.7, as from 2000 = 1.5. 
Source: The Committee of Experts records receipt of detailed reports in the document it submits each year to the International 
Labour Conference (see footnote 14). 
 
 
Table 3. Core Conventions GAP, examples from Asia: China, India and Sri Lanka, 
1985-2002 
  1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
 Ratification GAP 88.2 88.2 88.2 88.2 88.2 75.6 75.6 75.6 75.6 75.6 75.6 75.6 75.6 75.6 63.0 66.0 66.0 55.0
 Convention reporting GAP 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
China: core C. GAP 88.2 88.2 88.2 88.2 88.2 75.6 75.6 75.6 77.3 75.6 75.6 75.6 75.6 75.6 63.0 66.0 66.0 55.0 
 Ratification GAP 50.4 50.4 50.4 50.4 50.4 50.4 50.4 50.4 50.4 50.4 50.4 50.4 50.4 50.4 50.4 44.0 44.0 44.0
 Convention reporting GAP 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.7 3.4 3.4 3.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 0.0 0.0
India: core C. GAP 50.4 50.4 50.4 50.4 50.4 50.4 52.1 53.8 53.8 53.8 50.4 50.4 50.4 50.4 50.4 45.5 44.0 44.0 
Ratification GAP 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.0 50.4 50.4 37.8 37.8 37.8 25.2 25.2 22.0 11.0 11.0
Convention reporting GAP 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.7 3.4 1.7 3.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Sri Lanka: core C. GAP 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.0 50.4 52.1 41.2 39.5 41.2 25.2 25.2 22.0 11.0 11.0 
 
 
Logically, the Declaration component of ADHERENCE has to be related to unratified 
Conventions and the relevant GAP points.  Numerically, since the Declaration follow-up became 
operational in 2000, the Declaration component has to be related to the post-1999 value of a 
Convention, i.e. 11 points. 
 
Observing the Declaration is not equivalent internationally to ratifying a binding Convention.  
Therefore, the Declaration component can only be equal to a portion of the GAP that is due to 
lack of ratifications.  Put differently, observance of the Declaration can make good only a part of 
the shortfall of ratification(s). 
 
How much of a GAP can the Declaration component make good in the system proposed here?  
Some observers might put the Declaration’s weight low, others high.  This paper suggests that, as 
a whole, the Declaration component can make good up to half of a ratification GAP.  Expressed 
in numbers, the Declaration component can make good up to 5.5 of 11 GAP points per unratified 
Convention.  Declaration points may be viewed as bonus points.  The difference between the full 
GAP (11 points) and what is made good by observing fully the Declaration, remains a GAP (5.5 
points) and would require ratification to disappear.  The relationships are visualized in figure 1. 
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Figure 1.  Declaration’s general relationship to the ADHERENCE indicator, 
since 2000 
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Figure 2.  Declaration’s reporting impact on GAPs, since 2000 
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However, making up 50 per cent of the ratification GAP presupposes that a country performs 
perfectly under the Declaration component itself.  Two dimensions are involved: (i) reporting, 
and (ii) progressing in terms of the respect, promotion and realization of the relevant principles 
and rights. 
 
If a country does not perform well under one or both of the Declaration component’s dimensions, 
it cannot be credited with bonus points.  In that event, the GAP that is due to non-ratification will 
be reduced to a smaller extent, possibly not at all. 
 
2.5 Declaration Component: Reporting dimension 
 
Since 2000, a country has constitutional reporting obligations under the Declaration where is has 
not ratified one or both of the Conventions that are expressions of the fundamental principles and 
rights at work enshrined in this 1998 ILO instrument.16 
 
The Declaration reporting dimension is given a weight of 12.5 per cent of a Convention GAP.  
This is equivalent to one quarter of the maximum that the Declaration component can make 
good.17  Figure 2 adapts figure 1 in order to specify the reporting dimension. 
 
If 12.5 per cent of a Convention GAP of 11 points can be made good by correct reporting, that 
GAP would decrease by 11 x 0.125 = 1.4 points to 11 – 1.4 = 9.6 points. 
 
The Review of Annual Reports under the Follow-up to the Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work is the procedure through which reporting obligations under the 
Declaration are given effect. It is the source of the data used here (see note to table 4). 
 
Table 4 exemplifies the calculations involved for Uganda.  Through dutiful reporting under both 
the 2000 and the 2001 Annual Review, the country made good 6.9 points and 5.5 points, 
respectively, of its ratification GAP.  One year later, the country fulfilled only two thirds of its 
reporting obligations and thus made good only 3.7 points of its ratification GAP.   
 
When a country has ratified all core Conventions it is no longer required to report under the 
Declaration.  It then becomes subject to the reporting that is measured under the core Convention 
component. 
 
2.6 Declaration Component as from 2004: The progress dimension  
 
From 2004 onwards the Declaration’s reporting procedure will lead to positive identifications of 
countries that make significant efforts to realize the Declaration’s principles and rights.  When a 
 
16 The principles concerning the fundamental rights that are the subject of Convention Nos. 87 and 98 are freedom of 
association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining.  The principles concerning the 
fundamental rights that are the subject of Convention Nos. 25 and 105 are the elimination of all forms of forced or 
compulsory labour.  The principle concerning the fundamental rights that is the subject of Convention Nos. 138 and 
182 is the effective abolition of child labour.  The principles concerning the fundamental rights that are the subject of 
Convention Nos. 100 and 111 are the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation. 
17 The weights that have been chosen for the two reporting dimensions of this indicator system are appropriately 
similar.  Whereas reporting on ratified Conventions is worth 1.7 points prior to 1999 and 1.5 points afterwards, 
reporting on unratified Conventions under Declaration auspices is worth 1.4 points as from the year 2000.   
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Table 4. ADHERENCE, Declaration component, reporting on fundamental  
principles/rights and thereby making good a portion of the GAP, 
example Uganda, 2000-02 
 Review of 2000 Review of 2001 Review of 2002 
 Due Received Due Received Due Received 
Freedom of association and collective bargaining 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Forced labour  - - - - - - 
Child labour 1 1 1 1 1 0 
Non-discrimination  1 1 1 1 1 1 
Due                                                        Received  3 3 3 3 3 2 
Score = received/due  1 1 0.666 
Reduction = score x negative weight  -12.5% -12.5% -8.3% 
Ratification GAP (points) 55.0 44.0 44.0 
Change in GAP = Ratification GAP x reduction -6.9 points -5.5 points -3.7 points 
- Not applicable because the country had ratified Convention Nos. 29 and 105. 
Weight = Declaration reporting reduces GAP by up to 12.5 %. 
Report due = 1.  If received = 1.  If not received = 0.  Maximum 1, 2, 3 or 4. 
If all reports due are received, value = 1= full 12.5% reduction.  If none of the reports due is received, value = 0 = no reduction. 
Source: For 2000, see Expert-Advisers 2000: FACB paragraph 79, p. 19; FL paragraph 90, pp. 20-21; CL paragraph 97, pp. 21-
22 and DIS paragraph 109, p. 23.  For 2001, see Expert-Advisers 2001: FACB tables 6 and 7, p. 18; FL tables 8 and 9, pp. 20; 
CL tables 10 and 11, pp. 23 (the heading of table 11 should read “Countries that owed reports in this category and did not submit 
them for the annual review of 2001”) and DIS see tables 12 and 13, p. 26 (the heading of table 13 should read “Countries that 
owed reports in this category and did not submit them for the annual review of 2001”).  For 2002, see Expert-Advisers 2002: 
Annex tables 1-4, p. 51, covering FACB, FL, CL and DIS.  For 2003, see Expert-Advisers 2003: boxes 1 and 2, pp. 3-4, covering 
FACB, FL, CL and DIS. 
 
 
country in its annual report on one or several fundamental principles and rights at work informs 
the ILO of legislative changes, policies or other measures significant enough to mention this fact 
in the Programme and Budget implementation reports submitted each year to the Governing 
Body, the country warrants to be recognized for its efforts.  As for the Declaration reporting 
dimension so for this Declaration progress dimension: progress will reduce the size of the 
country’s ratification GAP. 
 
Within the Declaration component, the weight of significant progress has to be fairly important.  
It must reflect the fact that countries voluntarily take steps to realize the Declaration’s aims.  
Therefore, the weight of progress is put at three times the size of the reporting weight, i.e. at 37.5 
per cent, which is equivalent to three quarters of the maximum that the Declaration component 
can make good.   
 
If 37.5 per cent of a Convention GAP of 11 points can be made good by progressing towards the 
ILO’s ideal world, that GAP would decrease by 11 x 0.375 = 4.1 points to 11 - 4.1 = 6.9 points. 
  
How is one to determine whether progress obtains?  Two assessments are involved.18  The first 
narrows down the relevant types of positive changes, i.e. those that matter in relation to progress.  
These are set out in scheme 3 hereunder. 
 
 
18 The Director-General’s Programme and Budget Proposals for 2004-05 (document GB.286/PFA/9, paragraph 143) 
contain a condensed version of what follows. 
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Scheme 3.   Types of positive changes under the Declaration, as from 2004 
Changes Legislation and related measures Policies and practical measures 
Fundamental principles/rights 1. Legislative changes or judicial decisions 
    bringing member States closer to  
    realization of principles and rights 
2. Distinct programmes spreading information  
    on new legislation/court cases 
3. Training to implement new legislation/legal  
    practices 
4. New policies, practical measures, etc., to  
    give greater effect to principles and rights 
 
5. Distinct programmes spreading information  
    on recent policy changes/new measures 
6. Training to implement new policies 
Freedom of association and 
    collective bargaining 
Forced labour 
Child labour 
Discrimination 
 
? 
? 
? 
? 
 
? 
? 
? 
? 
 
 
The second assessment determines whether the following criteria are met: 
 
- are countries’ steps definite (as opposed to being plans, intentions, etc.)? 
 
- are countries’ steps important in scope or reach (as opposed to, for example, minor 
awareness raising or training of a very limited number of people)? 
 
- is timing discreet (is the type of positive change identifiably falling within the period of 
the last 12 months covered by the Annual Review as opposed to something that might 
have happened years ago)? 
 
What will count for progress under the ADHERENCE indicator are steps that relate to a specific 
category of principles/rights under the Declaration.  Hence, there is a ceiling to the number of 
instances of progress that this dimension should accommodate.  The relevant dimension ceiling is 
1 if only one category of fundamental principles and rights is concerned, 2 if two are concerned, 
etc.  The theoretical maximum is four.  Only one mention will be credited per principles/rights, 
otherwise the ceiling would be exceeded. 
 
Progress points count only once – after the ILO has been notified of these changes through the 
Annual Review procedure and if they have passed the typological and significance tests outlined.  
Still, further steps may well be taken in subsequent years under the same category or under 
another category of principles/rights. If they meet the criteria, the country would again make 
good a portion of its ADHERENCE GAP. 
 
To visualize the relationships between progress under the Declaration and non-ratified 
Conventions, one can go back to Figure 2 and replace the weight of 12.5 by 37.5 per cent.  The 
change in the weight increases the reduction of the GAP. 
 
As empirical data will not be available before 2004, table 5 illustrates calculations of the progress 
dimension for a hypothetical country called “Progressland”.  It shows that progress pays in terms 
of the indicator.  Progressland’s ratification GAP is reduced by 20.6 points in 2004 and by 8.3 
points in 2005.  In 2006, no progress having been recorded, Progressland’s GAP stays at its level 
of that year.  The bottom row of table 5 shows the absolute size of reductions of the GAP. 
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Table 5. ADHERENCE, Declaration component, recording actual progress  
and thereby making good a portion of the GAP, example Progressland 
Review of 2004 Review of 2005 Review of 2006  
Max Actual Max Actual Max Actual 
Freedom of association and collective bargaining  - - - - - - 
Forced labour  - - - - - - 
Child labour  1 1 1 1 1 0 
Non-discrimination 1 1 1 0 1 0 
Maximum                                   Actual instances  2 2 2 1 2 0 
Score = actual/maximum  1 0.5 0 
Reduction = score x negative weight -37.5% -18.8% 0% 
Ratification GAP (hypothetical points) 55.0 44.0 33.0 
Change in GAP = Ratification GAP x reduction -20.6 points -8.3 points 0 points 
- Not applicable because Progressland has ratified the relevant Conventions. The country has reporting obligations only 
concerning child labour and non-discrimination.   
Weight = Declaration progress reduces GAP by up to 37.5%. 
One instance = 1.  No instance = 0.  Maximum 1, 2, 3 or 4.  The relevant dimension ceiling is e.g. 1 if only one category of 
fundamental principles and rights is concerned, 2 if two are concerned, etc. The theoretical maximum is four.  While for each 
category of principles/rights there can be up to six forms of progress, only one mention can be credited to a single category of 
principles/rights.  Given Progressland’s ratification record, its maximum for the purposes of this table is 2. 
If there is progress on all requisite counts, value = 1= full 37.5% reduction.  If no progress at all value = 0 = no reduction. 
Source: Implementation report in Governing Body document. 
 
 
Table 6. ADHERENCE GAP, example of Namibia, selected years 1995-2002 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
 Ratification GAP 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.0 22.0 11.0 11.0
 Convention reporting GAP 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
 Core Convention GAP 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.0 22.0 11.0 11.0
 Declaration reporting bonus points  - - - - - -2.8 -1.4 -1.4
 Declaration progress bonus points* - - - - - - - -
Namibia ADHERENCE GAP 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.0 19.3 9.6 9.6
- Not applicable.  
* Can be attributed only as from 2004. 
 
 
Table 6 illustrates interim calculations that include the Declaration dimensions in the case of 
Namibia.  The country’s dutiful reporting under Declaration auspices has lowered its 
ADHERENCE GAP by 2.8 points or 1.4 points. 
 
Chapter 3. The implementation indicator 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Implementation problems in respect of workers’ rights could be conceptualised and measured in a 
number of ways for indicator purposes.  One way would be to encompass the implementation 
problems of both ratifying and non-ratifying countries. That is not possible with published 
regular ILO data except in respect of the principles and rights of freedom of association and 
collective bargaining.  As of 2002, the GAP system does not capture the implementation 
problems of the  
 
- 27 countries that have not ratified one or both of the forced labour Conventions,  
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- 72 countries that have not ratified one or both of the child labour Conventions, and  
 
- 26 countries that have not ratified one or both of the two equality Conventions.19   
 
These numbers were larger during the early years of the period under review here when countries 
had ratified fewer Conventions than in 2002.  This does not mean, however, that these countries 
are not covered or that they are “advantaged” by the system.  On the contrary, they incur “heavy” 
ADHERENCE GAPs on account of their lack of ratifications. 
 
Ratifying countries’ IMPLEMENTATION problems could be scaled along a range of 0 to 100 on 
the lines of the ADHERENCE indicator.  Such a scale could be split into components comprising 
the seven/eight core Conventions and the four fundamental principles and rights.  Weights could 
be attached to each component, and so on.  
 
A slightly modified approach is preferred that relates the problems which are revealed by selected 
ILO supervisory or complaints procedures to the Convention values accorded to a country as a 
result of ratification.  In this way, too, there will be a scale.  Given the weights chosen, it has an 
upper limit of 43 points.  This maximum would be reached if, in any single year, a country 
incurred comments by the Committee of Experts on all core Conventions and was the object of 
many reports by the Committee on Freedom of Association.  This eventuality did not happen.20 
 
IMPLEMENTATION points are calculated very simply.  IMPLEMENTATION GAPs start at 0.  
Zero points mean that no problems are revealed by supervision or complaints.  Problems add 
certain points to the indicator, which in turn opens up the rights GAP numerically.  If the 
problems get resolved later on or if they do not reappear, the points scored on the indicator 
decrease, and so does this part of the rights GAP.   
  
3.2 Relevant supervisory and complaints procedures 
 
Supervision and complaint procedures exist to verify that countries move from formal ratification 
to actual implementation of their international obligations as represented by ratified core 
Conventions and the freedom of association principles and rights of the ILO Constitution.  A 
number of ILO procedures have been instituted that permit member States, the Governing Body, 
national as well as international workers’ and employers’ organizations, even individual 
delegates to the International Labour Conference, to raise questions of implementation where 
there are doubts.  These procedures are made use of quite often; they are set in motion primarily 
in relation to the core Conventions or freedom of association principles and rights; and they 
frequently result in changes of countries’ laws and practices. 
 
To qualify for inclusion in the indicator system, supervisory or complaints procedures have to 
fulfil three criteria simultaneously.  They have to: 
 
 
19 Thirty-eight countries have not ratified one or both of the freedom of association and collective bargaining 
Conventions.  IMPLEMENTATION covers them through the Committee on Freedom of Association. 
20 The highest IMPLEMENTATION score during any year, 26.5 points, was shared by Guatemala and Peru in 1995 
and 1994, respectively. 
  
Gaps in basic workers’ rights 
 
21
- be concerned with what matters most. Procedures that are rather minor, occasional or of 
little impact are inappropriate for indicators; 
 
-  involve potentially all countries on an indiscriminate basis. No individual country or 
particular region or group of countries should either be exempt or victimised by the 
system; and 
 
- be based on YES/NO distinctions rather than on judgments to be made.21 
 
The ILO is privileged to have the most advanced, far-reaching and effective supervisory and 
complaints machinery among international organizations.  Its basic features and the multitude of 
procedures, well known to specialists, may be a little difficult to comprehend by outsiders and 
will therefore be summarized very briefly with particular reference to questions of relevance to 
the GAP system.22 
 
Three inter-acting bodies perform distinct roles: the Committee of Experts, the Committee on 
Freedom of Association and the Committee on the Application of Standards of the International 
Labour Conference.  The Committee of Experts was established not long after the ILO was 
founded.  It is currently composed of 20 persons appointed in their individual capacity among 
completely impartial experts of technical competence and independent standing.  They are drawn 
from all parts of the world so that the Committee may enjoy first-hand experience of different 
legal, economic and social system.  Its fundamental working principles, as reiterated by the 
Experts on a number of occasions,23 call for impartiality and objectivity in pointing out the extent 
to which it appears that the legal and factual position in a State having ratified a particular 
Convention is in conformity with the terms of that Convention and the obligations which that 
State has undertaken by virtue of the ILO’s Constitution.  To accomplish its supervisory function, 
the Committee of Experts examines – in March each year but since 1995 in December – the 
reports that governments submit on the application of ratified Conventions.24  Where the 
Committee finds something questionable, it puts forward certain comments that are published in 
a report addressed to the annual International Labour Conference, which meets each June in 
Geneva. 
 
The Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA) was set up in 1951 as a tripartite organ of 
the ILO Governing Body, comprising nine of its members and an independent Chair.  The CFA 
meets three times a year.  It is a complaints-driven body that examines allegations of 
infringements of the principles of freedom of association, which include questions of collective 
bargaining and strikes. The great majority of the complaints originate from national or 
 
21 Annex II lists the major forms of supervisory and complaints mechanisms that have been left aside in this paper. 
22 Among ILO publications the following are useful introductions to the questions of this paper.  ILO law on freedom 
of association: Standards and procedures (Geneva, 1995); the special issue on “Labour rights, human rights” of the 
International Labour Review, Vol. 137, No. 2 (1998); D. Tajgman and K. Curtis:  Freedom of association: A user’s 
guide (Geneva 2000); the Handbook of procedures relating to international labour Conventions and 
Recommendations that can be found on the ILO’s public website under 
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/manualg.htm; and “Examination of complaints alleging infringements of trade 
union rights” (unpublished).  
23 Such as in 1987 when, on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the establishment of the Committee, it restated its 
fundamental principles, mandate and method of work.  See CEACR, 1987, Part I, Chapter II, pp. 7-20. 
24 It may be noted in passing that Committee of Experts regularly takes account of difficulties encountered by 
member States in fulfilling their reporting obligations, “such as natural calamities or even general economic 
difficulties”, ibid., p. 13. 
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international workers’ organizations.  They can be lodged regardless of whether or not 
Convention Nos. 87 and/or 98 are ratified.  The consent of the government is not necessary for a 
complaint to be examined.  The procedure followed gives governments the opportunity to reply 
to the complaint as well as to the views of the CFA.  “In practice, the vast majority of 
governments cooperate with the work of the Committee – even though they sometimes delay in 
replying – since they are thus able to defend themselves against what they may consider to be 
unfounded accusations or to explain why they have adopted the measures objected to.”25  In its 
over 50 years of history, some 2,250 cases have so far been lodged.  Written communications, 
meetings between its Chair and countries’ representatives at the annual International Labour 
Conference and direct contact missions are among its modes of operation.  The CFA’s 
examinations, conclusions and recommendations are published, first of all in the form of a 
Governing Body paper26 and, after a while, in the Official Bulletin of the ILO. 
 
The third body, the Committee on the Application of Standards of the International Labour 
Conference, is a tripartite subgroup of delegates to the International Labour Conference.  The 
Application Committee is the recipient of both the annual report of the Committee of Experts and 
an attentive observer of cases under examination by the CFA.  The Application Committee 
selects between 20 and 40 of the many observations made by the Committee of Experts in order 
to discuss them individually, requesting concerned government representatives to be present.  
While the Committee of Experts is a technical body responsible for technical supervision, the 
Application Committee is a political body that seeks to persuade governments to change their 
laws and practices, including by expressing concern on cases the Committee considers to be 
serious or urgent ones and by mobilizing public opinion.  Its proceedings are public and 
published.27   
 
In the light of these considerations, the non-political Committee of Experts and the CFA are 
retained for the measurement of the IMPLEMENTATION indicator, but not the Application 
Committee.28 
 
3.3   Committee of Experts component: Direct Requests and Observations 
 
Direct Requests are one of the two forms of comment by the Committee of Experts included in 
the indicator system.  The Committee uses Direct Requests when the issues raised are of a 
technical nature or when it has doubts but is not sure about a particular question and wishes to 
obtain clarification before expressing an opinion.  It is a low-level form of indicating to a 
 
25 G. von Potovsky : « Freedom of association:  The impact of Convention No. 87 and ILO action”, in International 
Labour Review, Vol. 137, No. 2 (1998), p. 212. 
26 The latest was issued in March 2003, see GB.286/11. 
27 For the latest issue, see Report of the Committee on the Application of Conventions, Part I, Provisional Record No. 
28, 90th Session of the International Labour Conference (Geneva, ILO, 2002). 
28 While the Committee of Experts, the CFA and the Application Committee interact, they function each in their own 
right and for their own specific purposes.  Much of the Committee of Experts’ attention, most of the Application 
Committee’s attention and all of the CFA’s time is taken up by fundamental Conventions or the Declaration’s 
principles and rights.  The CFA regularly brings to the attention of the Committee of Experts cases of ratified 
Conventions where the CFA procedures have been concluded but where in the CFA’s opinion the Committee of 
Experts ought to engage in a dialogue with the government in question regarding the measures it has taken to give 
effect to the recommendations of the CFA.  This does not give rise to double counting as far as the indicator system 
is concerned because the two Committees will not examine the same question at the same time, and the Committee 
of Experts will look at the issue in its own right. 
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government that things may not be as they ought to be.  When included in the indicator system, it 
will be expressed as DIRECT REQUESTs in capital letters. 
 
The second form of comment by the Committee of Experts is observations. The Committee’s 
reports in Part II contain “General Observations” as well as “Individual Observations”.  The 
former are mainly concerned with questions of reporting on ratified Conventions, which the 
ADHERENCE indicator has already captured for the indicator system.  “General Observations” 
can therefore be left aside.   
 
Where the Committee of Experts perceives non-compliance with ratified Conventions, it puts 
forward a negative individual observation, i.e. a critical comment. Negative individual 
observations make up the very large majority of “Individual Observations”.  They are “generally 
used in more serious or long-standing cases of failure to fulfil obligations”29. 
 
Negative individual observations are hereunder referred to as OBSERVATIONs in capital letters.  
They are the Committee of Experts’ “most important comments”30.  The fact that they cover 
countries indiscriminately – given ratification records, they cover the large majority of countries 
– makes them well suited for assessing IMPLEMENTATION GAPs. 
 
Where a government has taken the measures called for by previous comments of the Committee 
of Experts, the Committee may consider this development to constitute significant progress and 
express its satisfaction.  If that is the case, it will both list the country in a distinct section at the 
beginning of Part I of its report and, usually but not always, express its “satisfaction” in an 
individual observation on the Convention itself.  “Cases of progress” will henceforth be referred 
to as PROGRESS in capital italicized letters.31 
 
3.4 CFA component: Different kinds of reports 
 
It is tempting to bring the Committee on Freedom of Association into the indicator system by 
attributing GAP points to the fact that a complaint against a particular government has been 
submitted.  One problem difficult to resolve is what weight to attach to this fact.  Does the mere 
lodging of a complaint call into question 0, 5, 25 or 50 per cent of the value of a core 
Convention?  Nothing is more uncertain.  Another problem is that complaints may not fulfil the 
requirements of receivability or that they may be withdrawn after a while by their initiators.  
Information on whether a complaint is receivable and on whether it is has been withdrawn is not 
always discernible in the CFA’s reports, which would incur scoring problems. 
 
This paper proposes a more pertinent method that instrumentalises the formal nature of two kinds 
of reports issued by the CFA and which attributes a different importance to these forms of 
 
29 Handbook…, op. cit, paragraph 54, endnote 8  
30 ILO law on freedom of association, op. cit., p.163. 
31 The Committee of Experts also notes certain developments “with interest” as opposed to “with satisfaction”.  
“Interest” is a much lower form of approval of developments than satisfaction; and at an earlier stage of the 
development of the system it was thought possible to instrumentalise this notion alongside the notion of 
“satisfaction”.  That idea was dropped (i) because there can be two, three or even more mentions of “interest” in a 
single comment, which would oblige one to accord a very small weight to a note of interest in order to keep its 
cumulative total below the weight of “satisfaction”; and (ii) because there is no fixed relationship between 
expressions of interest and expressions of satisfaction, i.e. two or more mentions of “interest” cannot be said to 
correspond invariably to one mention of “satisfaction”. 
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reports.  For example, some complaints raise broad and far-reaching policy issues while others 
involve only an individual enterprise or person.  As will be demonstrated later when regional 
CFA data are analysed in table 11, the selected forms of reports reflect something of the relative 
importance of the subject matter under examination.   
 
The Committee issues one of three or four kinds of reports in a document referred to as the 
“Introduction” to its reports.  Up to March 1996, it distinguished: 
 
- reports in which it requests to be kept informed of developments.  Where the CFA categorizes 
its reports in this form, the Committee considers that it has had sufficient information to adopt 
its conclusions and recommendations but it prefers to follow the manner in which the 
government gives effect to its recommendations in order to encourage their full 
implementation.  This is the first dimension of the CFA component that feeds the 
IMPLEMENTATION indicator.  It will be referred to as TO BE KEPT INFORMED in 
capital letters when related to the indicator and be given a relatively low weight in the 
indicator system; 
 
- reports that contain interim conclusions.  Where the CFA issues an interim report it does so 
either because it needs further information in order to come to its conclusions in knowledge 
of all the facts or when the problems raised, because of their gravity, should continue to be 
subject to an in-depth examination by the Committee.  This is the second dimension of the 
CFA component of the IMPLEMENTATION indicator.  It will be referred to as INTERIM 
REPORT in capital letters when related to the indicator. This kind of report will be given a 
relatively high weight.  The fact that INTERIM REPORTs are used more frequently when 
important questions are at stake will be verified when regional CFA data are analysed in table 
11 below; 
 
- reports containing definitive conclusions; 
 
- reports on cases that do not call for further examination. 
 
The latter two forms of reports appear to have been merged in mid-1996 into a single form called 
“definitive reports”. When the CFA issues a definitive report or when in its view no further 
examination is needed, the Committee considers that it has received sufficient information or that 
it can assess the merits of the case and that the publication of its final views is the next best step 
to deal with the case – irrespective of whether the allegations were justified, groundless or have 
been overtaken by events or whether their examination has entailed much or little material 
progress. 
 
When the CFA receives information from a government, mostly as a result of a TO BE KEPT 
INFORMED request, or from the complainant submitting further evidence, it may not issue a full 
report but it may note its views or reactions in a section headed “Effect given to the 
recommendations of the Committee and the Governing Body”.  It may express regret or 
satisfaction, hope or interest, simply take note or use a similar formula of this kind; or it may 
consider that a case does not call for further examination; or it may once again ask for 
information.  The many variations of words used reflect the diplomatic language of international 
organisations, the nuances that lawyers and politicians excel in and the assumed meanings that 
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they imply.  This section of the CFA’s Introduction cannot be instrumentalised for indicator 
purposes because one would have to make a judgment as to what exactly the CFA had in mind. 
 
TO BE KEPT INFORMED reports and INTERIM REPORTs are in the public domain, unlike 
some other modes of operation of the CFA such as so-called preliminary examinations and 
meetings between the CFA and government representatives during the International Labour 
Conference, which have to be left aside.32   
 
3.5 Reference values 
 
When the Committee of Experts issues a DIRECT REQUEST or an OBSERVATION, its 
comment relates to a ratified Convention.  When the CFA examines a case, it may relate to one or 
two ratified core Conventions or it may concern the principles and rights of freedom of 
association and collective bargaining.  Where ratified Conventions are involved, the values that a 
country has been credited with under the ADHERENCE indicator can now be referred to for the 
purpose of calculating appropriate “problem” points and the size of IMPLEMENTATION GAPs 
– in a way that is reminiscent of the method of relating the Declaration component to ratification 
values. 
 
To calculate IMPLEMENTATION GAPs when the CFA is seized of cases where Conventions 
are not ratified but where the principles and rights of freedom of association and collective 
bargaining are at stake, the indicator system has to find appropriate reference values.  One might 
argue that such reference values should take into account the reporting and/or progress points that 
countries are credited with under the Declaration component.  However, this presupposes that 
countries never fail in their Declaration reporting obligations, which is unrealistic, and that they 
are progressing towards the realization of the relevant fundamental principles and rights, which 
may rarely be the case. Most of all, it cannot be the case for Declaration reporting points before 
2000 and for Declaration progress points before 2004, i.e. this is not a feasible option. 
 
Another option would be to refer to the fact that the principles and rights of freedom of 
association and collective bargaining inspire two core Conventions.  In that perspective, should 
the reference value be at the level of two Conventions?  This would make it inordinately large in 
the event of an actual complaint being concerned with only one Convention.  Putting the 
reference value lower than the level of a single Convention could incur the opposite injustice, i.e. 
a CFA case concerned with principles and rights would effectively cover the same ground as a 
Convention case but would be undervalued by a lower reference value.  Clearly, the most 
pertinent reference value of a CFA case not relating to a ratified Convention is the value of one 
Convention, i.e. 12.6 before 2000 and 11 thereafter.  These values are retained for the GAP 
system.   
 
3.6 Weighting of the selected procedures 
 
Each of the four supervisory or complaints procedures will now be given a specific weight to 
reflect its importance relative to a Convention’s value as well as its importance relative to the 
other three dimensions of the IMPLEMENTATION indicator. 
 
32 The so-called “urgent appeals” by the CFA are also not instrumentalised for indicator purposes.  One reason is that 
they are of a purely procedural nature designed to induce governments not to delay their responses endlessly.  
Another reason is that one should not clutter an indicator with minor items of little weight. 
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DIRECT REQUESTs or when the CFA wishes TO BE KEPT INFORMED are important in their 
own right but not overwhelmingly so.  This paper suggests that, where the Committee of Experts 
makes a DIRECT REQUEST or where the CFA requests TO BE KEPT INFORMED, one tenth 
of a country’s Convention value should be counted as an IMPLEMENTATION GAP. DIRECT 
REQUESTs and TO BE KEPT INFORM reports are thus given identical weights for the purpose 
of the indicator system. 
 
One tenth of a Convention’s value should be seen as an average that applies to all countries 
without distinction and exception throughout the period under review, i.e. from 1985 till today.  
One may argue that this particular DIRECT REQUEST or that particular TO BE KEPT 
INFORMED report is more important than others.  But this is a question of judgment that the 
indicator system cannot afford to make.  Only objective categorizations can be employed – those 
made by the ILO’s supervisory or complaints bodies through the categorizations they have 
employed for decades. 
  
Up to 1999, ten per cent of 12.6 would constitute a GAP of 1.3 point. As from 2000, ten per cent 
of 11 would constitute a GAP of 1.1 points.   
 
As regards OBSERVATIONs or when the CFA issues an INTERIM REPORT, each represents a 
higher or more challenging form of questioning a country’s legal or factual situation than 
DIRECT REQUESTs and wishing TO BE KEPT INFORMED.  Therefore, the weights 
associated with them should be larger. This paper suggests that, if the Committee of Experts puts 
forward an OBSERVATION, one quarter of a country’s Convention value should be counted as 
an IMPLEMENTATION GAP. If the CFA issues an INTERIM REPORT, the 
IMPLEMENTATION GAP should amount to one fifth of a Convention’s value. 
 
Therefore, up to 1999, an OBSERVATION by the Committee of Experts gives rise to an 
IMPLEMENTATION GAP of 3.1 points, as from 2000 its size is 2.8 points. As regards CFA 
INTERIM REPORTs, up to 1999 one such report incurs an IMPLEMENTATION GAP of 2.5 
points, as from 2000 its size is 2.2 points.33 
 
Again, these weights should be viewed as averages that apply to all countries throughout the 
period under review without regard to individual variations that readers might subjectively wish 
to attach to this OBSERVATION or that INTERIM REPORT. 
 
Figure 3 represents visually the relationships and selected weights of all four 
IMPLEMENTATION dimensions. 
 
Since each procedure is a distinct and is operated by a specially established Committee in its own 
right, the points obtained under each component will be added together.  The total 
IMPLEMENTATION GAP, therefore, is the sum of the Committee of Experts component’s 
points and of the CFA component’s points. 
 
 
33 The logic of the approach of this paper might lead one to weight as 100 per cent a case where the ILO asked its 
member States to consider sanctioning a country in case of grave and sustained violations of a particular Convention. 
This has been the case for Myanmar as regards forced labour. However, such an exceptional and extreme 
eventuality, which has happened only once in the history of the ILO so far, should not form part of this indicator 
system. 
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Figure 3.  IMPLEMENTATION, weight of procedures giving rise to GAPs
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It needs perhaps to be made clear that the ADHERENCE values in question merely constitute a 
numerical reference or yardstick for the calculation of the IMPLEMENTATION indicator.  They 
will neither disappear nor be deducted from the ADHERENCE indicator, which will maintain 
them on the books, as it were. 
 
3.7 Scoring the Committee of Experts component 
 
DIRECT REQUESTs are scored when the Committee of Experts’ report in any year addresses 
such a request to the country’s government.  When a country is not the object of a DIRECT 
REQUEST, it will not have points put on its IMPLEMENTATION indicator. 
 
Where the nature of a DIRECT REQUEST changes in the light of new information that has come 
to the Committee of Experts’ attention, the charge on IMPLEMENTATION will stay the same.  
It is the formal fact of making a DIRECT REQUEST, not its contents, which matters.  No 
judgment is involved on the part of the GAP system.   
 
OBSERVATIONs are scored by the mere fact of the Committee of Experts’ report containing 
such a form of comment.  Again, this is a YES/NO question without a judgment or evaluation 
being involved other than the Committee’s, which has opted for this – the highest – form of 
questioning a country’s laws or practices. 
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If the content of an OBSERVATION changes in the light of new information that has come to 
the Committee of Experts’ attention, the charge on the indicator will stay the same.  The 
Committee can revert to an IMPLEMENTATION problem as often as it receives new 
information or as a result of itself having asked for a detailed report, or as result of the normal 
core Convention reporting cycle of two years.  Where a country has been the object of an 
OBSERVATION for many years, this is evidently a reflection of an unsatisfactory situation; and 
the country will be scored as long as the Committee of Experts makes OBSERVATIONs without 
perceiving PROGRESS.  The Committee does not stop asking for change until it has occurred.34  
 
If a country is listed as having made PROGRESS in Part I of the Committee’s report under the 
heading of “Cases of progress”, no GAP points will be charged to this IMPLEMENTATION 
dimension for the Convention concerned.  The Committee in Part II of its report usually adds a 
positive observation under that Convention.  Fortunately, the distinction between positive 
satisfaction and a negative observation is so clear in theory and practice that there should be no 
ambiguity when scoring.   In case of doubt, this system scores the explicit listing in Part I that is 
shown under “Cases of progress”.  PROGRESS is scored as from 1986. 
 
However, the Committee of Experts may not be entirely satisfied with the measures taken by the 
government.  While it lists the country and Convention in Part I under “Cases of progress”, it 
may well find that there are unresolved issues or that new questions have been raised by new 
measures.  The Committee will not hesitate to express its view that not everything is satisfactory 
in Part II of its report.  It will proceed to formulating an individual observation with distinctly 
positive and distinctly negative connotations; and it will make it very clear that, while steps have 
been taken by the government to close the GAP between the real world and the ideal world of 
ILO, there is not enough PROGRESS for the Committee to consider the question closed.  In the 
event of a mixed individual observation of this kind, the system will reduce the charge on the 
IMPLEMENTATION indicator by 50 per cent, to 1.6 or 1.4 points depending on the year in 
question.  If the Committee in a subsequent year finds that there is PROGRESS that it does not 
need to qualify by a mixed observation, IMPLEMENTATION will show no GAP points.35 
 
DIRECT REQUESTs and OBSERVATIONs on any single Convention will be summed by the 
indicator system.  The Committee of Experts not infrequently chooses to address both a DIRECT 
REQUEST and an OBSERVATION to a government in relation to the same core Convention.  In 
that event, 35 per cent of a Convention’s value are counted as GAP points during the year 
concnerned. 
 
It is worth spelling out once more that the concepts and measurements of the 
IMPLEMENTATION indicator must be objective ones, that they are dependent only on 
distinctions of the formal nature of the Committee’s comment.  A question may well be important 
in the eyes of one observer but not at all important in the eyes of another observer.  
Objectification requires that one does not interpret the importance of a comment.  What matters is 
whether the Committee of Experts has categorized its review of a country’s legal or factual 
 
34 Where OBSERVATIONs continue for a long time, it is possible that the Application Committee will publicly 
discuss the questions involved and possibly seek to put pressure on the country to change its laws or practices. 
35 Where a Committee of Experts’ OBSERVATION merely expresses its satisfaction and at the same time makes a 
cross-reference to a DIRECT REQUEST, the system nevertheless shows a zero OBSERVATION GAP because the 
DIRECT REQUEST does not call into question the PROGRESS achieved.  By contrast, the DIRECT REQUEST will 
be scored as such. 
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situation as meriting a DIRECT REQUEST or an OBSERVATION.  If that is the case, the 
indicator is loaded with problem points that determine the size of this component of the 
IMPLEMENTATION GAP. 
 
A number of scoring issues are resolved as follows: 
 
- until early 1995, the Committee met each year in March, recorded receipt of reports, formulated 
DIRECT REQUESTs or OBSERVATIONs, and the outside covers of its report referred to the 
same-year session of the International Labour Conference that took place a few months later in 
June.  In 1995, the Committee’s sessions were moved to December.  From then on, receipts of 
reports were recorded and DIRECT REQUESTs or OBSERVATIONs were formulated up to 
December of the year; but the Committee’s report referred to the next year because it was 
addressed to the Conference meeting in June.  The indicator system has to accommodate this 
switch, which it does as follows.  Up to and including 1994, the IMPLEMENTATION points in 
the system are those of the Committee’s report of the same year.  Starting with 1996, the points in 
the system are those of the report of the previous year.36  For instance, DIRECT REQUESTs or 
OBSERVATIONs contained in the report of the Committee of Experts of 2003 are entered under 
2002.  As regards 1995, when two reports were issued, the system permits accumulation but – to 
be fair to countries – only of one DIRECT REQUEST and one OBSERVATION per core 
Convention.  The system does not allow either two DIRECT REQUESTs or two 
OBSERVATIONs in 1995.  Likewise, it permits accumulation of PROGRESS during the year, 
but reductions in GAPs cannot go beyond the size of 3.1 points per Convention; 
 
- under OBSERVATIONs, cross-references by the Committee of Experts from one Convention 
to another count as two distinct OBSERVATIONs being put forward at the same time.  For 
example, the Committee may make an OBSERVATION under Convention No. 98 and state “See 
under Convention No. 87” in the report’s section containing individual observations on 
Convention No. 98.  The four pairs of ILO’s core standards consist each of two Conventions that 
are interlinked and which build on one another.  When matters are questionable under one of 
them, they are often also questionable under the other paired Convention.  Where the Committee 
of Experts refers to both, it is entirely appropriate to score both. 
 
Table 7 exemplifies Norway’s IMPLEMENTATION GAPs deriving from the Committee’s 
DIRECT REQUESTs and OBSERVATIONs.  It shows that a certain number of DIRECT 
REQUESTs involving all ratified Conventions except Convention No. 105 have been addressed 
to the country’s government.  (The most recent child labour Convention No. 182, which Norway 
ratified at the end 2000, has only just entered the reporting cycle.)  Numerous OBSERVATIONs 
were addressed by the Committee of Experts to Norway on the two freedom of association and 
collective bargaining Conventions, Nos. 87 and 98, without leading to developments judged 
satisfactory by the Committee, and on the two equality Conventions Nos. 100 and 111 as well.  
The zero points in Table 7 indicate definite PROGRESS in 1986 with respect to Convention No. 
100 and in 1989 with respect to Convention No. 138.  In terms of IMPLEMENTATION, Norway 
has had a GAP in the 5-10 points range on account of the Committee of Experts component of 
the indicator.  The trend in the IMPLEMENTATION GAP is marginally upwards. 
 
 
36 The (non-)receipt of reports, which forms part of the reporting dimension of the core Convention component 
explained in chapter 2.3 above, is handled by the system in the same way as DIRECT REQUESTs or 
OBSERVATIONs are.  The same-year and previous year rules are applied but need not be explained in detail. 
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Table 7. IMPLEMENTATION GAP, Committee of Experts component,  
example of Norway, 1985-2002 
 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
OBSERVATION C. 29                                     
OBSERVATION C. 87   3.1 3.1   3.1     3.1 3.1   3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1   2.8 2.8 2.8 
OBSERVATION C. 98   3.1     3.1               3.1   2.8   2.8   
OBSERVATION C. 100    0.0           3.1   3.1   3.1       2.8   2.8 
OBSERVATION C. 105                                     
OBSERVATION C. 111 3.1   3.1     3.1 3.1     3.1 3.1         2.8   2.8 
OBSERVATION C. 138        0.0                           
OBSERVATION C. 182 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Direct Request C. 29  1.3  1.3               
Direct Request C. 87 1.3                                   
Direct Request C. 98 1.3                                   
Direct Request C. 100   1.3   1.3   1.3       1.3       1.3   1.1   1.1
Direct Request C. 105                                     
Direct Request C. 111 1.3   1.3     1.3 1.3     1.3 1.3   1.3     1.1   1.1
Direct Request C. 138   1.3   1.3 1.3     1.3         1.3     1.1     
Direct Request C. 182 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
CEACR GAP 7.0 10.1 7.5 3.9 7.5 5.7 4.4 7.5 3.1 8.8 7.5 6.2 8.8 4.4 2.8 11.7 5.6 10.6 
- Not applicable. 
OBSERVATION = 3.1 points up to 1999 and 2.8 points as from 2000.  No OBSERVATION = no points. 
DIRECT REQUEST = 1.3 points up to 1999 and 1.1 points as from 2000.  No DIRECT REQUEST = no points. 
If PROGRESS is noted but a related OBSERVATION contains not only positive but also negative connotations, the load is half, 
i.e. 1.6 OBSERVATION points up to 1999 and 1.4 points as from 2000. Unqualified PROGRESS is noted as 0.0. 
 
 
The numbers that are loaded, half or fully unloaded through OBSERVATIONs in any year sum 
to a net number that defines the size of the GAP deriving from the Committee of Experts’ 
comments (see bottom row of table 7). The maximum that could accumulate under the 
Committee of Experts’ component of the system during any single year is a rounded 31 points 
(7x1.3 + 7x3.1 or 8x1.1 + 8x2.8, depending on the years covered). 
 
3.8 Scoring the CFA component 
 
The CFA component starts in 1985 but disregards all cases pre-dating this year.  Only new cases 
are relevant to IMPLEMENTATION.  The first case to enter the system is case no. 1319 
(Ecuador). 
 
Again, the guiding principle of loading is not one’s perception of the gravity of cases but their 
categorization by the CFA through the different forms of reports issued.  Before specifying the 
loading of problems that give rise to a GAP, it is important to make clear at the outset that a 
country is not scored in the following circumstances: 
 
- when a case is declared to be receivable.  It would be unjust if a country were scored after a 
case was declared receivable but the complainant then withdrew it37 or the CFA closed it some 
time later as being groundless or overtaken by events of for some other reason;38 
 
37 In which case the CFA can, and sometimes does, pursue the case of its own volition. 
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- where the CFA does not issue an INTERIM REPORT or does not ask TO BE KEPT 
INFORMED but declares that that no further examination is required or concludes the case by 
issuing a definitive report.  In these instances, the matter seems clear to the CFA; its findings may 
favour or incriminate the government; but publication is all that is foreseen – the case goes 
straight into the public domain.  A number of cases are dealt with in this way.  They will, 
therefore, never constitute an IMPLEMENTATION GAP.  This will entail a slight underestimate 
of the problems that this indicator is meant to capture.39  However, objectivity and fairness 
towards governments require the outmost prudence in the attribution of rights GAPs.  The CFA’s 
formal categorization of TO BE KEPT INFORMED and INTERIM REPORTs is the one and 
only yardstick that this paper applies for the purpose of scoring all member States of the ILO at 
all times.40   
 
Several scoring questions are resolved as follows: 
 
- if, as happens frequently, the CFA issues two or three reports during its several sessions in a 
single year, the particular case is scored on each occasion.  But, to be fair to countries, the 
indicator will contain only the points most favourable to them; 
 
- if the CFA’s categorization of cases changes in the course of time, because one part of a case is 
more or less resolved while another part continues to worry the Committee, or because new 
evidence is brought to the Committee, the indicator will reflect the changes as from the year in 
which they occur. Downgrading from INTERIM REPORTs to TO BE KEPT INFORMED 
reports occurs from time to time.  If that happens, the score will be downgraded from 2.5 or 2.2 
points to 1.3 or 1.1 points.  If the downgrading happens in the same year in which an INTERIM 
REPORT was first issued, only 1.3 or 1.1 points will be shown for that year – again a scoring 
decision in favour of countries; 
 
- if in the course of a session the CFA were to issue reports on a country in respect of several 
distinct cases, which happens frequently, each case would be taken into account on its own.  The 
CFA has an understandable habit of considering two, three or more related cases together.  Where 
cases are listed side-by-side under one heading, the indicator system scores them as two or more 
single cases.  Disentangling is necessary because the Committee sometimes concludes that there 
is no need for further examination of one or several of the cases that it covered by an INTERIM 
REPORT, while it wishes to continue examining one or several other cases of this batch. 
Therefore, each case must be scored separately according to the distinctions adopted by the 
Committee; 
 
 
38 Technically, one could put a small charge on IMPLEMENTATION using the information in the CFA’s report that 
a new case has been opened for this or that country.  If the case was withdrawn or the Committee found it did not 
merit further examination or if it arrived at definitive conclusions, the charge could be taken off the indicator from 
the time it was first entered. In practice, there could be attribution problems. 
39 Of course, the CFA does not hesitate to use language that indicates how worried it is about the allegations of 
infringements of freedom of association or the legal or factual situation that it studied.  But the many shades of 
meanings of expressions used by the Committee do not lend themselves to precise categorizations. 
40 INTERIM REPORTs frequently request governments to furnish information.  They will nevertheless be scored 
only as INTERIM REPORTs.  The request for further information will be disregarded in that case so as not to run 
the risk of double counting.  The two kinds of reports are not cumulative in one and the same CFA case, i.e. a 
country cannot be scored on both simultaneously. 
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- if a session of the CFA was concerned with only one or two countries, where the questions 
examined tend to be relatively serious and call for much study, the table of contents and the 
heading of the report in the ILO’s Official Bulletin may not specify whether this is a definitive 
report or a TO BE KEPT INFORMED report or an INTERIM REPORT.  It usually is an 
INTEIM REPORT.  But that fact can be established only by looking at the introductory words of 
the Committee’s recommendations and then attributing the appropriate weight; 
 
- if the CFA issued one of the two kinds of reports selected by the system but continued to 
examine a case for some time without concluding it in one way or another and then, years later, 
issued either an INTERIM REPORT or a TO BE KEPT INFORMED request, that particular case 
would be considered a continuing case and points would be recorded during the intervening years 
at the level of the original report.  For example, if an INTERIM REPORT was issued in year X 
and the next INTERIM REPORT three years later, the system would show INTERIM REPORT 
points during year X as well as during the subsequent two years.  If the last report were a TO BE 
KEPT INFORMED report, the final year’s points would correspond to the lighter load of this 
form of report. 
 
To maintain the indicator’s inherent relationship with the reference values of ratified Conventions 
and fundamental principles and rights, the total number of points that can be charged to a country 
is capped at 12 throughout the period 1985-2002.  A GAP cannot exceed 12 points under the 
CFA component, irrespective of how many TO BE KEPT INFORMED or INTERIM REPORTs 
are issued during a year. 
 
The notions of progress and satisfaction, which are also evoked in the CFA’s pronouncements 
and reports, cannot be instrumentalised for unloading purposes because they are not graded by 
the CFA itself with the same clarity, regularity and visibility as by the Committee of Experts.   
 
When no further report of the TO BE KEPT INFORMED or INTERIM kind is issued, no points 
will be put on IMPLEMENTATION’s CFA component.  Follow-up may be pursued in the form 
of a dialogue with the government prompted by the Committee,41 which may well continue for 
years but without giving rise to a further TO BE KEPT INFORMED report or to an INTERIM 
REPORT – no report, no GAP. 
  
The following tables demonstrate how points are loaded on the IMPLEMENTATION indicator’s 
CFA component using the example of Peru because it is instructive with regard to the scoring 
principles in their various manifestations.   
 
Table 8 is a record sheet showing the identification numbers of new cases since the late 1980s, as 
well as arrows indicating how the CFA has downgraded cases from INTERIM  REPORTs to TO 
BE KEPT INFORMED, i.e. towards the lighter of the two weights adopted in this paper.  A 
within-a-year change cannot be shown, but case 1878 is an example where the categorization 
changed from an INTERIM REPORT to a TO BE KEPT INFORMED report during 1997.  The 
record shows this as a TO BE KEPT INFORMED charge of 1.3 points.  Case 1478 was first 
examined by the CFA in 1989, and then taken up again in 1992 when the Committee downgraded 
its importance.  During the intervening years, 1990 and 1991, a full load of 2.5 points per year is 
 
41 This dialogue is indicated in the CFA’s Introduction under the heading “Effect given to the recommendation of the 
Committee and the Governing Body”. 
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Table 8. IMPLEMENTATION, CFA component, example Peru, since 1986 (record) 
Case numbers 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
IR case 1321  1432     1648  1845 1979 2111  
     Case    1478 1478 1478  1650   1855     2098  
     Case        1690    1880 1880 1880 1880  
     Case      1527 1527 1527 1527   1906 1906     
     Case      1541 1541 1541 1541  1796       
     Case       1598 1598 1598         
     Case       1642  1731        
     Case        1609          
     Case    1484 1484 1484  1706       2049   
TBKI case     1502  1478 1706 1527  1796  2004  1880  
         Case        1661  1541  1926     2098 
         Case       1484   1598  1878    2049  
         Case         1759   1944  2059   
         Case          1784      2076  
         Case          1804        
         Case         1823        
 
Table 9. IMPLEMENTATION GAP, CFA component, example Peru, since 1986 
Points 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
IR case 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.2
     Case 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.2
     Case 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.2
     Case 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5  
     Case 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
     Case 2.5 2.5 2.5  
     Case 2.5 2.5
     Case 2.5
     Case 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.2
TBKI case 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.1
         Case 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.1
         Case 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.1
         Case 1.3 1.3  1.1
         Case 1.3 1.1
         Case 1.3
         Case 1.3  
CFA GAP 2.5 0 2.5 5.0 6.3 10.0 12.0* 12.0* 12.0* 7.8 7.5 8.9 6.3 6.3 5.5 7.7 1.1
INTERIM REPORT (INTERIM) = 2.5 points up to 1999 and 2.2 points as from 2000. 
TO BE KEPT INFORMED (TBKI) = 1.3 points up to 1999 and 1.1 points as from 2000. 
TBKI + INTERIM joint maximum = 12 points for all years. 
* Joint maximum of 12 points reached. 
 
Table 10. IMPLEMENTATION GAP, examples from the Americas: Argentina, 
Peru and the United States, 1985-2002 
  1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
 CEACR GAP 10.6 7.5 6.2 10.1 8.9 5.7 11.9 5.7 11.9 7.5 11.9 14.5 10.6 5.7 7.5 2.5 5.0 6.7
 CFA GAP 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.8 2.6 0.0 1.3 1.3 1.3 6.3 3.8 1.3 1.1 4.4 1.1
Argentina: IMPL. GAP 10.6 7.5 6.2 10.1 8.9 5.7 20.7 8.3 11.9 8.8 13.2 15.8 16.9 9.5 8.8 3.6 9.4 7.8 
 CEACR GAP 8.8 0.0 9.9 8.3 5.7 12.7 14.8 14.3 4.4 14.5 11.4 10.1 8.8 13.2 5.0 9.2 5.0 9.5
 CFA GAP 0.0 2.5 0.0 2.5 5.0 6.3 10.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 7.8 7.5 11.4 6.3 6.3 5.5 7.7 1.1
Peru: IMPL. GAP 8.8 2.5 9.9 10.8 10.7 19.0 24.8 26.3 16.4 26.5 19.2 17.6 20.2 19.5 11.3 14.7 12.7 10.6 
 CEACR GAP 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.0 1.3 1.1 0.0 5.6 3.9
 CFA GAP 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 1.3 0.0 0.0 2.5 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
US: IMPL. GAP 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 1.3 0.0 0.0 2.5 1.3 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.0 1.3 1.1 0.0 5.6 3.9 
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loaded onto IMPLEMENTATION.  Other such cases are nos. 1484, 1527, 1541, 1598 and 1880.  
Unresolved cases have to be scored as continuing cases. 
 
In table 9, the case numbers are converted into indicator points, which in the bottom row sum to 
the CFA component of the IMPLEMENTATION GAP.  That component is quite large for Peru, 
hitting the ceiling in 1992, 1993 and 1994, though it seems to be on decline since then. 
 
The IMPLEMENTATION indicator being additive in terms of its two constituent components, 
table 10 adds up the Committee of Experts component and the CFA component for three 
American countries.  Argentina’s laws and practices have attracted many comments by the 
Committee of Experts, and since the early 1990s complaints to the CFA have given rise to a 
number of TO BE KEPT  INFORMED and INTERIM REPORTs.  Peru’s scores are even worse 
under both components of the IMPLEMENTATION indicator.  The United States, having 
ratified few core Conventions and not incurred many DIRECT REQUESTs or OBSERVATIONs 
on them, does not have a sizeable IMPLEMENTATION GAP under the Committee of Experts 
component, though there are indications of a slight upward trend.  As regards the CFA 
component, three TO BE KEP INFORMED reports and one INTERIM REPORT were addressed 
to the government between 1988 and 1993 in respect of the principles concerning the 
fundamental rights that are the subject of Convention Nos. 87 and 98, which the United States 
has not ratified. 
 
3.9 Limitations regarding supervisory or complaints data? 
 
Do the dimensions and data that have been retained respect the criteria established in chapters 1.3 
and 3.2? They do!  Do the data mirror realities on the ground throughout the world at large?  
They do – more than other data available internationally or in known government or private 
institutions!  If one looks for shortcomings one will have to take the two key bodies, the 
Committee of Experts and the CFA, under a magnifying glass. 
 
The Committee of Experts is solely concerned with ratified Conventions.  DIRECT REQUESTs 
or OBSERVATIONs on unratified Convention are not possible.  Does this introduce a bias 
against countries that have ratified one or several core Conventions?  It does not, because the 
system scores non-ratifying countries heavily: it charges them with an ADHERENCE GAP of 
12.6 or 11 points per unratified Convention, depending on the year.  If anything, the system may 
be said to be biased against non-ratifiers. 
 
Are DIRECT REQUESTs and OBSERVATIONs valid data in the sense that they reflect a legal 
or factual divergence between the real world and the ideal world of ILO standards?  Indeed they 
are!  Governments are sometimes unhappy that their view of what an international Convention 
requires them to do is questioned by the Committee of Experts; and during the period when the 
Soviet Union still existed there were repeated differences of views among some of the 
Committee’s members.  The experts may have limited knowledge of a country’s legal or factual 
situation because of insufficient data, which is a possibility that cannot be ruled out.  Still, the 
documentation at the disposal of the Committee tends to be voluminous and of such spread and 
depth as to permit correct judgements to be based on it.  This includes the information supplied 
by governments in their reports or when they appear before the Application Committee, the text 
of legislation, collective agreements or court decisions directly relevant to the implementation of 
standards, the information on the results of inspections furnished by member States, comments 
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made by employers’ and workers’ organizations, conclusions of other ILO bodies, the results of 
technical cooperation activities, etc.   
 
Not only are there valid reasons for formulating DIRECT REQUESTs and OBSERVATIONs, 
the same Committee of Experts readily takes note of PROGRESS, which it does on the basis of 
the same sources.  During the 18-year review period, 269 cases of PROGRESS were recorded by 
the system, an average of 2.6 cases of PROGRESS per country.  In Africa, this figure came to a 
low figure of 1.4 cases per country.  In Asia, the Pacific and Arab States, the figure was even 
lower, 0.7 cases per country.  In Europe it was a little below average, 2.1 cases.  In Latin 
America, 3.1 cases of PROGRESS were recorded per country.  It may be mentioned in passing 
that the Committee of Experts has expressed satisfaction on quite a number of occasions towards 
Australia (six times), Bolivia (seven times), Bulgaria (six times), Burkina Faso (six times), 
Canada (six times), Poland (eight times) and Zambia (six times).42   
 
Could it be argued that the realities in this or that country are, in general, very much in line with 
ILO core Conventions even though the country has failed to ratify those Conventions?  One 
could argue that.  But it is beside the point because the indicator system measures political will 
through its ADHERENCE indicator – and political will to adhere internationally to ILO’s values 
and reporting procedures is obviously absent where a country does not ratify Conventions that it 
broadly applies within its own borders.  Without ratification, the system proposed here, which 
relies exclusively on ILO data, cannot trace that country’s realities relative to the ideals set out by 
the Organization.  Outside the system, subjective judgments hold sway. 
 
In conclusion, both DIRECT REQUESTs and OBSERVATIONs are large in numbers and are 
addressed to every country in the world where the Committee of Experts has reason to believe 
that the legislation or factual situation is not in accordance with ratified Conventions.  This makes 
them entirely pertinent and valid for indicator purposes.  There is no regional or political bias in 
the data. 
 
As regards the Committee on Freedom of Association, the fact that it is included in the 
indicator system gives the principles and rights of freedom of association and collective 
bargaining, and the two derivative Conventions, more weight than the principles and rights 
concerning forced labour, child labour and non-discrimination.  This was already pointed out in 
chapter 1.2 but merits being spelt out more fully.  Member States can potentially be scored twice 
under the IMPLEMENTATION indicator in respect of freedom of association and collective 
bargaining: once if the country has ratified one or both Conventions, the Committee of Experts 
finds that there is something questionable and it formulates a DIRECT REQUEST or an 
OBSERVATION; a second time if the CFA is seized of a case and it asks TO BE KEPT 
INFORMED or issues an INTERIM REPORT.  The reason for the two-fold inclusion is the 
exceptional importance of this subject matter within the ILO.  Freedom of association is a 
constitutional principle that every member State is supposed to adhere to by virtue of its entry 
into the Organization.  That special importance warrants to be recognized by the indicator 
system.  One could do this by giving the principles and rights of freedom of association greater 
weight relative to forced labour, child labour and non-discrimination.  Or one could do it by 
bringing the CFA into the system.  I have chosen the latter option, essentially because it is more 
 
42 If one looks for a general trend in the number of cases of PROGRESS, one can put a trend-line through the data for 
all countries.  This reveals an upward trend up to the middle of the 1990s and a downward trend thereafter.  For the 
period 1985-2002 as a whole, the trend is slightly downwards. 
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pertinent, distinct and enables greater variety to be applied in scoring than through other 
approaches.  However, in order not to accord the CFA component too much weight, it has been 
capped at 12 points, roughly equivalent to the non-ratification of a core Convention. 
 
One of the requirements of indicators of the kind elaborated here is that they should potentially 
apply to all countries, not merely to a few that may have the greatest implementation problems.  
The number of cases (834) that have given rise to a TO BE KEPT INFORMED and/or an 
INTERIM REPORTs comes to an average of five reports per country over a period of 18 years.  
Thus, the numerical requirement is fulfilled quite satisfactorily.43   
 
One potential criticism of the CFA component puts forward the “no complaint, no problem” 
argument, i.e. that the lack of complaints or reports does not necessarily reflect realities on the 
ground – matters can be worse than revealed by the CFA’s procedures.  However, as far as 
freedom of association and collective bargaining is concerned, this argument looks only at one 
component of the indicator system, the CFA.  Other components are (i) non-ratification of 
Convention No. 87 and/or No. 98, which incurs an ADHERENCE GAP, and (ii) ratification, 
which may result in DIRECT REQUESTs or OBSERVATIONs that fuel the 
IMPLEMENTATION GAP.  In other words, the complaints-driven CFA is not the only input as 
far as freedom of association and collective bargaining GAPs are concerned.  The CFA 
component makes a special contribution but does not dominate the system. 
 
If there is no institutional bias in the CFA data, is there an empirical bias?  If there were, could 
one do anything about it?  Table 11 reveals a clear geographical imbalance.  During the first 50 
years of its history the Committee on Freedom of Association was seized of complaints 
concerning the Americas much more often than of complaints concerning other regions of the 
world.  The figures in column 3 relating to the last 18 years are similar to the benchmark figures.  
Actually, the share of complaints concerning America countries has increased by 10 per cent, and 
the share concerning Europe has dropped by 12 per cent.  The yardstick in column 5 that is based 
on the absolute number of TO BE KEPT INFORMED plus INTERIM REPORTs per country in 
each region, reflects the same geographic distinctions.   
 
Vibrant trade unions and societies where judicial dispute settlement is frequently resorted to may 
be one explanation for the bunching of complaints in certain regions and countries.  
Developments that objectively cause concern may be another factor, such as adjustment or 
globalization policies that weigh heavily on workers.  Yet another factor may be the likelihood of 
the ILO’s mode of exerting pressure – shaming governments into changing their stance – having 
an effect.  Whatever it may be, the CFA’s conclusions are an objective reaction to existing 
problems, which sometimes linger on for years.  Objective factors should always be given 
preference over personal judgements.  At any rate, it is neither possible nor desirable to correct 
for these empirical variations within the indicator system constructed here. 
 
 
43 Of course, some countries had complaints raised against them more often than others.  Using as a proxy the 
number of cases of TO BE KEPT INFORMED plus INTERIM REPORTs, the following high- and low-scoring 
countries illustrate the range: Morocco 36 such cases, the Philippines 21, Canada 36 and Colombia 74.  Countries 
where cases have not given rise to either forms of reports include Botswana, Mongolia, the Netherlands and 
Suriname (the only Latin American country with a zero score). 
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Table 11. Selected Committee of Freedom of Association data, by ILO region*,  
excluding non-functioning States** 
Complaints 
registered 
TO BE KEPT INFORMED and INTERIM REPORTs 
covered by the indicator system, 408 and 426 respectively 
1951-
2000 
1985-
2002 
1985-2002 
TO BE KEPT 
INFORMED 
reports 
INTERIM 
REPORTs 
 
2,112 
com-
plaints 
928 
com-
plaints 
Total of 
834 
reports 
issued 
(refer-
ence 
column) 
Reports 
per 
country 
in each 
region 
% of all 
426 
TBKI 
reports  
% of all 
reports 
in each 
region 
% of all 
426 
INTERIM 
REPORTs 
% of all 
reports 
in each 
region 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Africa 13% 14% 17% 2.9 18% 57% 14% 43% 
Americas 44% 54% 57% 13.6 50% 45% 64% 55% 
- North America (Canada and US) - - 5% 20.5 8% 78% 2% 22% 
- Latin America - - 49% 21.5 39% 41% 59% 59% 
- Caribbean - - 3% 1.8 3% 52% 3% 48% 
Asia and the Pacific, incl. Arab States 12% 12% 16% 3.7 16% 54% 16% 46% 
Europe  31% 19% 11% 1.9 16% 74% 5% 26% 
 
Total  
 
100% 
 
99% 
 
100% 
 
5.0 
 
100% 
 
49% 
 
99% 
 
51% 
- Not available. 
*   Europe includes Azerbaijan, Israel, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. 
** These are the seven States earlier excluded for the whole of the period 1985-2002: Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Somalia.  Yugoslavia, now called Serbia and Montenegro, and its various 
predecessor States have been left aside entirely for the whole of the period 1985-2002.  See also Annex I. 
 
 
The regional data in table 11 allow one to verify the veracity of 
(a) selecting TO BE KEPT INFORMED and INTERIM REPORTs in preference to the 
number of complaints registered, and  
(b) attaching different weights to each kind of report.   
 
Complaints evidently can raise quite fundamental or far-reaching policy questions of a general 
nature.  Or they can concern the dismissal of a single trade unionist.  Several other situations 
might be situated somewhere between such hypothetical end-points of importance.44  This paper 
assumes that the CFA is relatively difficult to satisfy quickly on questions of a general and 
fundamental policy nature.  Where these are known to exist in any particular region,  
(a)  the sum of reports of both kinds should exceed the sum of complaints registered, and  
(b)  the number of INTERIM REPORTs should exceed the number of TO BE KEPT 
INFORMED reports.   
 
Bearing in mind that the regional figures in table 11 are actually averages of sorts which lock 
countries into a single group that might be strung along a continuum, and starting with Europe 
where laws and practices on the whole tend to be not very far from the ideals of the ILO, one 
would expect this region to be confronted mostly with less fundamental or far-reaching questions.  
That is, the CFA could be expected  
(a)  to issue these two forms of reports relatively infrequently, and  
(b)  to resort to INTERIM REPORTs less often than to TO BE KEPT INFORMED reports.   
 
44 See also the considerations set out at the end of Annex II below. 
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As regards Latin America, a number of countries are known to have less secure foundations and 
more contentious practices45, which one would expect to give rise to  
(a)  a disproportionately large number of TO BE KEPT INFORMED plus INTERIM 
REPORTs taken together, and  
(b) a disproportionately large number of INTERIM REPORTs on their own.   
 
The Asia/Pacific/Arab group is quite heterogeneous46, comprising as it does countries such as 
India where unions in the private sector flourished under an import-substitution policy; the 
Suharto regime in Indonesia where export-oriented policies (and political considerations) 
repressed unions until 1998; China where the communist party imposed a single union system; 
and most Arab States where unions were, at least until recently, anathema.  Still, one might 
expect the Asia/Pacific/Arab region to give rise to  
(a)  disproportionately large numbers of TO BE KEPT INFORMED plus INTERIM 
REPORTs taken together, and  
(b) disproportionately large numbers of INTERIM REPORTs on their own, i.e. the form of 
reports assumed to prevail when serious cases are under examination or when cases 
cannot be elucidated quickly because of their inherent complexities.   
 
As regards Africa, North America and the Caribbean, no a priori distinctions are postulated here. 
 
To test hypothesis (a), one can compare the proportion of complaints registered in column 3 with 
the reference data in column 4, i.e. the sum of TO BE KEPT INFORMED plus INTERIM 
REPORTs.  If the figures in column 4 are significantly higher than those in column 3, one can 
conclude that the complaints registered are important and difficult to resolve quickly and 
satisfactorily.  The actual comparison of the two columns in the case of Europe shows that the 
figure in the reference column (11%) is much lower than that in column 3 (19%).  In the case of 
the Americas, the reference data (57%) exceeds that in column 3 (54%).  The Asia/Pacific/Arab 
region’s figure in the reference column (16%) is also significantly higher than the 12 per cent in 
column 3, which points to important issues being examined by the Committee in respect of that 
region.  This test strongly supports hypothesis (a), i.e. the assumption underlying the selection of 
TO BE KEPT INFORMED plus INTERIM REPORTs as better indicators of problems than the 
number of complaints itself.   
 
To test hypothesis (b), two comparisons can be performed on the basis of the data in table 11.  
The first focuses on reference column 4 relative to columns 6 and 8.  For certain regions, columns 
6 and 8 should contain either higher or lower percentages than column 4.  The first comparison 
starts with the Asia/Pacific/Arab group, where the figure of 16 per cent TO BE KEPT 
INFORMED reports in column 6 is the same as in the reference column, and the figure in column 
8 concerning INTERIM REPORTs, 16 per cent, is also the same as the reference data, i.e. this 
region does not support hypothesis (b).  By contrast, the figures for the Americas and Europe 
fully support the first test of hypothesis (b): while the 57 per cent of the reference column 4 
 
45 See, for instance, Marie Luz Vega: Los principios y derechos fundamentales en el trabajo : Su valor, su 
viabilidad, su incidencia y su importancia como elementos de progreso económico y de justicia social, Declaration 
Background Paper (Geneva, ILO, 2003). 
46 See, for example, the well-informed analyses by C. S. Venkata Ratnam in his book Globalization and labour-
management relations: Dynamics of change (New Delhi, etc.: Response Books, 2001), especially chapters 2-3. 
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compare with 64 per cent INTERIM REPORTs in the case of the Americas, the 11 per cent of 
column 4 in the case of Europe compare with 16 per cent TO BE KEPT INFORMED reports.   
 
The second test of hypothesis (b) compares the percentages of TO BE KEPT INFORMED 
reports in columns 7 with those of INTERIM REPORTs in column 9.  Even though the table’s 
overall proportions are similar (51 and 49 per cent), there are telling differences among major 
regions.  Again, while the data for the Asia/Pacific/Arab region do not support the hypothesis, the 
data for the Americas and Europe conform to expectations.  In the case of the Americas, 55 per 
cent of all reports are INTERIM REPORTs, which implies that important issues are raised and 
examined more often than others.  In Europe, about three quarters of all reports are TO BE KEPT 
INFORMED reports, i.e. far-reaching questions do not predominate in this region.  The second 
test, therefore, is somewhat but not entirely supportive of hypothesis (b). 
 
Taking all three tests together, they validate the reasoning underlying this paper’s selection of TO 
BE KEPT INFORMED and INTERIM REPORTs to instrumentalise the ILO’s complaints 
procedures handled by the Committee on Freedom of Association.  Readers may disagree with 
the actual weights assigned to the two forms of reports, 10 per cent and 20 per cent of the value 
of a core Convention, respectively.  But they can change weights in the light of their own 
perception.  Readers may also not want to cap the overall importance of the CFA component at 
12 points.  Again, they can vary the limit or dispense with it altogether. 
 
In figure 4, a trend-line is put through the annual CFA data at the base of table 11.  All regions 
show an upward trend in problems, albeit only marginally so in the case of the Asia/Pacific/Arab 
region.47  This suggests that freedom of association and collective bargaining have come under 
increasing pressure at the national level in the age of globalization. 
 
Reverting to critiques that can be levelled at the CFA component instrumentalised here for 
indicator purposes, one justified criticism is that the selection of TO BE KEPT INFORMED and 
INTERIM REPORTs slightly underestimates IMPLEMENTATION if and when the CFA does 
not issue either form of report but, instead, proceeds straight away to declaring that no further 
examination is required or to concluding the case by publishing a definitive report.  A number of 
cases are dealt with in this way.48  They will, therefore, not be reflected as IMPLEMENTATION 
GAPs.  A rapid assessment suggests that no particular group of countries or region is favoured by 
this mode of operation on the part of the CFA. 
 
One can conclude, therefore, that the geographic spread and frequency of the four selected 
supervisory and complaints dimensions is such that all of them can validly be used for the 
purposes of providing the IMPLEMENTATION indicator with the necessary objective raw 
material.  None of them as such incurs a particular political or country bias.  All four dimensions 
have to date yielded sufficient empirical cases to make them applicable potentially to any country 
at any time.  Furthermore, these supervisory or complaints procedures are all in the hands of 
independent experts from different political, economic and social regimes who are members of 
the Committee of Experts, or they are the object of consensus decisions of representatives of 
governments, employers’ and workers’ organisations in the CFA.  None of them is in the hands 
of individuals of the ILO Secretariat. 
 
47 To prevent distortions associated with the growth in the number of countries, the European region comprises only 
the 29 countries that formed part of the region in 1985 as well as in 2002. 
48 See also p. 31 above. 
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Figure 4.  Trends in the total number of To Be Kept Informed plus Interim Reports,  
by region, 1985-2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4. Results presented in different forms: Long-term trends, medium-term 
averages and single figures 
 
The data can be analysed in different ways.  One golden rule is not to focus on any particular year 
but to study trends or averages.  Each year’s scores reflect, at least in part, a combination of the 
annual or bi-annual rhythm of reporting on Conventions, where failing to report may entail an 
ADHERENCE GAP, and where reporting may entail an IMPLEMENTATION GAP in one year 
but not in another.  Although this washes out somewhat over the seven or eight core Conventions 
and their different reporting rhythms, it can incur uncharacteristically high or low scores in one or 
the other year.  These are most sensibly trended away or averaged out.  Similarly, the working 
methods of the Committee on Freedom of Association quite regularly lead it to examine during 
one session a number of different complaints against a country that were submitted at different 
points of time, and the CFA may well re-examine them all together after an interval of more than 
a year (as table 8 illustrated for Peru).  This, too, may incur bunching of scores in certain years 
but not in others.  Trends or averages smooth out erratic peaks and troughs.  In any case, the 
ultimate aim of the GAP system is to depict evolutions in the course of the many years required 
to change policies and whether trends are moving in the right or wrong direction. 
 
The method of indicator construction used in this paper yields results that are, as is to be 
expected, influenced to a considerable extent by the weights chosen.  The weights represent my 
best guesstimates of where they might reasonably be situated for most of the countries most of 
the time.  They are general or average figures – that is what the logic of the indicator system 
requires.  It makes little sense to distill statistically insensitive weights in a context where 
distinctions matter greatly because they are inherent in the social and political realities of the 
phenomena measured.  The question is not whether the proposed weights are statistically 
sensitive but whether there is agreement among specialists as to the order of magnitudes 
involved. 
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4.1 Adherence, implementation and overall trends 
 
The three key measurements, the ADHERENCE GAP, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAP and the 
overall or basic workers’ rights GAP, are detailed in table 12 for each year.  168 countries are 
listed in alphabetical order.  A simple linear trend is put through each set of GAPs.  The direction 
in which the trend is moving is specified in the last column. 
 
The following terms are used to characterise the direction in which the TRENDs are moving.  An 
ADHERENCE TREND in the top row of each country’s data set can be qualified as: 
 
- “smaller” when the trend-line indicates that the size of the GAP has decreased during 
the 18-year period or during the years for which data were available; 
 
- “no change” (abbreviated no chg) when a country’s ADHERENCE score has not 
significantly changed, irrespective of whether the actual GAP stayed at a high, 
medium or low level; 
 
- “growing” when the trend-line indicates that the number of the ADHERENCE points 
has increased, which may be due to non-ratification of the recent Convention No. 182 
and/or a worsening of the reporting record on ratified Conventions or under the 
Declaration. 
 
An IMPLEMENTATION TREND in the middle row of each country’s data set can be qualified 
as: 
 
- “smaller” when the trend-line indicates a decrease in the IMPLEMENTATION 
problems to which the Committee of Experts has drawn attention through DIRECT 
REQUESTs/OBSERVATIONs or which have given rise to TO BE KEPT 
INFORMED/INTERIM REPORTs by the CFA; 
 
- “no change” (abbreviated no chg) when a country’s IMPLEMENTATION score has 
not significantly changed, irrespective of whether the actual GAP stayed at a high, 
medium or low level; 
 
- “growing” when the trend-line indicates that the IMPLEMENTATION problems have 
increased. 
 
A TREND in the basic workers’ rights GAP, the bottom row of each country’s data set, can be 
qualified as: 
  
- “smaller” when the trend-line indicates that the size of the overall GAP has decreased 
during the 18-year period or during the years for which data were available;  
 
- “no change” (abbreviated no chg) when a country’s summary score has not 
significantly changed, irrespective of whether the actual GAP stayed at a high, 
medium or low level; 
 
- “growing” when the trend-line indicates that the size of the overall GAP has 
increased.   
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Table 12. Annual data base of the estimated workers’ rights GAPs and trends,  
by country, shaded by capacity, 1985-2002 
Country/Year 198519861987 1988 1989 1990 1991 19921993199419951996 1997 1998 1999 2000 20012002 TREND 
 ADHERENCE GAP 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.8 3.4 5.1 0.0 8.5 3.4 3.4 0.0 11.0 6.0 3.0 growing
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 11.4 7.0 15.8 8.3 0.0 18.4 5.7 7.0 14.0 8.3 12.7 8.3 13.2 16.3 7.8 8.9 12.8 12.8 growing
Algeria: GAP 11.4 7.0 15.8 8.3 0.0 18.4 5.7 13.8 17.4 13.4 12.7 16.8 16.6 19.7 7.8 19.9 18.8 15.8 growing
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 16.0 12.6 17.7 12.6 12.6 17.7 12.6 22.8 22.8 12.6 12.6 12.6 17.7 22.8 22.8 25.0 29.5 12.5 growing 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 0.0 0.0 3.9 2.6 4.4 3.9 8.3 8.3 8.3 7.0 2.6 1.3 2.6 7.0 6.1 6.1 3.3 8.9 growing 
Antigua & Barbuda: GAP 16.0 12.6 21.6 15.2 17.0 21.6 20.9 31.1 31.1 19.6 15.2 13.9 20.3 29.8 28.9 31.1 32.8 21.4 growing 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 14.3 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 14.3 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.0 0.0 0.0 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 10.6 7.5 6.2 10.1 8.9 5.7 20.7 8.3 11.9 8.8 13.2 15.8 16.9 9.5 8.8 3.6 9.4 7.8 no chg 
Argentina: GAP 24.9 20.1 18.8 22.7 21.5 18.3 35.0 20.9 24.5 21.4 25.8 15.8 16.9 9.5 8.8 14.6 9.4 7.8 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP - - - - - - - - 88.0 63.0 64.7 66.4 66.4 66.4 66.4 69.0 69.0 60.8 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP - - - - - - - - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 no chg 
Armenia: GAP - - - - - - - - 88.0 63.0 64.7 66.4 66.4 66.4 66.4 69.0 69.0 60.8 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 19.3 19.3 19.3 growing
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 9.6 3.9 1.3 5.5 7.0 5.5 2.6 2.5 11.4 2.6 7.3 2.9 4.4 13.2 3.9 11.7 7.8 7.8 growing
Australia: GAP 22.2 16.5 13.9 18.1 19.6 18.1 15.2 15.1 24.0 15.2 19.9 15.5 17.0 25.8 16.5 31.0 27.1 27.1 growing
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 16.0 12.6 14.3 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 9.6 0.0 0.0 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 5.7 0.0 8.3 10.1 10.6 7.5 4.4 11.9 5.7 11.9 5.7 10.6 4.4 6.2 1.1 1.1 6.7 3.9 smaller 
Austria: GAP 21.7 12.6 22.6 22.7 23.2 20.1 17.0 24.5 18.3 24.5 18.3 23.2 17.0 18.8 13.7 10.7 6.7 3.9 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP - - - - - - - - 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 9.6 9.6 17.1 no chg 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP - - - - - - - - 0.0 0.0 8.6 8.3 7.0 7.0 5.0 2.8 6.1 10.0 growing
Azerbaijan: GAP - - - - - - - - 12.6 12.6 21.2 20.9 19.6 19.6 17.6 12.4 15.7 27.1 growing
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 52.1 50.4 50.4 52.1 50.4 50.4 50.4 53.8 53.8 55.5 50.4 50.4 50.4 50.4 50.4 48.1 0.0 0.0 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 1.3 3.9 0.0 2.6 2.6 2.6 1.3 2.6 2.6 2.6 0.0 5.7 0.0 5.7 5.0 0.0 7.2 5.0 growing 
Bahamas: GAP 53.4 54.3 50.4 54.7 53.0 53.0 51.7 56.4 56.4 58.1 50.4 56.1 50.4 56.1 55.4 48.1 7.2 5.0 smaller 
 
ADHERENCE GAP 75.6 77.3 75.6 75.6 75.6 77.3 75.6 75.6 75.6 77.3 75.6 75.6 75.6 63.0 63.0 49.6 38.5 38.5 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 0.0 1.3 0.0 3.8 2.5 2.6 0.0 4.4 0.0 1.3 0.0 1.3 0.0 1.3 1.3 0.0 0.0 2.2 smaller 
Bahrain: GAP 75.6 78.6 75.6 79.4 78.1 79.9 75.6 80.0 75.6 78.6 75.6 76.9 75.6 64.3 64.3 49.6 38.5 40.7 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 28.6 14.3 12.6 19.3 9.6 22.0 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 17.0 0.0 17.6 11.9 17.6 8.8 8.8 4.4 1.3 11.9 13.2 6.9 15.0 10.6 7.8 7.8 10.6 12.8 smaller 
Bangladesh: GAP 42.2 25.2 42.8 37.1 42.8 34.0 34.0 29.6 26.5 37.1 38.4 32.1 43.6 24.9 20.4 27.1 20.2 34.8 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 12.6 12.6 17.7 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 17.7 12.6 19.4 12.6 16.0 17.7 12.6 12.6 1.5 1.5 7.5 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 7.0 7.0 7.0 2.6 11.2 7.0 7.0 5.7 13.2 5.7 14.5 7.5 8.2 8.3 2.2 3.9 4.4 5.0 smaller 
Barbados: GAP 19.6 19.6 24.7 15.2 23.8 19.6 19.6 23.4 25.8 25.1 27.1 23.5 25.9 20.9 14.8 5.4 5.9 12.5 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 no chg 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 7.5 5.7 5.7 4.2 4.4 5.5 5.5 2.6 4.2 5.7 11.4 7.0 14.0 6.8 2.2 5.0 13.3 7.2 growing
Belarus: GAP 7.5 5.7 5.7 4.2 4.4 5.5 5.5 2.6 4.2 5.7 11.4 7.0 14.0 6.8 2.2 5.0 13.3 7.2 growing
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 0.0 0.0 11.0 11.0 0.0 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 10.6 4.4 4.4 10.4 3.1 5.7 7.5 8.3 4.4 3.9 4.4 10.1 7.5 4.4 2.8 6.7 3.9 5.0 smaller 
Belgium: GAP 23.2 17.0 17.0 23.0 15.7 18.3 20.1 20.9 17.0 16.5 17.0 22.7 20.1 4.4 2.8 17.7 14.9 5.0 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 37.8 37.8 37.8 39.5 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 39.5 42.9 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 16.0 4.5 9.0 3.0 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 1.3 0.0 2.6 1.3 2.6 2.6 1.3 2.6 0.0 3.9 2.6 7.0 3.1 8.8 9.2 10.6 10.6 11.4 growing
Belize: GAP 39.1 37.8 40.4 40.8 40.4 40.4 39.1 40.4 39.5 46.8 40.4 44.8 40.9 46.6 25.2 15.1 19.6 14.4 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 16.0 14.3 12.6 12.6 12.6 17.7 17.7 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 17.7 12.6 12.6 16.0 22.0 0.0 0.0 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 3.9 1.3 5.2 3.9 2.6 5.2 6.5 10.9 1.3 5.2 3.9 3.9 3.1 11.4 7.8 8.9 3.9 3.9 growing 
Benin: GAP 19.9 15.6 17.8 16.5 15.2 22.9 24.2 23.5 13.9 17.8 16.5 21.6 15.7 24.0 23.8 30.9 3.9 3.9 smaller 
- Not applicable or n-fS = non-functioning State 
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Country/Year 198519861987 1988 1989 1990 1991 19921993199419951996 1997 1998 1999 2000 20012002 TREND 
 ADHERENCE GAP 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 25.2 26.9 25.2 28.6 25.2 28.6 33.7 19.4 12.6 14.3 19.3 26.5 22.0 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 5.7 0.0 4.4 2.6 7.0 1.3 7.0 1.3 7.0 5.7 12.6 11.4 10.1 10.1 6.7 12.8 12.8 14.5 growing
Bolivia: GAP 43.5 37.8 42.2 40.4 44.8 26.5 33.9 26.5 35.6 30.9 41.2 45.1 29.5 22.7 21.0 32.1 39.3 36.5 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP - - - - - - - - n-fS n-fS n-fS - 22.8 22.8 22.8 20.0 9.0 7.5 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP - - - - - - - - n-fS n-fS n-fS - 0.0 0.0 5.6 5.6 6.7 8.9 growing 
Bosnia & Herzeg.: GAP - - - - - - - - n-fS n-fS n-fS - 22.8 22.8 28.4 25.6 15.7 16.4 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 0.0 0.0 11.9 21.5 0.0 3.0 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.3 6.6 growing
Botswana: GAP 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 0.0 0.0 11.9 21.5 3.3 9.6 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 25.2 25.2 26.9 30.3 28.6 28.6 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 19.3 9.6 9.6 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 11.9 5.7 11.4 11.3 7.8 8.3 7.3 13.2 10.6 13.2 13.5 13.2 4.4 10.6 14.4 6.7 11.7 6.7 no chg 
Brazil: GAP 37.1 30.9 38.3 41.6 36.4 36.9 32.5 38.4 35.8 38.4 38.7 38.4 29.6 35.8 39.6 26.0 21.3 16.3 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 14.3 12.6 12.6 12.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 5.7 3.1 2.6 3.1 3.1 7.0 5.8 4.2 6.7 1.3 11.4 5.2 11.4 7.0 2.5 11.1 3.3 11.4 growing
Bulgaria: GAP 18.3 15.7 15.2 15.7 15.7 19.6 18.4 16.8 19.3 13.9 25.7 17.8 24.0 19.6 2.5 11.1 3.3 11.4 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 26.9 30.3 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 30.3 25.2 25.2 30.3 25.2 30.3 12.6 17.7 10.2 11.0 0.0 0.0 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 1.3 10.4 11.9 7.0 7.3 4.4 5.7 5.7 10.1 7.0 14.5 8.3 7.0 5.7 5.8 5.6 7.2 8.9 no chg 
Burkina Faso: GAP 28.2 40.7 37.1 32.2 32.5 29.6 36.0 30.9 35.3 37.3 39.7 38.6 19.6 23.4 16.0 16.6 7.2 8.9 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.0 25.2 26.9 33.7 33.7 21.1 21.1 12.6 11.0 11.0 0.0 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 0.0 8.8 0.0 7.5 0.0 8.8 0.0 8.8 6.0 4.4 5.7 5.7 1.3 10.1 7.2 5.0 7.8 3.9 growing
Burundi: GAP 63.0 71.8 63.0 70.5 63.0 71.8 63.0 71.8 31.2 31.3 39.4 39.4 22.4 31.2 19.8 16.0 18.8 3.9 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS - 75.6 75.6 75.6 75.6 0.0 11.0 20.0 15.6 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS - 1.3 0.0 5.6 5.6 1.3 0.0 0.0 2.2 no chg 
Cambodia: GAP n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS - 76.9 75.6 81.2 81.2 1.3 11.0 20.0 17.8 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 28.6 25.2 25.2 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 16.0 19.4 16.0 19.4 17.7 17.7 17.7 29.5 11.1 0.0 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 5.7 12.7 4.4 10.1 7.5 10.1 4.4 8.8 12.4 17.1 13.2 10.6 11.9 18.9 15.6 13.9 10.6 8.9 growing
Cameroon: GAP 34.3 37.9 29.6 22.7 20.1 22.7 17.0 21.4 28.4 36.5 29.2 30.0 29.6 36.6 33.3 43.4 21.7 8.9 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 28.9 28.9 28.9 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 3.1 11.7 7.3 7.4 7.0 3.1 5.7 14.0 9.9 13.9 20.8 8.8 5.7 16.3 14.1 8.3 8.9 7.2 growing 
Canada: GAP 40.9 49.5 45.1 45.2 44.8 40.9 43.5 51.8 47.7 51.7 58.6 46.6 43.5 54.1 51.9 37.2 37.8 36.1 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 25.2 26.9 30.3 30.3 33.7 25.2 28.6 33.7 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 28.6 17.7 22.3 23.5 15.5 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 1.3 5.2 3.9 5.2 6.5 6.5 2.6 6.8 6.5 7.0 6.0 1.3 4.4 2.6 6.1 7.2 3.9 2.2 no chg 
Cap Verde: GAP 26.5 32.1 34.2 35.5 40.2 31.7 31.2 40.5 31.7 32.2 31.2 26.5 29.6 31.2 23.8 29.5 27.4 17.7 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 19.4 19.4 16.0 21.1 19.4 12.6 17.7 19.4 19.4 21.1 12.6 19.4 14.3 12.6 19.4 9.0 1.5 0.0 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 14.5 17.6 14.5 11.9 13.2 15.8 7.0 17.1 17.1 12.7 13.2 4.4 5.7 11.9 9.2 13.9 8.9 8.9 smaller 
Central African Rep.: GAP 33.9 37.0 30.5 33.0 32.6 28.4 24.7 36.5 36.5 33.8 25.8 23.8 20.0 24.5 28.6 22.9 10.4 8.9 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 12.6 12.6 17.7 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 19.4 12.6 12.6 14.3 12.6 14.3 11.0 12.6 20.0 growing
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 8.8 1.3 7.5 15.0 7.5 8.8 10.1 6.2 8.3 10.1 17.6 7.0 17.9 15.0 8.9 2.8 8.9 16.7 growing
Chad: GAP 21.4 13.9 25.2 27.6 20.1 21.4 22.7 18.8 20.9 29.5 30.2 19.6 32.2 27.6 23.2 13.8 21.5 36.7 growing
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 50.4 50.4 50.4 50.4 50.4 50.4 50.4 50.4 50.4 50.4 50.4 52.1 52.1 50.4 0.0 1.5 0.0 7.5 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 5.7 4.4 4.2 3.1 4.4 4.2 1.6 5.7 4.4 5.7 7.0 1.3 5.7 11.4 0.0 5.0 7.2 7.7 growing 
Chile: GAP 56.1 54.8 54.6 53.5 54.8 54.6 52.0 56.1 54.8 56.1 57.4 53.4 57.8 61.8 0.0 6.5 7.2 15.2 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 75.6 75.6 75.6 77.3 75.6 75.6 75.6 75.6 75.6 63.0 57.8 60.5 48.1 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.5 2.5 2.5 1.3 2.5 1.3 1.3 2.6 0.0 3.8 1.3 1.1 1.1 0.0 no chg 
China: GAP 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 90.7 78.1 78.1 76.9 79.8 76.9 76.9 78.2 75.6 79.4 64.3 58.9 61.6 48.1 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 16.0 12.6 16.0 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 19.3 9.6 11.0 no chg 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 10.1 6.9 15.2 11.3 22.6 16.4 16.4 15.4 19.5 14.7 22.9 15.1 18.1 20.1 18.7 19.0 22.6 17.6 growing
Colombia: GAP 22.7 19.5 27.8 23.9 38.6 29.0 32.4 28.0 32.1 27.3 35.5 27.7 30.7 32.7 31.3 38.3 32.2 28.6 growing
- Not applicable or n-fS = non-functioning State 
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Country/Year 198519861987 1988 1989 1990 1991 19921993199419951996 1997 1998 1999 2000 20012002 TREND 
 ADHERENCE GAP 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 30.3 25.2 30.3 25.2 30.3 28.6 33.7 25.2 30.3 33.7 34.5 31.9 36.4 growing
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 3.9 1.3 6.5 1.3 0.0 6.5 3.9 0.0 3.9 3.9 5.2 5.2 2.6 5.7 8.5 5.0 2.8 7.8 growing
Comoros: GAP 29.1 26.5 31.7 26.5 25.2 36.8 29.1 30.3 29.1 34.2 33.8 38.9 27.8 36.0 42.2 39.5 34.7 44.2 growing
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 63.0 63.0 63.0 66.4 66.4 63.0 63.0 64.7 63.0 64.7 63.0 63.0 63.0 66.4 0.0 14.0 18.5 10.5 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 4.4 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 4.4 3.1 1.3 2.6 1.3 1.3 6.9 4.4 6.2 6.2 6.7 2.8 5.6 growing 
Congo: GAP 67.4 66.1 66.1 69.5 69.5 67.4 66.1 66.0 65.6 66.0 64.3 69.9 67.4 72.6 6.2 20.7 21.3 16.1 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.8 5.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.7 0.0 0.0 11.0 0.0 0.0 growing
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 8.8 3.9 8.8 2.6 8.8 6.4 10.1 5.2 11.4 3.9 20.5 13.9 16.3 16.1 8.6 12.8 8.3 3.9 growing
Costa Rica: GAP 8.8 3.9 8.8 4.3 8.8 6.4 10.1 12.0 16.5 3.9 20.5 13.9 18.0 16.1 8.6 23.8 8.3 3.9 growing
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 12.6 17.7 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 14.3 21.1 14.3 14.3 25.0 25.3 23.5 growing 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 2.6 1.3 5.2 4.4 4.4 7.0 8.2 8.2 15.1 7.0 8.8 10.1 10.1 14.5 2.8 6.1 7.8 7.8 growing 
Côte d’Ivoire: GAP 15.2 19.0 17.8 17.0 17.0 19.6 20.8 20.8 27.7 19.6 21.4 24.4 31.2 28.8 17.1 31.1 33.1 31.3 growing 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP - - - - - - - - 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.0 0.0 0.0 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP - - - - - - - - 0.0 1.3 10.1 1.3 15.3 13.0 6.7 2.2 8.9 2.8 growing
Croatia: GAP - - - - - - - - 12.6 13.9 22.7 13.9 15.3 13.0 6.7 13.2 8.9 2.8 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.0 11.0 9.6 growing 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 4.4 3.1 14.5 1.3 14.8 5.7 13.7 21.4 10.6 7.0 13.1 5.6 7.5 10.0 7.8 2.2 0.0 10.6 smaller 
Cuba: GAP 4.4 3.1 14.5 1.3 14.8 5.7 13.7 21.4 10.6 7.0 13.1 5.6 7.5 10.0 7.8 13.2 11.0 20.2 growing 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 25.2 25.2 12.6 12.6 12.6 14.3 12.6 12.6 12.6 14.3 14.3 16.0 6.8 1.7 3.4 0.0 1.5 7.5 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 2.6 2.6 2.6 1.3 8.7 5.7 5.7 9.1 2.6 1.3 8.8 7.5 10.6 10.6 5.0 6.7 3.3 8.9 growing
Cyprus: GAP 27.8 27.8 15.2 13.9 21.3 20.0 18.3 21.7 15.2 15.6 23.1 23.5 17.4 12.3 8.4 6.7 4.8 16.4 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP - - - - - - - - - 25.2 25.2 19.4 19.4 12.6 12.6 23.8 14.0 11.1 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP - - - - - - - - - 0.0 5.7 7.0 3.9 8.3 1.1 5.0 12.8 12.8 growing 
Czech Republic: GAP - - - - - - - - - 25.2 30.9 26.4 23.3 20.9 13.7 28.8 26.8 23.9 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 14.3 12.6 12.6 12.6 14.3 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 14.3 12.6 12.6 3.4 0.0 0.0 1.5 4.5 7.5 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 10.6 9.3 10.1 2.6 10.6 2.6 10.6 2.6 7.5 5.7 7.5 5.7 1.3 11.4 3.9 13.9 5.0 14.5 growing
Denmark: GAP 24.9 21.9 22.7 15.2 24.9 15.2 23.2 15.2 20.1 20.0 20.1 18.3 4.7 11.4 3.9 15.4 9.5 22.0 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 25.2 30.3 25.2 30.3 33.7 25.2 28.6 25.2 26.9 25.2 26.9 30.3 28.6 33.7 33.7 34.5 31.9 40.5 growing 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 0.0 3.9 2.6 3.9 3.9 5.2 1.3 2.6 3.9 2.6 3.9 6.9 11.3 15.1 16.4 9.4 8.3 6.1 growing 
Djibouti: GAP 25.2 34.2 27.8 34.2 37.6 30.4 29.9 27.8 30.8 27.8 30.8 37.2 39.9 48.8 50.1 43.9 40.2 46.6 growing 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 3.4 11.9 6.8 0.0 5.1 1.7 3.4 10.2 11.9 11.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.1 5.1 14.0 4.5 0.0 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 0.0 2.6 1.3 0.0 5.2 7.8 2.6 7.8 10.9 10.9 8.3 10.9 0.0 5.2 6.1 13.9 8.9 10.0 growing
Dominica: GAP 3.4 14.5 8.1 0.0 10.3 9.5 6.0 18.0 22.8 22.8 8.3 10.9 0.0 10.3 11.2 27.9 13.4 10.0 growing
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 12.6 12.6 19.4 16.0 22.8 21.1 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 9.3 5.7 9.3 11.9 19.4 23.2 18.8 10.0 9.3 8.4 5.5 8.8 8.8 10.1 6.7 6.7 5.0 15.1 smaller 
Dominican Republic: GAP 21.9 18.3 28.7 27.9 42.2 44.3 31.4 22.6 21.9 21.0 18.1 21.4 21.4 22.7 6.7 6.7 5.0 16.6 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 12.6 12.6 12.6 14.3 14.3 12.6 12.6 12.6 14.3 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 1.5 0.0 0.0 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 8.8 7.5 17.0 11.4 15.0 13.2 10.6 17.0 10.1 10.1 18.9 7.0 13.7 17.9 12.0 5.0 12.8 8.3 smaller 
Ecuador: GAP 21.4 20.1 29.6 25.7 29.3 25.8 23.2 29.6 24.4 22.7 31.5 19.6 26.3 30.5 24.6 6.5 12.8 8.3 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 0.0 11.0 11.0 0.0 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 6.2 2.6 11.7 10.1 7.5 11.4 11.9 1.3 13.2 14.5 16.3 5.7 7.3 11.4 2.8 6.1 12.8 6.1 no chg 
Egypt: GAP 18.8 15.2 24.3 22.7 20.1 24.0 24.5 13.9 25.8 27.1 28.9 18.3 19.9 24.0 2.8 17.1 23.8 6.1 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 75.6 75.6 75.6 77.3 75.6 75.6 75.6 77.3 75.6 75.6 50.4 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 19.3 19.3 19.3 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 0.0 4.4 4.4 6.9 5.0 9.4 7.5 14.4 6.9 2.5 8.3 3.9 1.3 7.0 1.1 4.4 2.2 7.8 no chg 
El Salvador: GAP 75.6 80.0 80.0 84.2 80.6 85.0 83.1 91.7 82.5 78.1 58.7 41.7 39.1 44.8 38.9 23.7 21.5 27.1 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.0 64.7 64.7 66.4 63.0 64.7 64.7 69.0 3.0 3.0 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.0 2.6 0.0 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 2.6 0.0 1.3 0.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 growing 
Equatorial Guinea: GAP 63.0 63.0 63.0 64.3 63.0 65.6 63.0 64.3 64.3 66.0 66.0 69.0 63.0 66.0 64.7 70.1 4.1 4.1 smaller 
- Not applicable or n-fS = non-functioning State 
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Country/Year 198519861987 1988 1989 1990 1991 19921993199419951996 1997 1998 1999 2000 20012002 TREND 
 ADHERENCE GAP - - - - - - - - - 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 9.6 11.0 11.0 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP - - - - - - - - - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.8 5.0 growing
Eritrea: GAP - - - - - - - - - 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 9.6 13.8 16.0 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP - - - - - - - - 88.0 63.0 63.0 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 28.9 19.3 19.3 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP - - - - - - - - 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.6 1.3 2.6 4.4 4.7 1.1 2.2 growing 
Estonia: GAP - - - - - - - - 88.0 63.0 63.0 27.8 26.5 27.8 29.6 33.6 20.4 21.5 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 50.4 50.4 50.4 50.4 50.4 50.4 50.4 50.4 50.4 50.4 50.4 50.4 53.8 50.4 17.7 23.8 28.3 19.3 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 6.2 4.4 7.5 3.1 8.8 0.0 8.8 3.1 4.2 3.9 6.8 6.9 12.6 10.0 9.2 8.9 12.8 11.7 growing
Ethiopia: GAP 56.6 54.8 57.9 53.5 59.2 50.4 59.2 53.5 54.6 54.3 57.2 57.3 66.4 60.4 26.9 32.7 41.1 31.0 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 55.5 50.4 52.1 55.5 52.1 50.4 50.4 50.4 50.4 50.4 50.4 50.4 50.4 52.1 53.8 58.0 55.0 11.0 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 3.9 3.9 2.6 8.2 8.2 0.0 5.7 1.3 0.0 5.7 3.1 5.7 3.1 2.6 5.0 2.2 5.0 1.4 no chg 
Fiji: GAP 59.4 54.3 54.7 63.7 60.3 50.4 56.1 51.7 50.4 56.1 53.5 56.1 53.5 54.7 58.8 60.2 60.0 12.4 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 no chg 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 8.8 4.4 8.9 6.0 7.8 8.8 4.4 8.8 5.7 4.4 6.0 1.3 8.8 4.4 2.8 7.8 1.1 6.1 smaller 
Finland: GAP 8.8 4.4 8.9 6.0 7.8 8.8 4.4 8.8 5.7 4.4 6.0 1.3 8.8 4.4 2.8 7.8 1.1 6.1 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 12.6 14.3 14.3 12.6 12.6 0.0 1.7 0.0 3.4 3.4 0.0 1.7 0.0 1.7 1.7 14.0 0.0 1.5 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 7.0 5.7 0.0 2.6 1.3 5.7 7.0 2.6 7.0 5.7 7.0 8.3 10.1 7.3 1.1 10.0 5.0 11.7 growing 
France: GAP 19.6 20.0 14.3 15.2 13.9 5.7 8.7 2.6 10.4 9.1 7.0 10.0 10.1 9.0 2.8 24.0 5.0 13.2 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 14.3 14.3 12.6 12.6 17.7 17.7 12.6 17.7 17.7 16.0 31.0 20.8 11.1 growing
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 7.5 7.0 7.5 8.3 7.5 14.5 11.9 14.5 5.7 7.5 17.6 2.6 5.7 9.6 9.6 9.4 6.1 12.2 no chg 
Gabon: GAP 20.1 19.6 20.1 20.9 20.1 28.8 26.2 27.1 18.3 25.2 35.3 15.2 23.4 27.3 25.6 40.4 26.9 23.3 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 9.6 0.0 10.5 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 no chg 
Gambia: GAP 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 9.6 0.0 10.5 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP - - - - - - - - - 37.8 37.8 12.6 16.0 22.8 10.2 17.0 14.0 4.5 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP - - - - - - - - - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 1.1 7.7 growing
Georgia: GAP - - - - - - - - - 37.8 37.8 12.6 16.0 22.8 10.2 18.1 15.1 12.2 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.0 11.0 0.0 growing 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 8.8 13.7 13.2 10.1 11.9 4.4 19.2 8.8 11.9 9.3 12.0 9.3 8.8 9.3 6.7 5.6 5.6 5.0 smaller 
Germany: GAP 10.5 13.7 13.2 10.1 11.9 4.4 19.2 8.8 11.9 9.3 12.0 9.3 8.8 9.3 6.7 16.6 16.6 5.0 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 17.7 12.6 12.6 17.7 17.7 16.0 12.6 12.6 14.3 17.7 17.7 12.6 17.7 22.8 17.7 14.0 9.6 9.6 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 3.1 10.1 10.1 3.9 15.8 12.7 11.9 8.8 13.2 8.8 17.6 11.4 5.7 15.8 11.1 9.5 8.9 3.9 growing
Ghana: GAP 20.8 22.7 22.7 21.6 33.5 28.7 24.5 21.4 27.5 26.5 35.3 24.0 23.4 38.6 28.8 23.5 18.5 13.5 no chg 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 12.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.1 1.7 5.1 3.4 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.7 0.0 0.0 11.0 0.0 0.0 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 5.7 11.4 11.9 10.6 10.6 17.2 23.3 10.1 22.0 7.5 4.4 4.4 2.6 15.0 2.8 7.8 3.9 11.7 smaller 
Greece: GAP 18.3 11.4 11.9 10.6 15.7 18.9 28.4 13.5 23.7 7.5 4.4 4.4 4.3 15.0 2.8 18.8 3.9 11.7 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 50.4 53.8 53.8 55.5 52.1 55.5 55.5 52.1 52.1 30.3 25.2 33.7 33.7 33.7 32.0 34.5 35.4 33.0 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 2.6 1.3 1.3 3.9 1.3 2.6 1.3 2.6 0.0 1.3 0.0 1.3 1.3 3.1 2.8 2.2 1.1 2.2 no chg 
Grenada: GAP 53.0 55.1 55.1 59.4 53.4 58.1 56.8 54.7 52.1 31.6 25.2 35.0 35.0 36.8 34.8 36.7 36.5 35.2 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 12.6 0.0 0.0 3.4 0.0 5.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 15.5 0.0 0.0 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 7.5 10.4 11.7 2.9 8.8 6.9 12.5 14.4 14.5 15.8 26.5 17.7 23.9 14.5 17.2 16.6 21.1 21.7 growing 
Guatemala: GAP 32.7 35.6 36.9 28.1 21.4 6.9 12.5 17.8 14.5 20.9 26.5 17.7 23.9 14.5 17.2 32.1 21.1 21.7 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 19.4 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 17.7 12.6 12.6 17.7 14.3 17.7 16.0 21.1 22.8 22.0 23.8 31.0 growing
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 13.2 17.6 10.1 16.1 4.2 10.1 7.0 3.9 11.4 3.9 11.4 15.2 11.4 16.3 14.5 13.4 10.6 14.5 growing
Guinea: GAP 32.6 30.2 22.7 28.7 16.8 22.7 24.7 16.5 24.0 21.6 25.7 32.9 27.4 37.4 37.3 35.4 34.4 45.5 growing
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 30.3 30.3 28.6 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 33.7 33.7 33.7 25.2 28.6 28.6 30.3 30.3 30.9 33.0 28.9 growing
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 5.7 8.3 7.0 5.8 4.5 5.2 2.6 9.6 9.6 6.5 9.6 3.9 7.0 9.6 7.2 3.3 2.2 1.1 smaller 
Guinea-Bissau: GAP 36.0 38.6 35.6 31.0 29.7 30.4 27.8 43.3 43.3 40.2 34.8 32.5 35.6 39.9 37.5 34.2 35.2 30.0 no chg 
- Not applicable or n-fS = non-functioning State 
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Country/Year 198519861987 1988 1989 1990 1991 19921993199419951996 1997 1998 1999 2000 20012002 TREND
 ADHERENCE GAP 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 19.4 17.7 21.1 12.6 17.7 21.1 12.6 12.6 12.6 0.0 0.0 11.0 0.0 0.0 smaller
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 3.8 3.8 6.5 2.6 4.4 5.2 5.2 5.7 7.0 3.9 3.9 3.1 2.6 7.5 1.1 6.7 3.3 3.9 no chg
Guyana: GAP 16.4 16.4 19.1 15.2 23.8 22.9 26.3 18.3 24.7 25.0 16.5 15.7 15.2 7.5 1.1 17.7 3.3 3.9 smaller
 
 ADHERENCE GAP - n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS - 17.7 17.7 12.6 25.0 26.8 31.0 growing 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP - n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS - 4.4 15.0 12.8 12.2 15.0 17.3 growing 
Haiti: GAP - n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS - 22.1 32.7 25.4 37.2 41.8 48.3 growing 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.7 0.0 8.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.0 0.0 0.0 growing
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 3.1 11.9 11.4 7.0 4.4 7.0 16.4 12.0 5.6 5.2 11.4 10.1 2.6 7.5 10.6 2.8 11.7 3.9 smaller 
Honduras: GAP 3.1 11.9 11.4 8.7 4.4 15.5 16.4 12.0 5.6 10.3 11.4 10.1 2.6 7.5 10.6 13.8 11.7 3.9 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 4.4 2.6 4.4 2.6 5.7 2.6 3.9 2.6 8.8 8.3 8.8 1.3 7.0 1.3 7.2 2.2 2.2 6.1 growing 
Hungary: GAP 29.6 27.8 29.6 27.8 30.9 27.8 29.1 27.8 34.0 20.9 21.4 13.9 19.6 1.3 7.2 2.2 2.2 6.1 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 17.7 12.6 12.6 12.6 14.3 12.6 14.3 14.3 14.3 12.6 12.6 12.6 14.3 12.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 7.0 7.0 1.3 4.4 1.3 7.5 3.9 10.6 1.3 8.8 4.4 2.6 4.4 3.1 2.2 3.9 2.8 10.6 no chg 
Iceland: GAP 24.7 19.6 13.9 17.0 15.6 20.1 18.2 24.9 15.6 21.4 17.0 15.2 18.7 15.7 2.2 3.9 2.8 10.6 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 50.4 50.4 50.4 50.4 50.4 50.4 52.1 53.8 53.8 53.8 50.4 50.4 50.4 50.4 50.4 40.0 38.5 38.5 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 1.3 11.3 1.3 5.7 8.2 6.4 18.9 15.2 10.1 15.7 5.7 5.7 8.3 10.6 2.8 3.9 3.9 12.8 no chg 
India: GAP 51.7 61.7 51.7 56.1 58.6 56.8 71.0 69.0 63.9 69.5 56.1 56.1 58.7 61.0 53.2 43.9 42.4 51.3 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 50.4 50.4 50.4 50.4 50.4 53.8 50.4 50.4 50.4 55.5 50.4 50.4 50.4 37.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 0.0 4.4 7.5 3.8 5.7 2.6 7.0 1.3 4.4 8.3 9.5 5.6 11.3 6.9 4.1 2.8 5.8 7.2 growing
Indonesia: GAP 50.4 54.8 57.9 54.2 56.1 56.4 57.4 51.7 54.8 63.8 59.9 56.0 61.7 44.7 4.1 2.8 5.8 8.7 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 39.5 42.9 41.2 42.9 37.8 37.8 37.8 39.5 37.8 37.8 37.8 41.2 37.8 37.8 39.5 40.0 40.0 30.4 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 4.4 10.1 8.8 7.0 8.8 10.1 3.1 1.3 10.1 1.3 4.4 5.7 7.0 3.1 8.9 3.9 3.9 3.9 smaller 
Iran, Islamic Rep. of: GAP 43.9 53.0 50.0 49.9 46.6 47.9 40.9 40.8 47.9 39.1 42.2 46.9 44.8 40.9 48.4 43.9 43.9 34.3 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 14.3 12.6 12.6 14.3 12.6 14.3 17.7 14.3 17.7 12.6 20.6 14.1 15.5 growing
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 6.5 1.3 6.5 3.9 7.5 3.9 11.9 15.8 4.4 13.2 6.2 10.1 13.2 8.3 11.7 6.7 10.6 10.6 growing
Iraq: GAP 19.1 13.9 19.1 16.5 20.1 18.2 24.5 28.4 18.7 25.8 20.5 27.8 27.5 26.0 24.3 27.3 24.7 26.1 growing
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 12.6 12.6 12.6 17.7 17.7 19.4 12.6 16.0 12.6 14.3 12.6 14.3 12.6 12.6 0.0 1.5 3.0 0.0 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 7.5 1.3 7.5 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 9.6 7.0 3.9 6.2 1.3 7.0 4.4 6.1 5.0 1.1 2.2 smaller 
Ireland: GAP 20.1 13.9 20.1 23.4 23.4 25.1 18.3 25.6 19.6 18.2 18.8 15.6 19.6 17.0 6.1 6.5 4.1 2.2 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.7 0.0 0.0 3.4 0.0 1.7 11.0 11.0 11.0 growing
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 0.0 8.3 0.0 5.2 1.3 5.2 0.0 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 3.9 3.3 1.1 6.1 2.2 no chg 
Israel: GAP 0.0 8.3 0.0 5.2 1.3 5.2 0.0 2.6 2.6 4.3 2.6 2.6 6.0 3.9 5.0 12.1 17.1 13.2 growing
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 0.0 3.4 5.1 5.1 8.5 1.7 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 3.9 9.6 3.9 8.1 5.2 3.9 3.9 7.0 7.0 2.6 5.2 0.0 5.2 3.9 2.2 2.2 1.1 1.1 smaller 
Italy: GAP 3.9 13.0 9.0 13.2 13.7 5.6 5.6 7.0 7.0 2.6 5.2 0.0 6.9 3.9 2.2 2.2 1.1 1.1 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 16.0 19.4 17.7 16.0 19.4 12.6 16.0 14.3 17.7 17.7 14.3 17.7 16.0 12.6 16.0 29.5 23.8 23.5 growing
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 11.4 14.5 11.9 13.2 10.1 13.2 13.2 13.7 5.7 16.3 16.3 15.0 8.8 13.2 6.7 10.6 10.6 9.5 smaller
Jamaica: GAP 27.4 33.9 29.6 29.2 29.5 25.8 29.2 28.0 23.4 34.0 30.6 32.7 24.8 25.8 22.7 40.1 34.4 33.0 growing
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 28.9 19.3 19.3 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 7.5 10.6 7.5 8.8 6.2 4.4 4.4 5.7 6.2 6.2 10.6 9.3 4.4 12.4 8.1 12.3 11.2 18.9 growing 
Japan: GAP 45.3 48.4 45.3 46.6 44.0 42.2 42.2 43.5 44.0 44.0 48.4 47.1 42.2 50.2 45.9 41.2 30.5 38.2 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 25.2 30.3 25.2 25.2 26.9 28.6 25.2 30.3 32.0 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 12.6 12.6 9.6 9.6 9.6 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 5.1 8.3 8.3 5.7 3.1 5.2 4.4 7.0 5.2 7.0 3.1 4.4 7.0 3.9 5.0 1.1 5.0 6.1 smaller 
Jordan: GAP 30.3 38.6 33.5 30.9 30.0 33.8 29.6 37.3 37.2 32.2 28.3 29.6 32.2 16.5 17.6 10.7 14.6 15.7 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP - - - - - - - - - 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 75.6 66.0 12.5 11.1 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP - - - - - - - - - 1.3 1.3 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.2 no chg 
Kazakhstan: GAP - - - - - - - - - 89.5 89.5 89.5 88.0 88.0 75.6 66.0 12.5 13.3 smaller 
- Not applicable or n-fS = non-functioning State 
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Country/Year 198519861987 1988 1989 1990 1991 19921993199419951996 1997 1998 1999 2000 20012002 TREND
ADHERENCE GAP 39.5 41.2 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 39.5 39.5 38.5 11.0 11.0 smaller
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 2.6 5.7 11.4 10.1 7.0 5.7 5.7 10.1 2.5 8.3 7.5 7.0 11.9 8.8 10.6 0.0 13.4 6.7 growing
Kenya: GAP 42.1 46.9 49.2 47.9 44.8 43.5 43.5 47.9 40.3 46.1 45.3 44.8 49.7 48.3 50.1 38.5 24.4 17.7 smaller
 
 ADHERENCE GAP - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 44.0 38.5 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0.0 0.0 no chg 
Kiribati: GAP - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 44.0 38.5 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP - - - - - - - 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 75.6 63.0 50.4 48.1 38.5 41.5 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP - - - - - - - 0.0 2.5 1.3 0.0 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 3.3 3.3 4.4 growing
Korea, Republic of: GAP - - - - - - - 88.0 90.7 89.5 88.0 90.7 78.1 65.5 52.9 51.4 41.8 45.9 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 39.5 37.8 41.2 37.8 39.5 37.8 37.8 37.8 41.2 37.8 25.2 19.3 19.3 20.8 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 7.0 7.0 4.4 2.6 8.3 3.9 1.3 5.7 8.3 3.1 4.4 7.5 2.6 5.7 5.6 3.9 5.6 8.9 no chg 
Kuwait: GAP 44.8 44.8 42.2 40.4 47.8 41.7 42.5 43.5 47.8 40.9 42.2 45.3 43.8 43.5 30.8 23.2 24.9 29.7 smaller 
 
ADHERENCE GAP - - - - - - - - 12.6 12.6 17.7 22.8 21.1 22.8 10.2 20.0 21.5 21.5 growing
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP - - - - - - - - 0.0 0.0 2.6 2.6 3.9 5.2 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.2 growing
Kyrgyzstan: GAP - - - - - - - - 12.6 12.6 20.3 25.4 25.0 28.0 17.4 27.2 28.7 28.7 growing
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 75.6 77.3 75.6 77.3 77.3 75.6 75.6 77.3 77.3 75.6 75.6 77.3 77.3 75.6 75.6 78.5 77.0 76.1 no chg 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 0.0 1.3 1.3 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.6 0.0 1.1 0.0 1.1 no chg 
Lao PDR: GAP 76.9 78.6 76.9 78.6 78.6 76.9 75.6 78.6 78.6 76.9 75.6 77.3 77.3 78.2 75.6 79.6 77.0 77.2 no chg 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP - - - - - - - 25.2 25.2 25.2 26.9 32.0 33.7 30.3 25.2 28.9 33.0 31.9 growing
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP - - - - - - - 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.5 5.2 7.7 5.2 8.3 2.2 6.1 3.3 growing
Latvia: GAP - - - - - - - 25.2 25.2 25.2 32.4 37.2 41.4 35.5 33.5 31.1 39.1 35.2 growing
b 
 ADHERENCE GAP - - - n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS - 25.2 26.9 26.9 25.2 25.2 25.2 28.9 19.3 19.3 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP - - - n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS - 5.2 2.6 2.6 2.6 7.0 2.8 2.2 5.0 3.3 no chg 
Lebanon: GAP - - - n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS - 30.4 29.5 29.5 27.8 32.2 28.0 31.1 24.3 22.6 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 53.8 50.4 50.4 50.4 50.4 50.4 50.4 52.1 53.8 52.1 50.4 50.4 50.4 25.2 26.9 34.5 1.5 0.0 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 2.6 4.4 3.1 0.0 3.1 1.3 3.1 3.8 2.6 1.3 1.3 1.3 2.6 2.6 1.1 4.4 7.8 7.2 growing
Lesotho: GAP 56.4 54.8 53.5 50.4 53.5 51.7 53.5 55.9 56.4 53.4 51.7 51.7 53.0 27.8 28.0 38.9 9.3 7.2 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 17.7 12.6 16.0 21.1 16.0 17.7 21.1 12.6 12.6 17.7 12.6 19.4 19.4 21.1 22.8 1.5 0.0 3.0 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 4.4 7.5 14.5 10.1 13.2 8.8 11.9 13.2 5.7 5.7 11.4 8.3 13.2 10.1 11.7 8.9 7.8 8.9 growing 
Libyan Arab Jamahir.: GAP 22.1 20.1 30.5 31.2 29.2 26.5 33.0 25.8 18.3 23.4 24.0 27.7 32.6 31.2 34.5 10.4 7.8 11.9 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP - - - - - - - 88.0 88.0 12.6 12.6 17.7 14.3 0.0 0.0 11.0 11.0 9.6 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP - - - - - - - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.9 5.2 5.2 5.0 5.0 5.5 6.1 growing
Lithuania: GAP - - - - - - - 88.0 88.0 12.6 12.6 21.6 19.5 5.2 5.0 16.0 16.5 15.7 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 14.3 12.6 19.4 12.6 12.6 12.6 19.3 3.0 7.5 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 4.4 1.3 2.6 2.6 0.0 2.6 0.0 2.6 1.3 1.3 0.0 1.3 2.6 3.9 0.0 1.1 3.3 4.4 no chg 
Luxembourg: GAP 17.0 13.9 15.2 15.2 12.6 15.2 12.6 15.2 13.9 15.6 12.6 20.7 15.2 16.5 12.6 20.4 6.3 11.9 smaller 
 
ADHERENCE GAP - - - - - - - - - 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 17.7 21.1 31.0 31.0 20.0 growing
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP - - - - - - - - - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 3.9 3.9 2.8 3.9 growing
Macedonia: GAP - - - - - - - - - 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 19.0 25.0 34.9 33.8 23.9 growing
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 39.5 44.6 39.5 39.5 41.2 37.8 39.5 42.9 41.2 39.5 39.5 41.2 39.5 32.0 30.3 22.0 9.6 15.6 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 8.8 10.1 8.8 7.0 6.2 5.7 4.2 5.7 10.1 5.7 8.8 10.1 8.8 13.2 11.7 8.9 5.0 13.9 growing
Madagascar: GAP 48.3 54.7 48.3 46.5 47.4 43.5 43.7 48.6 51.3 45.2 48.3 51.3 48.3 45.2 42.0 30.9 14.6 29.5 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 53.8 50.4 50.4 50.4 50.4 52.1 53.8 50.4 52.1 52.1 50.4 52.1 53.8 52.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 1.3 2.6 2.6 1.3 2.6 1.3 3.9 2.6 5.1 3.9 2.6 1.3 2.6 3.9 1.1 0.0 6.1 16.1 growing 
Malawi: GAP 55.1 53.0 53.0 51.7 53.0 53.4 57.7 53.0 57.2 56.0 53.0 53.4 56.4 56.0 1.1 0.0 6.1 16.1 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 50.4 50.4 50.4 50.4 50.4 50.4 64.7 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.0 64.7 41.2 37.8 44.6 30.3 28.9 28.9 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 7.5 5.7 5.7 5.7 6.9 5.7 9.4 5.6 3.8 5.7 3.1 3.1 3.1 4.4 3.9 3.9 5.0 1.1 smaller 
Malaysia: GAP 57.9 56.1 56.1 56.1 57.3 56.1 74.1 68.6 66.8 68.7 66.1 67.8 44.3 42.2 48.5 34.2 33.9 30.0 smaller 
- Not applicable or n-fS = non-functioning State 
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Country/Year 1985 198619871988 19891990 1991 1992 19931994 199519961997 19981999 2000 2001 2002 TREND 
 ADHERENCE GAP 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 16.0 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 17.7 22.8 12.6 11.1 9.6 0.0 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 2.6 1.3 2.6 3.9 1.3 3.9 3.9 2.6 8.3 3.9 4.4 5.7 3.9 8.3 7.2 5.0 6.1 6.1 growing
Mali: GAP 15.2 13.9 15.2 16.5 13.9 16.5 16.5 18.6 20.9 16.5 17.0 18.3 21.6 31.1 19.8 16.1 15.7 6.1 growing
 
ADHERENCE GAP 25.2 25.2 25.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.7 5.1 5.1 1.7 11.0 0.0 0.0 smaller
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 6.2 10.6 7.5 1.3 6.0 1.3 4.4 5.5 10.0 7.0 1.3 5.7 2.6 5.7 5.0 3.9 2.2 5.0 smaller
Malta: GAP 31.4 35.8 32.7 1.3 6.0 1.3 4.4 5.5 10.0 7.0 1.3 7.4 7.7 10.8 6.7 14.9 2.2 5.0 smaller
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 53.8 53.8 52.1 52.1 53.8 55.5 53.8 50.4 50.4 50.4 50.4 52.1 39.5 41.2 41.2 41.5 0.0 0.0 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 7.5 7.5 3.1 2.6 8.8 10.6 11.9 0.0 11.9 11.7 7.5 7.5 10.1 7.5 10.6 6.7 7.8 13.4 growing 
Mauritania: GAP 61.3 61.3 55.2 54.7 62.6 66.1 65.7 50.4 62.3 62.1 57.9 59.6 49.6 48.7 51.8 48.2 7.8 13.4 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 50.4 50.4 50.4 50.4 52.1 39.5 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 28.9 28.9 28.9 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 4.4 5.7 3.1 0.0 8.8 6.2 6.2 3.1 4.4 3.1 7.5 0.0 8.8 2.6 6.9 1.1 10.6 6.7 growing
Mauritius: GAP 54.8 56.1 53.5 50.4 60.9 45.7 44.0 40.9 42.2 40.9 45.3 37.8 46.6 40.4 44.7 30.0 39.5 35.6 smaller 
 
ADHERENCE GAP 25.2 30.3 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 19.3 19.3 19.3 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 7.0 0.0 5.7 2.6 5.7 1.3 5.7 1.3 5.7 1.3 5.7 5.7 5.1 5.7 8.0 5.0 7.8 15.6 growing 
Mexico: GAP 32.2 30.3 30.9 27.8 30.9 26.5 30.9 26.5 30.9 26.5 30.9 30.9 30.3 30.9 33.2 24.3 27.1 34.9 no chg 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP - - - - - - - - 75.6 75.6 77.3 39.5 39.5 44.6 25.2 11.0 11.0 0.0 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP - - - - - - - - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.4 1.1 1.1 3.3 growing
Moldova: GAP - - - - - - - - 75.6 75.6 77.3 39.5 39.5 44.6 29.6 12.1 12.1 3.3 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 39.5 37.8 42.9 37.8 42.9 37.8 42.9 39.5 39.5 41.2 39.5 37.8 37.8 41.2 37.8 47.0 34.9 39.0 no chg 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 3.1 0.0 3.1 3.1 4.4 0.0 4.4 5.7 0.0 2.6 3.9 2.6 1.3 2.6 0.0 3.3 3.3 3.3 no chg 
Mongolia: GAP 42.6 37.8 46.0 40.9 47.3 37.8 47.3 45.2 39.5 43.8 43.4 40.4 39.1 43.8 37.8 50.3 38.2 42.3 no chg 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 32.0 25.2 25.2 25.2 28.6 30.3 25.2 25.2 19.3 9.6 9.6 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 8.8 5.1 7.0 11.4 5.7 10.8 11.4 20.1 15.8 19.5 14.5 18.3 17.6 19.4 3.9 6.1 8.6 9.4 growing
Morocco: GAP 34.0 30.3 32.2 36.6 30.9 36.0 36.6 52.1 41.0 44.7 39.7 46.9 47.9 44.6 29.1 25.4 18.2 19.0 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 50.4 50.4 50.4 50.4 50.4 50.4 50.4 52.1 50.4 52.1 50.4 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 28.9 28.9 28.9 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 0.0 2.6 0.0 5.8 0.0 7.0 1.3 3.9 2.6 1.3 3.9 2.6 4.2 5.2 6.1 2.8 2.2 7.8 growing 
Mozambique: GAP 50.4 53.0 50.4 56.2 50.4 57.4 51.7 56.0 53.0 53.4 54.3 27.8 29.4 30.4 31.3 31.7 31.1 36.7 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.0 66.4 63.0 63.0 63.0 66.4 66.4 64.7 63.0 64.9 63.4 57.8 no chg 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 3.1 1.3 3.1 4.4 3.1 1.3 7.5 7.5 6.2 3.1 6.2 6.2 3.1 6.2 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 growing
Myanmar: GAP 66.1 64.3 66.1 67.4 66.1 64.3 70.5 73.9 69.2 66.1 69.2 72.6 69.5 70.9 68.6 70.5 69.0 63.4 growing
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.0 19.3 9.6 9.6 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.6 4.4 3.1 3.9 2.8 1.1 0.0 growing 
Namibia: GAP 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 63.0 65.6 67.4 66.1 66.9 22.1 10.7 9.6 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.0 64.7 66.4 63.0 50.4 37.8 37.8 41.2 38.5 38.5 22.0 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 2.6 5.1 2.5 5.1 2.5 5.1 2.6 3.1 1.3 4.4 7.5 3.1 7.5 4.4 8.9 1.1 7.2 7.2 growing
Nepal: GAP 65.6 68.1 65.5 68.1 65.5 68.1 65.6 66.1 66.0 70.8 70.5 53.5 45.3 42.2 50.1 39.6 45.7 29.2 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 0.0 0.0 1.7 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.0 11.0 0.0 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 3.1 10.4 7.5 4.4 6.2 7.5 5.7 7.5 4.4 7.5 4.4 7.0 5.7 7.3 7.8 5.0 7.8 5.0 no chg 
Netherlands: GAP 15.7 23.0 20.1 17.0 18.8 20.1 18.3 20.1 4.4 7.5 6.1 8.7 5.7 7.3 7.8 16.0 18.8 5.0 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 41.2 38.5 30.9 28.9 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 0.0 7.0 0.0 8.2 1.3 8.8 7.5 6.2 4.4 4.4 7.5 3.1 3.1 4.4 2.8 1.1 6.1 2.8 no chg 
New Zealand: GAP 37.8 44.8 37.8 46.0 39.1 46.6 45.3 44.0 42.2 42.2 45.3 40.9 40.9 42.2 44.0 39.6 37.0 31.7 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.7 8.5 3.4 3.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 4.4 12.5 19.5 19.5 15.0 8.3 7.5 9.8 13.5 16.7 12.0 5.7 5.7 5.5 7.4 5.0 7.7 3.9 smaller 
Nicaragua: GAP 4.4 12.5 19.5 19.5 16.7 16.8 10.9 13.2 13.5 16.7 12.0 5.7 5.7 5.5 7.4 5.0 7.7 3.9 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 0.0 8.5 0.0 0.0 5.1 1.7 6.8 0.0 0.0 1.7 0.0 0.0 8.5 5.1 8.5 3.0 1.5 6.0 growing
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 2.6 2.6 2.6 3.9 1.3 7.8 5.2 5.2 1.3 8.3 7.0 2.6 8.3 9.9 5.0 6.9 6.1 8.9 growing
Niger: GAP 2.6 11.1 2.6 3.9 6.4 9.5 12.0 5.2 1.3 10.0 7.0 2.6 16.8 15.0 13.5 9.9 7.6 14.9 growing
- Not applicable or n-fS = non-functioning State 
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Country/Year 1985 198619871988 19891990 1991 1992 19931994 199519961997 19981999 2000 2001 2002 TREND 
 ADHERENCE GAP 25.2 28.6 25.2 25.2 25.2 30.3 25.2 25.2 25.2 28.6 25.2 26.9 30.3 33.7 30.3 34.9 40.5 0.0 no chg 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 0.0 8.8 9.3 7.0 11.9 7.0 11.4 8.6 8.8 8.2 5.7 4.4 8.8 14.8 14.3 10.6 11.7 11.7 growing 
Nigeria: GAP 25.2 37.4 34.5 32.2 37.1 37.3 36.6 33.8 34.0 36.8 30.9 31.3 39.1 48.5 44.6 45.5 52.2 11.7 growing 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 no chg
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 7.0 10.1 7.5 3.9 7.5 5.7 4.4 7.5 3.1 10.1 7.5 6.2 8.8 4.4 2.8 11.7 5.6 10.6 no chg
Norway: GAP 7.0 10.1 7.5 5.6 7.5 5.7 4.4 7.5 3.1 10.1 7.5 6.2 8.8 4.4 2.8 11.7 5.6 10.6 no chg
 
 ADHERENCE GAP - - - - - - - - - - 88.0 88.0 88.0 75.6 75.6 77.0 59.8 57.8 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP - - - - - - - - - - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.9 growing 
Oman: GAP - - - - - - - - - - 88.0 88.0 88.0 75.6 75.6 77.0 59.8 61.7 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 25.2 28.6 33.7 25.2 28.6 25.2 33.7 25.2 25.2 30.3 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 33.0 9.6 12.6 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 6.2 10.1 19.4 19.4 20.7 11.9 23.2 16.3 10.4 17.6 16.3 15.0 10.6 8.8 18.7 7.5 18.4 9.5 smaller 
Pakistan: GAP 31.4 38.7 53.1 44.6 49.3 37.1 56.9 41.5 35.6 47.9 41.5 40.2 35.8 34.0 43.9 40.5 28.0 22.1 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 14.3 14.3 14.3 17.7 12.6 12.6 17.7 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 16.0 14.3 12.6 12.6 0.0 0.0 3.0 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 7.5 3.1 18.8 11.3 12.5 12.7 10.0 18.4 7.0 2.9 15.8 4.4 8.6 17.5 17.5 7.5 11.7 6.1 no chg 
Panama: GAP 21.8 17.4 33.1 29.0 25.1 25.3 27.7 31.0 19.6 15.5 28.4 20.4 22.9 30.1 30.1 7.5 11.7 9.1 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 52.1 55.5 53.8 55.5 55.5 50.4 52.1 55.5 52.1 53.8 55.5 50.4 50.4 50.4 50.4 1.5 0.0 9.0 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 2.6 2.6 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 3.1 5.7 5.7 4.4 5.7 5.7 3.1 2.6 3.9 1.1 6.7 1.1 no chg 
Papua New Guinea: GAP 54.7 58.1 59.5 61.2 61.2 56.1 55.2 61.2 57.8 58.2 61.2 56.1 53.5 53.0 54.3 2.6 6.7 10.1 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 16.0 12.6 12.6 17.7 12.6 12.6 17.7 12.6 17.7 12.6 22.0 15.6 14.0 growing 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 20.0 10.0 18.8 8.8 19.4 16.1 15.1 23.2 15.0 14.6 20.2 13.2 13.2 11.9 12.3 7.8 16.1 9.5 smaller 
Paraguay: GAP 32.6 22.6 31.4 21.4 32.0 32.1 27.7 35.8 32.7 27.2 32.8 30.9 25.8 29.6 24.9 29.8 31.7 23.5 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 14.3 14.3 19.4 12.6 16.0 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 19.3 19.3 0.0 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 8.8 2.5 9.9 10.8 10.7 19.0 24.8 26.3 16.4 26.5 19.2 17.6 17.7 19.5 11.3 14.7 12.7 10.6 growing
Peru: GAP 21.4 15.1 22.5 23.4 25.0 33.3 44.2 38.9 32.4 39.1 31.8 30.2 30.3 32.1 23.9 34.0 32.0 10.6 growing
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 28.6 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 28.6 14.3 12.6 19.3 9.6 9.6 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 5.7 7.0 10.1 2.5 13.3 9.2 15.9 13.3 15.1 9.6 11.7 7.0 8.2 17.1 8.9 3.9 10.6 11.7 growing 
Philippines: GAP 34.3 32.2 35.3 27.7 38.5 34.4 41.1 38.5 40.3 34.8 36.9 32.2 36.8 31.4 21.5 23.2 20.2 21.3 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.0 11.0 0.0 growing
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 7.5 4.4 17.6 7.5 10.6 10.0 4.4 10.6 10.1 4.4 7.0 7.0 5.7 2.9 3.5 6.1 2.2 6.7 smaller 
Poland: GAP 7.5 4.4 17.6 7.5 10.6 10.0 4.4 10.6 10.1 4.4 7.0 7.0 5.7 2.9 3.5 17.1 13.2 6.7 no chg 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 14.5 8.3 7.3 0.0 4.4 5.5 4.4 1.3 7.0 1.3 8.8 5.7 10.6 4.4 6.7 2.8 3.9 10.6 no chg 
Portugal: GAP 27.1 20.9 19.9 12.6 17.0 18.1 17.0 13.9 19.6 13.9 21.4 18.3 23.2 4.4 6.7 2.8 3.9 10.6 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 77.3 77.3 77.3 75.6 75.6 75.6 75.6 75.6 77.3 75.6 75.6 75.6 75.6 63.0 63.0 48.1 48.1 48.1 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 0.0 0.0 1.3 1.3 1.3 0.0 0.0 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 0.0 1.3 1.1 3.9 3.9 3.9 growing
Qatar: GAP 77.3 77.3 78.6 76.9 76.9 75.6 75.6 76.9 78.6 76.9 76.9 76.9 75.6 64.3 64.1 52.0 52.0 52.0 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 12.6 16.0 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 14.3 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 10.1 8.8 8.8 7.0 11.3 6.0 7.3 18.9 5.7 12.7 12.7 11.9 8.6 8.8 7.8 8.6 2.2 8.9 smaller 
Romania: GAP 22.7 24.8 21.4 19.6 23.9 18.6 21.6 31.5 18.3 25.3 25.3 24.5 21.2 8.8 7.8 8.6 2.2 8.9 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP - - - - - - - - 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 0.0 0.0 11.0 11.0 9.6 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP - - - - - - - - 5.7 3.9 7.0 7.0 3.1 3.9 3.6 11.1 3.3 9.2 growing
Russian Federation: GAP - - - - - - - - 18.3 16.5 19.6 19.6 15.7 3.9 3.6 22.1 14.3 18.8 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 37.8 39.5 37.8 12.6 14.3 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 19.4 14.3 16.0 12.6 11.0 0.0 0.0 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 1.3 7.0 1.3 2.6 1.3 7.0 5.5 8.8 7.3 2.6 10.1 10.1 13.2 14.5 15.6 5.6 6.7 11.4 growing 
Rwanda: GAP 39.1 46.5 39.1 15.2 15.6 19.6 18.1 21.4 19.9 15.2 22.7 29.5 27.5 30.5 28.2 16.6 6.7 11.4 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP - - - - - - - - - - - - 88.0 88.0 88.0 11.0 9.6 21.5 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP - - - - - - - - - - - - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 no chg 
St. Kitts and Nevis: GAP - - - - - - - - - - - - 88.0 88.0 88.0 11.0 9.6 21.5 smaller 
- Not applicable or n-fS = non-functioning State 
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 ADHERENCE GAP 14.3 21.1 22.8 22.8 12.6 12.6 17.7 16.0 22.8 22.8 22.8 22.8 22.8 22.8 22.8 18.5 12.5 15.6 growing
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 5.2 3.9 5.2 5.2 3.9 2.6 3.9 3.9 5.2 5.2 10.1 8.8 8.8 10.1 10.6 5.0 2.2 7.2 growing
Saint Lucia: GAP 19.5 25.0 28.0 28.0 16.5 15.2 21.6 19.9 28.0 28.0 32.9 31.6 31.6 32.9 33.4 23.5 14.7 22.8 growing
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 50.4 50.4 52.7 14.0 9.6 smaller
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 2.2 2.2 growing
St. Vincent & Grenad.: GAP 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 50.4 50.4 53.8 16.2 11.8 smaller
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 75.6 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 39.5 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.4 0.0 0.0 1.5 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.9 2.6 1.3 0.0 1.3 0.0 0.0 1.3 3.9 1.1 1.1 2.2 0.0 growing 
San Marino: GAP 75.6 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 43.4 40.4 39.1 37.8 39.1 0.0 0.0 1.3 3.9 4.5 1.1 2.2 1.5 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 64.7 63.0 63.0 66.4 63.0 63.0 63.0 39.5 39.5 41.2 44.6 44.6 37.8 44.6 44.6 50.0 50.0 47.0 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 1.3 2.6 1.3 2.6 0.0 2.6 0.0 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 5.2 5.2 4.4 6.1 6.1 6.1 growing
Sao Tome & Principe: GAP 66.0 65.6 64.3 69.0 63.0 65.6 63.0 42.1 42.1 43.8 47.2 47.2 43.0 49.8 49.0 56.1 56.1 53.1 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 39.5 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 38.5 28.9 28.9 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 1.3 2.6 2.6 2.6 0.0 3.9 4.4 3.1 10.1 17.6 7.0 3.1 5.7 3.9 1.1 7.8 3.9 2.2 growing 
Saudi Arabia: GAP 40.8 40.4 40.4 40.4 37.8 41.7 42.2 40.9 47.9 55.4 44.8 40.9 43.5 41.7 38.9 46.3 32.8 31.1 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 17.7 14.3 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 14.3 17.7 12.6 19.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 2.6 4.4 4.4 7.0 5.7 7.0 5.7 7.0 14.0 2.6 8.8 11.4 8.8 8.3 11.3 5.0 0.0 6.1 growing
Senegal: GAP 20.3 18.7 17.0 19.6 18.3 19.6 18.3 19.6 26.6 15.2 23.1 29.1 21.4 27.7 11.3 5.0 0.0 6.1 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 52.1 50.4 50.4 53.8 55.5 50.4 52.1 55.5 55.5 55.5 52.1 55.5 53.8 55.5 12.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 5.7 1.3 3.1 1.3 4.4 3.1 4.4 4.4 4.4 1.3 5.7 2.6 1.3 7.0 2.2 3.9 1.1 6.1 no chg 
Seychelles: GAP 57.8 51.7 53.5 55.1 59.9 53.5 56.5 59.9 59.9 56.8 57.8 58.1 55.1 62.5 14.8 3.9 1.1 6.1 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP - - - - - - n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS - 31.0 - 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP - - - - - - n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS - 14.5 - 
Sierra Leone: GAP - - - - - - n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS - 45.5 - 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 63.0 63.0 64.7 63.0 63.0 63.0 64.7 63.0 63.0 66.4 64.7 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.0 59.8 48.1 38.5 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 4.4 3.1 3.1 6.2 6.2 3.1 3.1 6.2 0.0 6.2 6.2 6.2 0.0 6.2 2.8 0.0 6.7 3.9 no chg 
Singapore: GAP 67.4 66.1 67.8 69.2 69.2 66.1 67.8 69.2 63.0 72.6 70.9 69.2 63.0 69.2 65.8 59.8 54.8 42.4 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP - - - - - - - - - 25.2 25.2 25.2 0.0 0.0 1.7 4.5 1.5 1.5 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP - - - - - - - - - 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 3.1 2.2 5.0 4.4 11.1 growing 
Slovakia: GAP - - - - - - - - - 27.8 27.8 27.8 2.6 3.1 3.9 9.5 5.9 12.6 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP - - - - - - - - 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 0.0 1.7 0.0 11.0 4.5 1.5 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP - - - - - - - - 0.0 3.9 2.6 2.6 7.0 2.6 2.2 2.2 6.6 11.1 growing
Slovenia: GAP - - - - - - - - 12.6 16.5 15.2 15.2 7.0 4.3 2.2 13.2 11.1 12.6 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 75.6 75.6 75.6 75.6 75.6 77.3 77.3 77.3 77.3 77.3 77.3 77.3 75.6 77.3 77.3 78.5 78.5 78.5 growing 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.0 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 growing 
Solomon Islands: GAP 75.6 75.6 75.6 76.9 75.6 78.6 78.6 78.6 78.6 78.6 78.6 78.6 76.9 78.6 78.4 79.6 79.6 79.6 growing 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP - - - - - - - - - - 88.0 63.0 25.2 25.2 25.2 0.0 1.5 0.0 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP - - - - - - - - - - 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.6 1.1 1.1 3.3 1.1 growing
South Africa: GAP - - - - - - - - - - 88.0 63.0 25.2 27.8 26.3 1.1 4.8 1.1 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.0 0.0 0.0 growing 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 7.0 3.9 1.3 5.7 2.9 12.7 8.8 8.3 7.5 5.7 13.2 11.9 3.1 13.2 9.5 6.7 3.9 11.7 growing 
Spain: GAP 7.0 3.9 1.3 5.7 2.9 12.7 8.8 8.3 7.5 5.7 13.2 11.9 3.1 13.2 9.5 17.7 3.9 11.7 growing 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.0 50.4 52.1 41.2 39.5 41.2 25.2 25.2 19.3 9.6 9.6 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 3.1 1.3 3.1 1.3 4.4 0.0 4.4 4.4 5.7 7.5 10.6 5.7 4.4 8.8 6.7 14.5 6.4 5.0 growing
Sri Lanka: GAP 66.1 64.3 66.1 64.3 67.4 63.0 67.4 67.4 56.1 59.6 51.8 45.2 45.6 34.0 31.9 33.8 16.0 14.6 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 26.9 25.2 25.2 26.9 25.2 26.9 26.9 30.3 30.3 26.9 25.2 25.2 28.6 25.2 25.2 33.0 30.4 28.9 growing 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 2.6 5.7 11.4 7.0 8.8 11.3 2.5 14.5 15.7 17.6 7.5 9.3 17.5 13.2 5.6 9.5 13.4 6.7 growing 
Sudan: GAP 29.5 30.9 36.6 33.9 34.0 38.2 29.4 44.8 46.0 44.5 32.7 34.5 46.1 38.4 30.8 42.5 43.8 35.6 growing 
- Not applicable or n-fS = non-functioning State 
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Country/Year 1985 198619871988 19891990 1991 1992 19931994 199519961997 19981999 2000 2001 2002 TREND
 ADHERENCE GAP 39.5 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 38.5 38.5 41.3 no chg
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 5.7 0.0 2.6 2.6 0.0 2.6 0.0 0.0 2.6 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.6 2.2 0.0 0.0 1.1 smaller
Suriname: GAP 45.2 37.8 40.4 40.4 37.8 40.4 37.8 37.8 40.4 39.1 37.8 37.8 37.8 40.4 40.0 38.5 38.5 42.4 smaller
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 19.4 14.3 12.6 12.6 14.3 19.4 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 14.3 12.6 19.4 25.0 25.0 0.0 no chg 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 6.5 6.5 8.8 2.6 7.5 7.0 11.4 2.6 8.3 5.7 8.8 7.0 11.3 7.0 11.7 10.0 9.5 6.1 growing 
Swaziland: GAP 25.9 20.8 21.4 15.2 21.8 26.4 24.0 15.2 20.9 18.3 21.4 19.6 25.6 19.6 31.1 35.0 34.5 6.1 growing 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 12.6 14.3 12.6 12.6 12.6 0.0 1.7 0.0 3.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.7 0.0 5.1 11.0 3.0 0.0 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 0.0 2.6 4.4 2.9 1.3 5.7 5.7 4.4 12.7 7.0 13.2 5.7 8.8 1.3 2.2 8.9 3.9 4.4 growing
Sweden: GAP 12.6 16.9 17.0 15.5 13.9 5.7 7.4 4.4 16.1 7.0 13.2 5.7 10.5 1.3 7.3 19.9 6.9 4.4 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 1.3 5.7 5.7 4.4 1.3 8.6 5.7 1.3 7.0 4.4 4.2 4.4 0.0 10.1 0.0 1.1 6.1 10.0 growing 
Switzerland: GAP 26.5 30.9 30.9 29.6 26.5 33.8 30.9 26.5 32.2 29.6 29.4 29.6 25.2 35.3 0.0 1.1 6.1 10.0 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 16.0 14.3 14.3 14.3 12.6 17.7 22.8 12.6 12.6 16.0 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 16.0 19.3 9.6 9.6 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 8.8 4.4 14.5 8.8 4.4 7.0 11.4 8.8 8.8 5.7 4.4 7.5 5.7 11.9 9.5 6.1 13.1 2.8 smaller 
Syrian Arab Republic: GAP 24.8 18.7 28.8 23.1 17.0 24.7 34.2 21.4 21.4 21.7 17.0 20.1 18.3 24.5 25.5 25.4 22.7 12.4 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP - - - - - - - - n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS - 21.5 - 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP - - - - - - - - n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS - 11.1 - 
Tajikistan: GAP - - - - - - - - n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS n-fS - 32.6 - 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 50.4 50.4 52.1 50.4 50.4 53.8 50.4 50.4 50.4 50.4 52.1 52.1 53.8 39.5 37.8 31.9 19.3 3.0 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 3.1 0.0 4.4 5.7 5.7 2.6 11.9 11.9 8.8 7.5 7.5 8.8 7.5 11.9 11.7 11.7 3.9 6.4 growing
Tanzania, United Rep.: GAP 53.5 50.4 56.5 56.1 56.1 56.4 62.3 62.3 59.2 57.9 59.6 60.9 61.3 51.4 49.5 43.6 23.2 9.4 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 63.0 63.0 63.0 64.7 63.0 66.4 66.4 64.7 64.7 64.7 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.0 50.4 48.1 40.0 38.5 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 8.8 0.0 8.8 4.4 0.0 8.8 5.7 8.8 3.1 10.1 7.5 0.0 3.1 7.5 0.0 6.7 0.0 5.8 smaller 
Thailand: GAP 71.8 63.0 71.8 69.1 63.0 75.2 72.1 73.5 67.8 74.8 70.5 63.0 66.1 70.5 50.4 54.8 40.0 44.3 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 17.7 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 3.1 3.9 7.0 3.9 4.4 5.2 5.7 8.3 5.7 2.6 5.7 8.8 2.6 2.6 7.4 3.9 5.0 6.1 growing 
Togo: GAP 15.7 16.5 19.6 16.5 17.0 17.8 18.3 20.9 18.3 15.2 18.3 21.4 15.2 20.3 9.1 3.9 5.0 6.1 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 25.2 28.6 30.3 25.2 25.2 25.2 26.9 28.6 30.3 26.9 25.2 26.9 16.0 12.6 19.4 19.3 19.3 22.3 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 2.6 10.1 10.1 11.9 10.6 4.4 7.5 11.9 5.7 8.8 11.9 7.5 7.5 10.6 7.8 10.6 9.5 3.9 no chg 
Trinidad & Tobago: GAP 27.8 38.7 40.4 37.1 35.8 29.6 34.4 40.5 36.0 35.7 37.1 34.4 23.5 23.2 27.2 29.9 28.8 26.2 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 14.3 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 0.0 5.1 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 7.5 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 11.9 14.4 8.8 10.1 7.5 4.4 14.5 10.1 4.4 5.7 2.9 10.1 11.4 12.7 0.0 8.9 2.2 8.3 smaller 
Tunisia: GAP 26.2 27.0 21.4 22.7 20.1 17.0 27.1 22.7 17.0 18.3 2.9 15.2 13.1 12.7 0.0 8.9 3.7 15.8 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 26.9 0.0 0.0 11.0 0.0 0.0 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 7.5 4.4 7.5 7.5 10.6 7.5 7.3 10.1 6.0 8.3 15.0 8.8 3.1 15.0 5.2 15.6 7.8 17.8 growing
Turkey: GAP 45.3 42.2 45.3 45.3 48.4 45.3 45.1 47.9 31.2 33.5 40.2 34.0 30.0 15.0 5.2 26.6 7.8 17.8 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP - - - - - - - - - 88.0 88.0 88.0 12.6 12.6 22.8 31.0 28.3 31.0 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP - - - - - - - - - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 no chg 
Turkmenistan: GAP - - - - - - - - - 88.0 88.0 88.0 12.6 12.6 22.8 31.0 28.3 31.0 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 52.1 50.4 50.4 52.1 50.4 53.8 52.1 50.4 50.4 50.4 53.8 50.4 50.4 52.1 50.4 48.1 41.5 44.8 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 4.4 0.0 7.5 3.1 5.7 4.4 4.4 4.4 0.0 1.3 4.4 2.9 0.0 4.4 8.0 2.8 8.4 8.4 growing
Uganda: GAP 56.5 50.4 57.9 55.2 56.1 58.2 56.5 54.8 50.4 51.7 58.2 53.3 50.4 56.5 58.4 50.9 49.9 53.2 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 4.4 4.4 5.7 4.2 4.4 5.5 7.3 2.6 6.0 2.6 3.9 7.0 2.6 10.1 7.6 7.2 5.5 6.1 growing
Ukraine: GAP 17.0 17.0 18.3 16.8 17.0 18.1 19.9 15.2 18.6 15.2 16.5 19.6 15.2 22.7 20.2 7.2 5.5 6.1 smaller 
 
ADHERENCE GAP 77.3 75.6 75.6 75.6 75.6 77.3 75.6 75.6 75.6 77.3 75.6 75.6 50.4 37.8 37.8 42.8 19.3 19.3 smaller
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 0.0 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.0 0.0 1.3 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.0 5.0 7.8 6.1 growing
United Arab Emirates: GAP 77.3 76.9 75.6 75.6 75.6 78.6 75.6 75.6 76.9 78.6 75.6 75.6 50.4 39.1 37.8 47.8 27.1 25.4 smaller
- Not applicable or n-fS = non-functioning State 
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Country/Year 1985 198619871988 19891990 1991 1992 19931994 199519961997 19981999 2000 2001 2002 TREND 
ADHERENCE GAP 26.9 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 12.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 3.1 5.7 6.2 11.9 7.5 13.2 6.2 13.1 11.9 15.0 8.8 8.7 11.3 14.8 11.7 2.5 14.5 5.0 growing 
United Kingdom: GAP 30.0 30.9 31.4 37.1 32.7 38.4 31.4 38.3 37.1 40.2 34.0 33.9 36.5 40.0 24.3 2.5 14.5 5.0 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 75.6 75.6 75.6 75.6 75.6 75.6 75.6 75.6 75.6 57.8 57.8 57.8 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 1.3 0.0 0.0 2.5 1.3 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.0 1.3 1.1 0.0 5.6 3.9 growing
United States: GAP 88.0 88.0 88.0 89.5 89.5 88.0 75.6 78.1 76.9 75.6 75.6 76.9 75.6 76.9 76.7 57.8 63.4 61.7 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 12.6 12.6 12.6 17.7 12.6 12.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.4 11.0 0.0 0.0 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 6.2 0.0 7.5 0.0 5.6 4.4 3.1 3.8 3.9 4.4 1.3 5.7 8.8 5.2 6.7 8.9 7.2 15.0 growing 
Uruguay: GAP 44.0 37.8 45.3 37.8 18.2 17.0 15.7 21.5 16.5 17.0 1.3 5.7 8.8 5.2 10.1 19.9 7.2 15.0 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP - - - - - - - - 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 25.2 28.6 33.7 40.5 40.5 40.5 growing
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP - - - - - - - - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 no chg 
Uzbekistan: GAP - - - - - - - - 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 25.2 28.6 33.7 40.5 40.5 40.5 growing
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 5.1 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 1.7 1.7 5.1 6.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.1 0.0 0.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 growing 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 0.0 4.4 12.1 9.5 7.0 14.0 4.4 6.9 7.6 14.5 11.3 11.3 18.3 15.1 14.2 6.1 16.6 20.0 growing 
Venezuela: GAP 5.1 7.8 15.5 12.9 10.4 15.7 6.1 12.0 14.4 14.5 11.3 11.3 23.4 15.1 14.2 17.1 27.6 31.0 growing 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP - - - - - - - - 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 63.0 63.0 63.0 51.3 48.1 51.1 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP - - - - - - - - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.2 1.1 growing
Viet Nam: GAP - - - - - - - - 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 63.0 63.0 63.0 51.3 50.3 52.2 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP - - - - - 12.6 12.6 16.0 17.7 12.6 17.7 21.1 22.8 12.6 17.7 0.0 0.0 1.5 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP - - - - - 3.9 14.0 2.6 10.1 8.8 7.5 8.8 5.7 9.9 5.0 5.0 8.9 3.9 smaller 
Yemen: GAP - - - - - 16.5 26.6 18.6 27.8 21.4 25.2 29.9 28.5 22.5 22.7 5.0 8.9 5.4 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 25.2 28.6 25.2 26.9 25.2 26.9 26.9 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 0.0 1.7 1.7 0.0 11.0 0.0 6.0 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 2.6 1.3 9.9 9.5 5.7 8.8 1.6 8.0 7.0 5.7 1.3 8.6 3.1 5.2 6.9 6.1 2.2 8.3 no chg 
Zambia: GAP 27.8 29.9 35.1 36.4 30.9 35.7 28.5 33.2 32.2 30.9 26.5 8.6 4.8 6.9 6.9 17.1 2.2 14.3 smaller 
 
 ADHERENCE GAP 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 75.6 75.6 75.6 75.6 75.6 75.6 75.6 75.6 75.6 37.8 25.2 9.6 12.6 9.6 smaller 
 IMPLEMENTATION GAP 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.0 1.3 0.0 1.3 0.0 2.6 0.0 3.3 3.9 7.2 growing 
Zimbabwe: GAP 88.0 88.0 88.0 88.0 75.6 75.6 75.6 76.9 75.6 76.9 75.6 76.9 75.6 40.4 25.2 12.9 16.5 16.8 smaller 
- Not applicable or n-fS = non-functioning State 
 
 
Table 12 enables individual countries’ situations to be studied.  That is not intended here.  Only 
broad comparisons can be made of the movements of the three sets of trend-lines across all 
countries, which provides an indication of general trends.   
 
Of the 166 overall TRENDs, a good three quarters are moving in the right direction, i.e. they 
point downward.  This is chiefly due to the quantitatively dominant ADHERENCE factor.  But 
19 per cent of the basic workers’ rights TRENDs point upwards. 
 
Of the ADHERENCE GAPs, three quarters are identified as “smaller”.  The main reason for this 
is the general rise in ratifications of core Conventions, especially since the Director-General of 
the ILO launched a ratification campaign in 1995.  But 18 per cent are “growing”, i.e. they are 
moving in the wrong direction. 
 
As regards IMPLEMENTATION GAPs, the picture is the reverse.   Fifty-nine per cent of the 
TRENDs go in the wrong direction, i.e. they indicate increasing IMPLEMENTATION problems.  
Only 18 per cent point in the direction of a decrease.  Nearly a quarter of the 
IMPLEMENTATION TRENDs record “no change”, sometimes at rather high levels of GAPs.   
 
A small portion of the rise in IMPLEMENTATION scores may be attributable to a correlation 
between ratifications and subsequent comments by the Committee of Experts due to the fact that, 
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with more ratifications, the Committee has to scrutinize more countries’ situations and may find 
more things that warrant a DIRECT REQUEST or an OBSERVATION.  Verification of this 
correlation would require close inspection of the base data, which cannot be carried out here.49  A 
correlation is quite likely to exist in the case of the two promotional standards concerned with 
non-discrimination, Convention Nos. 100 and 111, where the Committee of Experts has a 
tendency to prod countries to go further or faster.  On the other hand, a correlation between 
ratification of the two freedom of association and collective bargaining standards, Convention 
Nos. 87 and 98, and comments by the Committee of Experts is unlikely to exist, partly because 
countries’ situations can come under the scrutiny of the CFA prior to ratification.  
 
Two other factors seem to me to be chiefly responsible for the rise in IMPLEMENTATION 
problems.  One is the impact of globalization, which is contemporaneous with the period of the 
GAP system. Its deregulation and privatisation precepts have affected many workers, especially 
in economically weak countries.  This is reflected in the regional CFA data shown in figure 4 
above where the upward trend of TO BE KEP INFORMED plus INTERIM REPORTs is most 
pronounced for Latin America and Africa.  The second factor is linked to UNDP’s finding that 
“the spread of democratisation appears to have stalled, with many countries failing to consolidate 
and deepen the first steps towards democracy and several slipping back to authoritarianism.”50  It 
would be surprising if such “stalling” and “slipping back” did not call into question existing basic 
workers’ rights.  Another pointer is the downward trend in the number of cases of PROGRESS 
that were acknowledged by the Committee of Experts in respect of core Conventions since 1985 
(see footnote 42 above). 
 
The conclusion one can draw from this cross-country analysis is that, while there is growing 
ADHERENCE to ILO’s values, procedures, etc., countries have experienced increasing 
IMPLEMENTATION problems, even countries well endowed with capacity to deal with 
international obligations. 
 
4.2 Some graphic illustrations 
 
Presentation of data in graphic form renders visible the movement of TRENDs.  To start with, 
figure 5 illustrates the prevailing pattern of a scissor movement where the ADHERENCE 
TREND points downwards and the IMPLEMENTATION TREND upwards.  Bolivia is the 
example chosen.  The load on Bolivia’s IMPLEMENTATION indicator derives almost entirely 
from Committee of Experts’ comments, i.e. it is not merely a reflection of the ratifications that 
occurred in 1990 and 1997.  DIRECT REQUESTs and OBSERVATIONs appear to be on a 
secular upward trend – prima facie evidence for wanting to help that country to get to grips with 
labour administration problems. 
 
In figure 6 worrying developments are illustrated of both a growing ADHERENCE GAP and a 
growing IMPLEMENTATION GAP.  The Côte d’Ivoire is taken as an example, but there are 20 
other countries with simultaneously worsening TRENDs at all levels of capacity: Algeria, 
Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Chad, the Comoros, Congo, Djibouti, Dominica, Guinea, Haiti, 
Iraq, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Niger, Saint Lucia, the 
Solomon Islands, Spain, Sudan and Venezuela. 
 
49 Correlation can be tested at a later stage when pairs of core Conventions are intended to be scored individually. 
50 See UNDP: Human Development Report 2002:  Deepening democracy in a fragmented world (New York and 
Oxford: OUP for UNDP, 2002), p. 13. 
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Figure 5. Graphic representation of trend-lines of Bolivia’s GAPs 
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Figure 6. Graphic representation of trend-lines of Côte d’Ivoire’s GAPs 
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Figure 7. Graphic representation of trend-lines of Malaysia’s GAPs 
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Desirable TREND movements are illustrated in figure 7, which shows Malaysia’s simultaneously 
decreasing ADHERENCE and IMPLEMENTATION GAPs. Other examples are Barbados, 
Ecuador, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Jordan, Romania and Thailand. 
 
4.3 Grouping countries by adherence and implementation scores 
 
The designation of trends as “bigger”, “smaller” or “no change” in the last column of table 12 can 
have quite different meanings depending on the level or absolute size of GAPs.  A large-size 
basic workers’ rights GAP with a worsening trend, such as in the case of the Solomon Islands, 
should be greater cause for concern than a low-level GAP that has had a marginal tendency to 
worsen, as for example in the case of Norway.  Therefore, the absolute size of GAPs has to be 
brought to the fore. 
 
As was suggested in the introduction of this paper, the light should be trained on the two 
constituent elements of the basic workers’ rights indicator, i.e. the ADHERENCE GAP and the 
IMPLEMENTATION GAP.  This enables one to perceive where countries lag behind 
significantly, where they may need assistance and what form of assistance they may need.  The 
overall GAP is too crude a measurement in that respect. 
 
To distinguish whether the absolute size of GAPs is worrisome or not, one has to establish 
categories through cut-off points between the minimum and maximum values of a range.  This 
paper distinguishes three categories: “good”, “medium” and “poor” performers.  When one 
applies these distinctions simultaneously to the ADHERENCE and IMPLEMENTATION 
indicators, the following nine groups can be said to exist: 
 
1. good adherents that are good implementers; 
2. good adherents that are medium implementers; 
3. good adherents that are poor implementers; 
4. medium adherents that are good implementers; 
5. medium adherents that are medium implementers; 
6. medium adherents that are poor implementers; 
7. poor adherents that are good implementers; 
8. poor adherents that are medium implementers; and 
9. poor adherents that are poor implementers. 
 
How should one fix the quantitative thresholds?  Commonly applied cut-off points are one-half 
and one-quarter values of the maximum range.  In the case of the ADHERENCE GAP this would 
designate countries with more than 44 of the 88 maximum points as poor performers, countries 
with 22 to 44 points as medium performers and countries with less than 22 points as good 
performers. 
 
In the case of the IMPLEMENTATION GAP one has to take account of the fact that DIRECT 
REQUESTs and OBSERVATIONSs can come about only after countries have ratified 
Conventions.  If a country has not ratified a Convention, it can ipso facto not incur an 
IMPLEMENTATION GAP through the Committee of Experts component.  The ratification of a 
single Convention maximally entails an IMPLEMENTATION GAP of 4.4 points prior to 2000 
and of 3.9 points as from that year; ratification of all Conventions can entail a maximum 
IMPLEMENTATION GAP of 31 points.  These variations reflect the inherent relationships 
established within the GAP system.  To overcome the difficulty of having a variable maximum 
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range, the yardstick used here derives from the other component of the IMPLEMENTATION 
indicator, the Committee on Freedom of Association, because complaints can be submitted 
irrespective of whether a country has ratified Convention Nos. 87 and/or 98.  The maximum of 
the CFA component being 12 points, therefore, countries with more than 6 points are designated 
as poor performers, countries with 3-6 points as medium performers and countries with less than 
3 points as good performers. 
 
To imagine what the achievement of a good ADHERENCE score requires, one should refer to 
the values of (non-)ratification and (non-)reporting on ratified Conventions or under the 
Declaration that were set out in chapter 2.  A good ADHERENCE score in, for instance, the year 
2002 would require ratification of a least seven of the eight core Conventions and a reasonable 
reporting record.  Given that non-ratification of two Conventions incurs 22 GAP points in 2002, 
the cut-off point between good and medium ADHERENCE performers seems a reasonable 
threshold.   
 
To imagine what achievement of a good IMPLEMENTATION score requires in 2002, one could 
refer to a single OBSERVATION, which would leave a country in the category of good 
implementers; an additional DIRECT REQUEST would put it into the category of “medium” 
performers.  If the country had incurred neither DIRECT REQUESTs nor OBSERVATIONs but 
the CFA had addressed TO BE KEPT INFORMED or INTERIM REPORTs to the government, 
again a certain combination of these forms of reports would assign the country to one category or 
another.  No more than one INTERIM REPORT in 2002 would leave a country in the category of 
good implementers, an additional TO BE KEPT INFORMED report would put it into the 
category of “medium” performers.  The IMPLEMENTATION cut-off points, too, seem 
reasonable. 
 
The listing of country’s scores according to their ADHERENCE and IMPLEMENTATION 
groups can be found in table 13.  Countries in groups 1, 2 and 4 are mentioned only for 
completeness’ sake.   They are unlikely to need much or any ILO assistance. 
 
Table 13 chooses to present averages.  The averages pertain to the first ten years of the system, 
1985-1994, and the subsequent seven years, 1995-2001.  The average score of the recent period is 
used to sort countries, within each group, in the order of increasing GAPs.  The year 2002 is set 
apart to illustrate the point made at the beginning of this chapter that points in any single year can 
potentially be misleading.   
 
If one considers the relationship between countries’ scores and their capacity to administer core 
Conventions or principles and rights (see chapter 1.5), one finds countries with adequate, little 
and least capacity in all categories of table 13.  Lack of capacity is, no doubt, an important factor, 
but it is not the only one.  Political will also counts!  Countries without much capacity can be 
found among good implementers, Botswana is an example.  By contrast, possessing the requisite 
capacity does not ensure good implementation.  Half of the 46 countries with adequate capacity, 
ranging from Australia to Thailand, show up as poor implementers in table 13! 
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Table 13. Grouping of countries by their ADHERENCE and IMPLEMENTATION 
  GAPs, sorted by 1995-2001 averages and ranked within each group* 
Indicator points by range Size of countries’ overall GAPs 
ADHERENCE 
GAP 
(max. = 88) 
IMPLEMEN-
TATION  
GAP  
(max. = 12) 
Nine groups of 
countries Countries Average 
1985-94 
GAP 
(max. = 100) 
Average 
1995-2001 
GAP 
(max. = 100) 
2002  
GAP 
(max. = 100) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Small 
<3 points 
1. Good 
adherents, good  
implementers 
San Marino, Italy, Luxembourg, Georgia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia  
(5 countries in group 1 in 1995-2001). 
Medium 
3-6 points 
2. Good 
adherents,  
medium  
implementers 
Finland, Israel, Malta, Greece, Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, Zambia, Iceland, Guyana, 
Slovakia, Ireland, Togo, Lithuania, Russian Federation, Belgium, Austria, Switzerland, 
Mali, Jordan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kyrgyzstan, Antigua and Barbados  
(23 countries in group 2 in 1995-2001)  
Norway 6.9 6.7 10.6 
Nicaragua 14.4 7.0 3.9 
Tunisia 22.0 8.1 15.8 
Uruguay 27.1 8.3 15.0 
Belarus 5.1 8.5 7.2 
Sweden 11.7 9.3 4.4 
Honduras 9.9 9.7 3.9 
Cuba 9.7 9.7 20.2 
France 12.0 9.7 13.2 
Netherlands 16.5 10.1 5.0 
Niger 6.5 10.3 14.9 
Spain 6.4 10.4 11.7 
Germany 11.3 11.3 5.0 
Portugal 18.0 11.5 10.6 
Dominica 11.5 11.7 10.0 
Denmark 20.3 11.9 22.0 
Croatia 13.3 13.4 2.8 
Cyprus 19.7 13.7 16.4 
Argentina 22.8 14.4 7.8 
Romania 22.8 14.1 8.9 
Dominican Republic 28.0 14.6 16.6 
Bulgaria 16.9 14.9 11.4 
Ukraine 17.3 15.3 6.1 
Costa Rica 8.4 15.6 3.9 
Algeria 11.1 16.0 15.8 
Senegal 19.3 16.8 6.1 
Venezuela 11.4 17.1 31.0 
Barbados 21.6 17.6 12.5 
Azerbaijan 12.6 18.2 27.1 
Egypt 21.6 19.3 6.1 
Benin 18.7 19.5 3.9 
Yemen 22.2 20.4 5.4 
Panama 24.6 21.6 9.1 
Small 
<22 points 
Large 
>6 points 
3. Good 
adherents,  
poor  
implementers 
(61 countries in 
group 3 in 1995-
2001) 
Ecuador 25.2 21.7 8.3 
* 166 countries.  Sierra Leone and Tajikistan not included because 1995-2001 averages have not been calculated for these 
countries. 
 
  
Gaps in basic workers’ rights 
 
58
 
Table 13 (continued). 
Indicator points by range Size of countries’ overall GAPs 
ADHERENCE 
GAP 
(max. = 88) 
IMPLEMEN-
TATION  
GAP  
(max. = 12) 
Nine groups of 
countries Countries Average 
1985-94 
GAP 
(max. = 100) 
Average 
1995-2001 
GAP 
(max. = 100) 
2002  
GAP 
(max. = 100) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Australia 17.8 21.8 27.1 
Guatemala 22.7 21.9 21.7 
Syrian Arab Republic 23.6 21.9 12.4 
Central African Republic 32.7 22.3 8.9 
Turkey 43.0 22.7 17.8 
Burkina Faso 34.0 23.0 8.9 
Rwanda 25.0 23.1 11.4 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 26.0 24.0 11.9 
Chad 22.2 24.0 36.7 
Czech Republic 25.2 24.4 23.9 
Iraq 20.4 25.5 26.1 
United Kingdom 34.8 26.5 5.0 
Burundi 60.0 26.7 3.9 
Swaziland 21.0 26.7 6.1 
Côte d’Ivoire 19.5 26.7 31.3 
Ghana 25.0 27.4 13.5 
St. Lucia 23.0 28.7 22.8 
Philippines 35.7 28.9 21.3 
Trinidad and Tobago 35.6 29.1 26.2 
Paraguay 29.6 29.4 23.5 
Bangladesh 35.1 29.5 34.8 
Jamaica 29.0 30.2 33.0 
Peru 29.5 31.6 10.6 
Haiti - 31.8 48.3 
Cameroon 27.1 32.0 8.9 
Colombia 28.1 32.6 28.6 
Small 
<22 points 
(continued) 
Large 
>6 points 
(continued) 
3. Good 
adherents,  
poor  
implementers 
(continued) 
(61 countries in 
group 3 in 1995-
2001) 
 
Guinea 24.1 32.9 45.5 
Small 
<3 points 
4. Medium 
adherents, good  
implementers 
Botswana, Malawi, Estonia, South Africa, Grenada, Uzbekistan, Seychelles, Moldova, 
Turkmenistan, Mongolia, Kiribati  
(11 countries in group 4 in 1995-2001). 
Cape Verde 33.6 28.5 17.7 
Lebanon 30.4 28.9 22.6 
Mozambique 53.2 33.7 36.7 
Chile 54.7 34.9 15.2 
Guinea Bissau 35.6 35.7 30.0 
Latvia 25.2 35.7 35.2 
Comoros 29.9 36.1 44.2 
Kuwait 43.6 36.2 29.7 
Lesotho 54.0 37.2 7.2 
El Salvador 82.1 38.3 27.1 
Mauritius 48.9 40.6 35.6 
Papua New Guinea 58.3 41.1 10.1 
Saudi Arabia 42.8 41.3 31.1 
New Zealand  42.6 41.4 31.7 
Iran 46.0 44.4 34.3 
Bahamas 54.1 46.2 5.0 
Medium 
22-44 points Medium 
3-6 points 
5. Medium 
adherents,  
medium  
implementers 
(17 countries in 
group 5 in 1995-
2001) 
Nepal 66.9 49.6 29.2 
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Table 13 (continued). 
Indicator points by range Size of countries’ overall GAPs 
ADHERENCE 
GAP 
(max. = 88) 
IMPLEMEN-
TATION  
GAP  
(max. = 12) 
Nine groups of 
countries Countries Average 
1985-94 
GAP 
(max. = 100) 
Average 
1995-2001 
GAP 
(max. = 100) 
2002  
GAP 
(max. = 100) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Gabon 22.6 27.7 23.3 
Mexico 29.3 29.6 34.9 
Brazil 36.6 32.8 16.3 
Bolivia 36.2 33.0 36.5 
Belize 40.5 33.2 14.4 
Indonesia 55.8 33.6 8.7 
Morocco 37.4 36.0 19.0 
Sri Lanka 64.2 36.9 14.6 
Pakistan 43.6 37.7 22.1 
Sudan 36.8 38.4 35.6 
Madagascar 47.8 40.1 29.5 
Djibouti 30.6 41.6 46.6 
Nigeria 34.5 41.7 11.7 
Kenya 45.2 43.0 17.7 
Japan 44.6 43.6 38.2 
Mauritania 60.2 46.2 13.4 
Canada 46.1 47.3 36.1 
Ethiopia 55.4 48.8 31.0 
Medium 
(continued) 
22-44 points 
Large 
>6 points 
6. Medium 
adherents,  
poor  
implementers 
(19 countries in 
group 5 in 1995-
2001) 
Tanzania, United Republic of 57.1 49.9 9.4 
Suriname 39.7 38.7 42.4 
Zimbabwe 80.9 46.2 16.8 
Cambodia - 49.6 17.8 
United Arab Emirates 76.6 50.5 25.4 
Namibia 88.2 51.7 9.6 
St. Kitts and Nevis - 57.0 21.5 
Equatorial Guinea 64.0 57.6 4.1 
St. Vincent and Grenadines 88.2 62.2 11.8 
Bahrain 77.7 63.5 40.7 
Gambia 88.2 64.4 10.5 
Qatar 77.1 66.0 52.0 
Eritrea 88.2 66.3 16.0 
Viet Nam 88.2 66.7 52.2 
Armenia 75.6 66.9 60.8 
Korea, Republic of 89.5 66.9 45.9 
China 83.3 70.7 48.1 
United States 83.8 71.8 61.7 
Kazakhstan 89.5 72.8 13.3 
Lao PDR 77.6 77.2 77.2 
Solomon Islands 77.2 78.6 79.6 
Small 
<3 points 
7. Poor 
adherents,  
good  
implementers 
(21 countries in 
group 7 in 1995-
2001) 
Oman - 78.9 61.7 
Malaysia 61.8 48.1 30.0 
Sao Tome and Principe 58.5 49.8 53.1 
India 61.0 53.1 51.3 
Uganda 54.8 53.9 53.2 
Fiji 55.7 56.7 12.4 
Thailand 70.2 59.3 44.3 
Singapore 67.8 64.7 42.4 
Medium 
3-6 points 
8. Poor 
adherents,  
medium  
implementers 
(8 countries in 
group 8 in 1995-
2001) Myanmar 67.4 70.0 63.4 
Large 
>44 points 
Large 
>6 points 
9. Poor  
adherents, poor 
implementers 
(No countries in this group in 1995-2001). 
- Not available. 
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4.4  Ranking and regionalizing averages of overall GAPs 
 
Tables 14 and 15 train the light on single figures – ranks and regions, respectively.  Averages are 
used again for the same time periods. 
 
Ranking, although it is not the purpose of the GAP system, is shown here in the most relevant 
way, which is the sorting of ranks by the most recent averages, those of 1995-2001, and the 
listing of countries that can be considered to be medium or poor performers in terms of the basic 
workers’ rights GAP.  The cut-off points are determined by the same method as in chapter 4.3.  
The maximum overall GAP being 100, all countries with scores above 50 points are designated 
as poor overall performers and all countries with 25 to 50 points are designated as medium 
overall performers.  The countries most in need of ILO assistance are bound to be among poor 
and medium performers.   
 
The fact that three in five member States of the ILO score in the medium range in table 14, and 
one in seven as poor overall performers in table 15, should be cause for concern.  Put differently, 
close to 100 of the ILO’s member States fall outside the category of good overall performers. 
 
In these tables, too, one can find countries with adequate, little or least capacity in all categories, 
which underlines the point made earlier that capacity matters but political will counts.    
 
Regional and sub-regional averages of basic workers’ rights GAPs are estimated in table 16 
where the regions correspond to those in table 11 above.  Reducing 166 member States’ scores to 
four regions’ and three sub-regions’ scores minimises the differences, because the variations 
among many countries greatly exceed the variations among a few averages.  Nevertheless, there 
are some evident differences among the regions, with North America consistently scoring the 
highest overall GAPs, followed by Asia/Pacific/Arab countries and Africa.  Latin American and 
Caribbean scores are close to the below-average scores of Europe.51 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
The ILO procedures and data on which the indicator system is built have proven their pertinence 
and value.  The seven dimensions measured so far have performed credibly, both analytically and 
empirically.  The eighth dimension, progress under the Declaration, can validly be tested only 
several years from now.   
 
While it stands on its own, the GAP system could – suitably standardised and weighted – be 
integrated into such Decent Work indices as the ILO may construct in years ahead. 
 
For technical assistance purposes, the grouping of countries into nine performance categories 
strung along the ADHERENCE and IMPLEMENTATION ranges of table 13 is the most 
informative. 
 
51 It is worth noting that the ranking that can be read into table 16 (Europe – Latin America – Caribbean – Africa – 
Asia etc. – North America) is not the same as the ranking that can be read into the earlier table 11 concerned with 
CFA data, irrespective of whether one goes by the number of complaints registered (Asia etc. – Africa – Europe – 
Americas) or the number of TO BE KEPT INFORMED plus INTERIM REPORTs per country in each region 
(Europe – Caribbean – Africa – Asia etc. – North America – Latin America).  This would seem to suggest that the 
GAP system’s dimensions are less correlated than one might be tempted to assume.  At any rate, the Committee on 
Freedom of Association component that was retained in this paper does not predict overall GAP points. 
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Table 14. Ranking of medium overall performers, sorted by 1995-2001 averages 
Countries, followed by GAP points  Countries, followed by GAP points Basic 
wor-
kers’ 
rights 
GAP 
(max. = 
100) 
Countries Average 
1985-94 
GAP 
(max. = 
100) 
Average 
1995-
2001 
GAP 
(max. = 
100) 
2002 
GAP 
(max. = 
100) 
 
Basic 
wor-
kers’ 
rights 
GAP 
(max. = 
100) 
Countries Average 
1985-94 
GAP 
(max. = 
100) 
Average 
1995-
2001 
GAP 
(max. = 
100) 
2002 
GAP 
(max. = 
100) 
Iraq 20.4 25.5 26.1  Morocco 37.4 36.0 19.0 
United Kingdom 34.8 26.5 5.0  Comoros 29.9 36.1 44.2 
Swaziland 21.0 26.7 6.1  Seychelles 56.5 36.2 6.1 
Burundi 60.0 26.7 3.9  Kuwait 43.6 36.2 29.7 
Cote d’Ivoire 19.5 26.7 31.3  Moldova 75.6 36.4 3.3 
Ghana 25.0 27.5 13.5  Sri Lanka 64.2 36.9 14.6 
Gabon 22.6 27.7 23.3  Lesotho 54.0 37.2 7.2 
Cape Verde 33.6 28.5 17.7  Pakistan 43.6 37.7 22.1 
Saint Lucia 23.0 28.7 22.8  El Salvador 82.1 38.3 27.1 
Philippines 35.7 28.9 21.3  Sudan 36.8 38.4 35.6 
Lebanon 30.4 28.9 22.6  Suriname 39.7 38.7 42.4 
Trinidad & Tobago 35.6 29.1 26.2  Madagascar 47.8 40.1 29.5 
Paraguay 29.6 29.4 23.5  Turkmenistan 88.2 40.5 31.0 
Bangladesh 35.1 29.5 34.8  Mauritius 48.9 40.6 35.6 
Mexico 29.3 29.6 34.9  Papua New Guinea 58.3 41.1 10.1 
Jamaica 29.0 30.2 33.0  Saudi Arabia 42.8 41.3 31.1 
Botswana 88.2 30.4 9.6  New Zealand 42.6 41.4 31.7 
Peru 29.5 31.6 10.6  Djibouti 30.6 41.6 46.6 
Haiti - 31.8 48.3  Nigeria 34.5 41.7 11.7 
Cameroon 27.1 32.0 8.9  Mongolia 42.8 41.9 42.3 
Malawi 54.3 32.3 16.1  Kenya 45.2 43.0 17.7 
Colombia 28.1 32.6 28.6  Japan 44.6 43.6 38.2 
Estonia 75.6 32.7 21.5  Kiribati - 44.0 38.5 
Brazil 36.6 32.8 16.3  Iran, Islamic Rep. 46.0 44.4 34.3 
Guinea 24.1 32.9 45.5  Congo 67.0 46.1 16.1 
Bolivia 36.2 33.0 36.5  Zimbabwe 80.9 46.2 16.8 
Belize 40.5 33.2 14.4  Mauritania 60.2 46.2 13.4 
Indonesia 55.8 33.6 8.7  Bahamas 54.1 46.3 5.0 
Mozambique 53.2 33.7 36.7  Canada 46.1 47.3 36.1 
South Africa - 33.8 1.1  Malaysia 61.8 48.1 30.0 
Grenada 52.9 34.3 35.2  Ethiopia 55.4 48.8 31.0 
Chile 54.7 34.9 15.2  Nepal 66.9 49.6 29.2 
Uzbekistan 37.8 34.9 40.5  Cambodia - 49.6 17.8 
Guinea-Bissau 35.6 35.7 30.0  Sao Tome Principe 58.5 49.8 53.1 
Medi-
um 
GAP 
25-50 
points 
(70 
count-
ries in 
group in 
1995-
2001) 
Latvia 25.2 35.7 35.2  
Medi-
um 
GAP 
25-50 
points 
(conti-
nued) 
(70 
count-
ries in 
group in 
1995-
2001) 
Tanzania 57.1 49.9 9.4 
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Table 15. Ranking of poor overall performers, sorted by 1995-2001 averages 
Countries, followed by GAP points  Countries, followed by GAP points Basic 
wor-
kers’ 
rights 
GAP 
(max. = 
100) 
Countries Average 
1985-94 
GAP 
(max. = 
100) 
Average 
1995-
2001 
GAP 
(max. = 
100) 
2002 
GAP 
(max. = 
100) 
 
Basic 
wor-
kers’ 
rights 
GAP 
(max. = 
100) 
Countries Average 
1985-94 
GAP 
(max. = 
100) 
Average 
1995-
2001 
GAP 
(max. = 
100) 
2002 
GAP 
(max. = 
100) 
UAE 76.6 50.5 25.4  Qatar 77.1 66.0 52.0 
Namibia 88.2 51.7 9.6  Eritrea 88.2 66.4 16.0 
India 61.0 53.1 51.3  Viet Nam 88.2 66.7 52.2 
Uganda 54.8 54.0 53.2  Armenia 75.6 66.9 60.8 
Fiji 55.7 56.7 12.4  Korea, Republic of 89.5 67.0 45.9 
Saint Kitts & Nevis - 57.1 21.5  Myanmar 67.4 70.0 63.4 
Equatorial  Guinea 64.0 57.6 4.1  China 83.3 70.7 48.1 
Thailand 70.2 59.3 44.3  United States 83.8 71.8 61.7 
St Vincent & Gren. 88.2 62.2 11.8  Kazakhstan 89.5 72.8 13.3 
Bahrain 77.7 63.6 40.7  Lao PDR 77.6 77.2 77.2 
Gambia 88.2 64.4 10.5  Solomon Islands 77.2 78.6 79.6 
Large 
GAP 
>50 
points 
(24 
count-
ries in 
group in 
1995-
2001) 
Singapore 67.8 64.7 42.4  
Large 
GAP 
>50 
points 
(conti-
nued) 
(24 
count-
ries in 
group in 
1995-
2001) 
Oman - 78.9 61.7 
- Not applicable. 
 
 
Table 16.  Regional basic workers’ rights GAPs, sorted by 1995-2001 averages 
Regions, followed by GAP points Basic workers’ rights GAP 
Average 1985-94 
GAP 
Average 1995-
2001 GAP 
2002 GAP 
Africa 43 34 20
Americas 33 27 21
- North America (Canada and US) 74 60 49
- Latin America 29 24 18
- Caribbean 35 27 20
Asia and the Pacific, incl. Arab States 60 49 33
Europe  41 18 15
Total  44 31 21
 
 
The system documents empirically that a majority of member States have encountered increasing 
IMPLEMENTATION problems in respect of the Organization’s core values since the onset of 
contemporary globalization.  This finding is troubling.  It suggests that the Organization has not 
aimed its resources sufficiently at what matters most to it. 
 
Chapter 5. Some correlations with other indicators 
 
To test the validity of the system constructed here, one could correlate the size of all three 
indicators – AHERENCE, IMPLEMENTATION and overall GAPs – with pertinent other data.  
Correlations should be performed at the level of countries rather than regions to capture 
variations in as many situations as possible.  To simplify the presentation, correlations are limited 
to GAP averages for the recent seven-year period 1995 to 2001, on the one hand, and comparable  
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Table 17. Correlations between GAPs and selected other indicators*  
Variables  
(Everything else is  equal) 
Overall GAPs 
1995-2001 average 
ADHERENCE GAPs  
1995-2001 average 
IMPLEMENTATION GAPs 
1995-2001 average 
Capacity  factor  
Assessed contributions to 
ILO budget in % in 2000, 
166 countries.  
Expected: negative 
 
Actual: 0.08 
Not significant 
Expected: negative 
 
Actual: 0.08 
Not significant 
Expected: negative 
Actual: -0.02 √ 
Not significant 
Foreign direct investment  
Share of country in global 
FDI inflows 1993-99,  
137 countries.   
Expected: negative 
 
Actual: 0.16 
Not significant 
Expected: negative 
 
Actual: 0.17 
Significance level: low 
Expected: negative 
Actual: -0.08 √ 
Not significant 
UNDP Human 
Development Index  
HDI = 2000 score,  
157 countries.   
Expected: none or weak 
negative 
Actual: -0.24 √ 
Significance level: medium 
Expected: none or weak 
negative 
Actual: -0.20 √ 
Significance level: low 
Expected: none or weak 
negative 
Actual: -0.10 √ 
Not significant 
Freedom House  
Average of civil liberties and 
political rights index1993-
97, reversed scaling,  
155 countries.   
Expected: negative 
Actual: -0.38 √ 
Significance level: high 
Expected: negative 
Actual: -0.35 √ 
Significance level: high 
Expected: negative 
Actual: -0.09 √ 
Not significant 
SES Voice Representation 
Security Index  
Normalized index 1999,  
97 countries.   
Expected: negative 
Actual: -0.37 √ 
Significance level: high 
Expected: negative 
Actual: -0.30 √ 
Significance level: high 
Expected: negative 
Actual: -0.22 √ 
Significance level: low 
SES Decent Work Index  
Normalized index 1999,  
75 countries.  
Expected: negative 
Actual: -0.49 √ 
Significance level: high 
Expected: negative 
Actual: -0.41 √ 
Significance level: high 
Expected: negative 
Actual: -0.20 √ 
Significance level: low 
* Pearson product moment correlation coefficients, range –1 to +1. 
Significance level: high = 1 per cent, medium = 5 per cent, low = 10 per cent. 
 
 
data for other factors.  Table 17 summarizes the expected relationships and records Pearson 
correlation coefficients as well as significance levels.  Pearson product moment correlation 
coefficients are a dimensionless index that ranges from -1.0 (perfect inverse or negative 
relationship) to 1.0 (perfect positive relationship), which reflects the extent of a linear 
relationship between two sets of data.  A tick (√) indicates that the expected (negative or positive) 
relationship holds empirically.   
 
The relationship between the capacity factor used in this paper and variations in GAPs – the 
bigger a country’s underlying capacity, the larger its contribution to the ILO budget and the 
smaller should be its GAPs – is not borne out empirically.  The fact that capacity does not 
differentiate the countries as much as assumed could already be seen from the shaded tables.  
This does not, however, invalidate the reasoning put forward.  It suggests either that the actual 
yardstick used does not measure countries’ capacity well or that other variables intervene 
strongly.  Both appear to play a role.  Capacity is actually reflected somewhat in the correlations 
with UNDP’s Human Development Index (see below).  Political will seems to me to be the most 
important intervening factor because, under the table’s capacity factor, the overall GAP and the 
ADHERENCE GAP have the “wrong” sign.  This suggests that the political commitment 
embodied in ADHERENCE, which is the primary determinant of the overall GAP, plays a very 
large role.  Thus, while capacity matters, it is overshadowed in the ILO by the willingness of 
member States to be in good standing with the Organization. 
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The other sub-set of relationships that does not hold empirically concerns foreign direct 
investment (FDI).  Here, an indirect and negative relationship can be postulated on the 
assumption that foreign investors, everything else being equal, prefer to go to countries that are 
characterized by good governance as opposed to countries where legislation might not have a 
high value or might not be applied strictly in practice.  Legislation concerning labour being an 
element of overall governance, good governance in this field should be reflected in low GAPs.  
In turn, low GAPs should be associated with high FDI inflows.  If one further assumes that 
correct application of existing laws matters more to foreign investors than formal legislation, the 
relationships should be stronger for IMPLEMENTATION than for either the overall GAP or 
ADHERENCE.52  The correlation results in table 17 are similar to those of the capacity factor in 
that the overall GAP and the ADHERENCE GAP have the “wrong” sign, and the 
IMPLEMENTATION GAP has the right sign but at a marginal and insignificant level.  Non-
correlation might be explained by reference to intervening factors on which investors place 
greater emphasis such as property, company and copyright legislation, wages differences or the 
size and anticipated growth of a country’s market.  Furthermore, the bulk of FDI flows takes 
place between a limited number of countries, chiefly advanced market economy countries.  It is 
probably a combination of all of these factors, including labour law and practices, which 
determines investors’ preferences and accounts for the empirical results in table 17. 
 
Further correlations make use of two widely used indicators. One is UNDP’s Human 
Development Index (HDI).53  What should one expect?  In principle, there should be no 
relationship because the HDI and the GAP system measure two quite different things.  At best, a 
weak inverse correlation might exist between, on the one side, increases in countries’ capacities 
due to improvements in human developments (longevity, literacy and GDP per capita) and, on 
the other, decreasing GAP scores.  This seems to be borne out by table 17. 
 
The second indicator is Freedom House’s ratings of civil liberties and political rights.54  A direct 
but negative relationship can be expected, everything else being equal: the more democratic a 
country, the less GAPs there should be of any kind.  The coefficients in table 17 turn out as 
postulated, though they are significant only for the overall GAP and the ADHERENCE GAP. 
 
Finally, two sets of ILO data are used to test correlations.  One is the Socio-Economic Security 
Programme’s recently elaborated Voice Representation Security Index, the other its overall 
Decent Work Index that is nearing completion.55  As regards Voice Representation Security, one 
could argue that the more workers are able to organize freely and defend their interests 
 
52 The data on FDI are percentages of total world inflows of FDI per country, averaged for the period 1993-99, 
kindly made available by D. Kucera.  For his work in this context, see footnote 5. 
53 Data from UNDP: Deepening democracy…, op. cit., table 1. 
54 Freedom House: Freedom in the world: The annual survey of political rights and civil liberties, 1998-1999 (New 
York, 1999).  Again, I am grateful to D. Kucera for making available his own data.  He averaged Freedom House’s 
civil liberties and political rights scores and reversed the scaling, i.e. his data give higher values to more democratic 
countries, whereas Freedom House itself uses a scale with a value of 1 for strongest rights and a value of 7 for 
weakest rights. 
55 The work of this Programme is referred to in footnote 5 above.  GAPs and the SES Programme’s indicators are 
likely to be auto-correlated to the extent that the latter uses ratification as an input indicator.  However, auto-
correlation is probably very small due to the fact that the Voice Representation Security Index and the Decent Work 
Index comprise, respectively, 13 and 6 components; and only two of the former’s 13 dimensions are ratifications – of 
Convention Nos. 87 and 98 – that are given a low weight relative to the other factors. 
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independently, everything else being equal, the lower should be all three GAPs.  The coefficients 
in table 17 confirm this at satisfactory levels. 
 
Empirically even stronger is the relationship between the Socio-Economic Security Programme’s 
Decent Work Index and GAPs.  The anticipated inverse relationship, according to which 
countries with higher achievements of Decent Work should be characterized by lower GAPs, is 
empirically well supported in table 17. 
 
In summarizing the table it can be said that 14 of the 18 relationships seem to hold, although at 
various significance levels.  This testifies to the validity of the indicator system constructed in 
this paper.  The fact that all relationships with IMPLEMENTATION GAPs have the expected 
sign – even though most are, statistically speaking, not significant or significant only at low 
levels – is re-assuring in that it confirms the validity of the selection of the indicator’s 
supervisory and complaints dimensions. 
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Annex I. ILO membership questions relevant to the indicators56 
Year Country Explanation and scoring 
1985 All member States except  
- Viet Nam 
- Czech and Slovak Republic 
- USSR 
- Yugoslavia 
- German Democratic Republic 
 
- Yemen Arab Republic 
- People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen 
(153 member States). 
Membership terminated (see under 1992). 
Czech and Slovak Republic split in 1993.  Not scored. 
Dissolved in 1991.  Not scored. 
Broke up early 1990s.  Not scored (see under 2001). 
German Democratic Republic joined the Federal Republic of 
Germany in 1990.  Germany scored as from 1985. 
Yemen Arab Republic not scored. 
People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen not scored. 
1986-89 No change - 
1990 Republic of Yemen 
 
Yemen Arab Rep. and People’s Democratic Rep. of Yemen 
united new name of Rep. of Yemen.  Scored as from 1992.57 
Albania 
Korea, Republic of 
Latvia 
1991 
Lithuania 
Readmitted. Non-functioning 1997-2001. Scored as from 2002. 
New member. Scored as from 1992. 
Rejoined. Scored as from 1992. 
Rejoined. Scored as from 1992. 
Viet Nam 
Armenia 
Azerbaijan 
Croatia 
Estonia 
Kyrgyzstan 
Moldova 
Russian Federation 
Slovenia 
1992 
Uzbekistan 
Readmitted.  Scored as from 1993. 
New member.  Scored as from 1993. 
New member.  Scored as from 1993. 
New member.  Scored as from 1993. 
New member.  Scored as from 1993. 
New member.  Scored as from 1993. 
New member.  Scored as from 1993. 
New member.  Scored as from 1993. 
New member.  Scored as from 1993. 
New member.  Scored as from 1993. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Czech Republic 
Eritrea 
Georgia 
Kazakhstan 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
Slovak Republic 
Tajikistan 
1993 
Turkmenistan 
New member. Non-functioning till 1995.  Scored as from 1997. 
New member.  Scored as from 1994. 
New member.  Scored as from 1994. 
New member.  Scored as from 1994. 
New member.  Scored as from 1994. 
New member.  Scored as from 1994. 
New member.  Scored as from 1994. 
New member. Non-functioning till 2000.  Scored as from 2002. 
New member.  Scored as from 1994. 
Oman 1994 
South Africa 
New member.  Scored as from 1995. 
South Africa resumed membership.  Scored as from 1995. 
1996 St. Kitts and Nevis New member.  Scored as from 1997. 
1997-99 No change - 
2000 Kiribati New member.  Scored as from 2001. 
2001 Yugoslavia (renamed Serbia and Montenegro in 
February 2003) 
New member (predecessor States disregarded).   
Not scored. 
2002 No change (175 member States) 
 
 
56 Regarding non-functioning States, see section 1.7 above. 
57 The Republic of Yemen accepted the obligations previously incurred by the two predecessor States, which had 
ratified Convention Nos. 29, 87, 98 100, 105 and 111.  Its first reporting obligations arose in 1992. 
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Annex II. ILO supervisory or complaints procedures 
   not retained for the indicator system 
 
Bearing in mind the criteria set out in chapters 1.3 and 3.2, a selection had to be made among the 
ILO’s multiple procedures and their several forms.  Why have Commissions of Inquiry, Fact 
Finding and Conciliation Commissions on Freedom of Association, Direct Contact missions, 
General Surveys prepared by the Committee of Experts or Special Cases and further 
pronouncements by the Committee of Experts and the Application Committee not been retained? 
 
One reason is that some of these procedures are rarely or irregularly invoked or that they involve 
only a limited number of countries.  In more than 80 years of ILO history, Commissions of 
Inquiry have so far been concerned only with ten countries:  Chile, Côte d’Ivoire, Dominican 
Republic and Haiti, Germany, Greece, Liberia, Nicaragua, Poland and Romania.  The Fact 
Finding and Conciliation Commission is today practically defunct. Questionnaire-based General 
surveys of where countries stand in relation to ratified or unratified Conventions and the 
Recommendations accompanying them are drafted at such irregular intervals that they are 
entirely unsuited, and they suffer from incomplete coverage due to a low response rate. Footnotes 
by the Committee of Experts, which may request a government to send a detailed report in 
advance of the date when a report would otherwise be due, are also disregarded because reporting 
requirements are captured by ADHERENCE.  Another kind of footnote, asking the government 
to supply full particulars to the Conference, is likewise not instrumentalised for the purposes of 
constructing IMPLEMENTATION because of its uncertain substantive and procedural 
implications. 
 
Representations are a form of complaint that one might be tempted to include in workers’ rights 
indicators. According to Article 24 of ILO’s Constitution, employers’ or workers’ organization 
can ask the Governing Body whether any member State that has ratified a Convention effectively 
observes its provisions.  However, two problems render representations unsuitable for the GAP 
system. One is that this instrument tends to be used mostly by trade unions from advanced 
industrial countries. The other is the relative small number of representations.  Since the 
beginning of the review period of the GAP system, only nine representations concerned 
Convention No. 29, seven Convention No. 87, six Convention No. 98, three Convention No. 100, 
six Convention No. 105, 18 Convention No. 111 and two Convention No. 13858. This makes 
representations fail the test of wide applicability on a non-discriminatory basis.  Furthermore, 
some of the representations include legislative aspects that the Committee of Experts gets asked 
to deal with, in which case they do become part of the GAP system. 
 
The Application Committee of the International Labour Conference sometimes takes matters 
further than the Committee of Experts can.  The reasons for doing so could be either an 
unresponsive government or the inherent gravity of questions.  One form in which matters may 
be taken further is when the Application Committee refers to a case in a special paragraph 
towards the end of the Introduction of its report to the International Labour Conference.  Special 
cases have been identified by the Application Committee since 1957 where the discrepancies 
between the real world and the ideal world of ILO standards, principles and rights were so 
fundamental or had been discussed for such a long time that, in the view of this political body, 
the Conference’s attention should be called to them.  The other form in which the Application 
 
58  See Representations (art. 24) under ILOLEX Advanced Query Form on the ILO’s public website: 
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/iloquery.htm. 
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Committee takes matters further is when it points to a “continued failure to implement” a 
particular Convention.59  Although core Conventions have been the object of priority attention by 
the Application Committee, both “special cases” and “continued failure to implement” are left 
aside here because they concern a small number of countries.  During the review period, only 20 
countries’ compliance problems were pinpointed by the Application Committee – Belarus, 
Central African Republic, Cameroon, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Ethiopia, 
Guatemala, India, Iran, Morocco, Myanmar, Nigeria, Panama, Pakistan, Romania, Sudan, 
Thailand, Turkey and Venezuela, with a number of these countries being singled out several 
times. 
 
The Application Committee is not the only body to express serious concern.  The CFA also refers 
to “serious and/or urgent cases which the Committee draws to the attention of the Governing 
Body”.  Urgent cases generally involve matters of human life, liberty or new or changing 
conditions that affect the freedom of action of a trade union movement as a whole.   The CFA in 
recent years has been using the initial paragraphs of the Introduction of its report to the 
Governing Body to express serious concern.  However, since this practice by the CFA is 
relatively new – it took that step for the first time in 1995 –– and does not cover most of the years 
of the indicator system, the CFA’s expression of serious concern cannot be instrumentalised with 
respect to the IMPLEMENTATION indicator.   
 
One could put differential numbers on the type of complaints handled by the CFA, which have 
been categorized by the Committee for some time.60  For instance, general denial of the right to 
organize could be judged to be more important than refusal to recognize union delegates in a 
specific enterprise, which could be judged to be more important than the dismissal of a single 
trade unionist following strike action. A scale could be established and points could be accorded. 
But there is no objectified ILO categorization of the relative importance of one kind of case 
relative to another.  For the indicator system proposed in this paper, such a specification is 
actually entirely unnecessary; but one could pursue such work for different purposes and by 
making transparent how much weight one factor has relative to others.  
 
59 Recently, Myanmar’s problems with Convention No. 87 and Sudan’s with Convention No. 29 have been the object 
of the designation “continued failure to implement”. 
60 For an exemplification, see the pie chart portraying allegations examined by type of restriction in ILO: Your voice 
at work, Global report under the Follow-up to the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work 
(Geneva: ILO, 2000), p. 26.  
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List Working Papers of the InFocus Programme on Promoting the Declaration 
 
 
No. 1 Bonded labour in Pakistan, by Aly Ercelawn and Muhammad Nauman, June 2001. 
 
No. 2 A perspective plan to eliminate forced labour in India, by L. Mishra, July 2001. 
 
No. 3 Défis et opportunités pour la Déclaration au Bénin, by Bertin C. Amoussou, August 
2001. 
 
No. 4 Identification des obstacles à la mise en œuvre des principes et droits fondamentaux 
au travail et propositions et solutions au Niger, by Moussa Oumanou, August 2001. 
 
No. 5 Égalité de rémunération au Mali, by Dominique Meurs, August 2001. 
 
No. 6 Défis et opportunités pour la Déclaration au Burkina Faso, by Seydou Konate, 
September 2001. 
 
No. 7 Child labour in the Russian Federation, by Svetlana Stephenson, June 2002. 
 
No. 8 Intersecting risks: HIV/AIDS and Child Labour, by Bill Rau, June 2002. 
 
No. 9 Los principios y derechos fundamentales en el trabajo: su valor, su viabilidad, su 
incidencia y su importancia como elementos de progreso económico y de justicia 
social, de María Luz Vega Ruiz y Daniel Martínez, Julio 2002. 
 
No. 10 Collective bargaining and equality: Theorizing the links between Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work, by Adelle Blackett and Colleen Sheppard, September 
2002. 
 
No. 11 Annotated bibliography of forced/bonded labour in India, by Mr. L. Mishra, 
December 2002. 
 
No. 12 Minimum wages in Latin America: Identifying the employment and pay equity effects, 
by D. Grimshaw and M. Miozzo, March 2003. 
 
No. 13 Gaps in basic workers’ rights: Measuring international adherence to and 
implementation of the Organization’s values with public ILO data, by W. R. Böhning, 
May 2003. 
 
 
